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ABSTRACT
The three essays in this dissertation examine how differences across firms shape macroe-
conomic outcomes. These essays combine models of heterogeneous firms with detailed
micro data to answer long-running questions about the U.S. economy: how well are re-
sources allocated across firms? Does globalization drive income inequality? How large are
the economic spillovers of firm reputation? Each essay highlights a different aspect of firm
or industry heterogeneity that meaningfully changes the answer to the question at hand.
Chapter 1, from a work with Sui-Jade Ho, quantifies misallocation in the U.S. manu-
facturing sector using a structural model and restricted microdata from the U.S. Census.
The estimated misallocation—the distance between aggregate productivity and a frontier
where marginal products are equalized—declined 13 percent between 1982 and 2007.
Key features of the model and estimation are markups and returns to scale that vary across
industries and time. Strikingly, imposing a common markup and constant returns to scale,
as is commonly done in the literature, implies that misallocation increased 29 percent over
the same period. The essay rationalizes these discrepancies and shows that they arise from
overlooking variation in markups and returns to scale.
Chapter 2, from a work with Lin Ma, provides causal evidence that access to global
markets leads to a higher executive-to worker pay ratio within the firm. Specifically, the
essay uses China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization as a trade shock to show
that firms that exported to China prior to 2001 subsequently exported more, grew larger,
and grew more unequal in terms of executive-to-worker pay. Counterfactual exercises in
the accompanying structural model suggest that trade and FDI liberalizations can explain
around 52 percent of the surge in top 0.1 percent income shares in the U.S. data between
1988 and 2008.
Chapter 3, joint with Ruediger Bachmann and Gabriel Ehrlich, uses the 2015 Volkswa-
gen emissions scandal as a natural experiment to provide causal evidence that group repu-
tation externalities matter for firms. The essay estimates that the scandal reduced the U.S.
sales of non-Volkswagen German auto manufacturers by approximately 76,000 vehicles
over the following year, leading to a loss of approximately $3.7 billion of revenue. These
declines in sales accompanied declines in stock returns and in social-media sentiment to-
xii
ward these firms. Volkswagen’s malfeasance materially harmed the group reputation of
“German car engineering” in the United States.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Returns to Scale, Productivity Measurement, and Trends
in U.S. Manufacturing Misallocation
From a work with Sui-Jade Ho
Abstract
Aggregate productivity suffers when workers and machines are not matched with their
most productive uses. This paper builds a model that features industry-specific markups,
industry-specific returns to scale, and establishment-specific distortions, and uses it to mea-
sure the extent of this misallocation in the economy. Applying the model to restricted U.S.
census microdata on the manufacturing sector suggests that misallocation declined by 13%
between 1982 and 2007. The jointly estimated markup and returns to scale parameters
vary substantially across industries. Furthermore, while the average markup has been
relatively constant, the average returns to scale declined over this period. The finding
of declining misallocation starkly contrasts the 29% increase implied by the widely used
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model, which assumes that all establishments charge the same
markup and have constant returns to scale. Accounting for the variation in markups and
returns to scale leads to the divergence of misallocation estimates in this paper from those
implied by the Hsieh-Klenow model.
JEL Codes: D24, E23, E25, O47
Keywords:returns to scale, productivity, misallocation, manufacturing
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1.1 Introduction
Aggregate productivity retreats from its frontier when workers and machines mismatch
with their most productive uses. Formalized elegantly by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008),
this notion of misallocation has the potential to explain why countries differ in their in-
comes, or why aggregate productivity changes over time. Yet, quantifying the extent of
this misallocation is challenging, in part because we do not observe productivity directly.
Most commonly, we must infer an establishment’s total factor productivity from its rev-
enue. This inference is a two-step process: first, we must deduce how establishments set
prices, so we can map revenue to output; then, we must deduce how they produce, so we
can map output to productivity.
To infer productivity and measure misallocation, this paper builds a quantitative model
in which markups of price over marginal cost and returns to scale differ across industries
and time. We implement the model on restricted U.S. Census microdata covering the
U.S. manufacturing sector from 1977 through 2007. In the process, we jointly estimate
markups and returns to scale for individual industries within U.S. manufacturing. Our
estimates show that industries differ meaningfully in both markups and returns to scale,
with standard deviations across industries of about one-third the level of the respective
parameters. Moreover, while the average markup remained relatively constant over this
period, the average returns to scale fell, starting off as increasing and ending as nearly
constant. We use these parameters to infer productivity, and find that misallocation in U.S.
manufacturing declined 13% between 1982 and 2007.
Allowing for heterogeneous markups and returns to scale is crucial when estimating
productivity and misallocation. The widely-used Hsieh and Klenow (2009) model is a spe-
cial case of our framework in which all industries have a common markup and constant
returns to scale. Figure 1 contrasts the downward trend in misallocation under our esti-
mated parameters with the upward trend implied by the Hsieh-Klenow assumptions. Both
measures of misallocation answer the question: how much more productive would the
U.S. manufacturing sector be if it were as misallocated today as it was in 1982? If misal-
location by this measure has increased, productivity today would be higher at 1982 levels
of misallocation. Indeed, as the dashed red line shows, the assumptions of a common
markup and constant returns to scale suggest a 29% increase in misallocation over the last
25 years. By contrast, the solid blue line traces out the declining trend in misallocation
from our model.
We arrive at the declining trend in misallocation by estimating markups and returns to
scale using a control-function approach rooted in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn
2
Figure 1.1: Misallocation in U.S. Manufacturing
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Note: Misallocation is the distance between aggregate productivity and a frontier where marginal revenue
products are equalized across establishments in each industry. Positive (negative) values indicate an increase
(decrease) in misallocation relative to 1982.
and Petrin (2003). Our estimating procedure infers markups and returns to scale even
in datasets, like the U.S. Census microdata, where we observe revenues, but not output
or prices. For this procedure, we derive a model-based estimating equation that relates
establishment revenue to its inputs and to industry size, as in De Loecker (2011). We map
the reduced-form revenue elasticities to the markup and returns-to-scale parameters using
model equations. In line with prior empirical work [e.g. Hall (1990), Basu and Fernald
(1997), Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006), Broda and Weinstein (2006)], we find that
both markups and returns to scale indeed vary across industries. Moreover, the average
markup for U.S. manufacturing has remained relatively constant over time, while returns
to scale have declined, starting off as increasing in 1982 and ending as nearly constant by
2007.
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We show that the decline in returns to scale is the key to rationalizing the different
trends in misallocation between our model and the Hsieh-Klenow model. In short, ignor-
ing the variation in markups and returns to scale leads to measures of productivity that
conflate productivity and distortion. These conflated measures of productivity lead to in-
correct inferences about the extent to which the most productive establishments bear the
largest distortions, and hence lead to incorrect measures of misallocation. Our estimates
suggest that the Hsieh-Klenow model understates misallocation on average. Over time, as
the assumption of constant returns better fits the data for the U.S. manufacturing sector,
the Hsieh-Klenow model understates misallocation less and less. This better fit drives the
upward trend in misallocation under a common markup and constant returns.
Outside their relevance for measuring productivity and misallocation, the patterns we
document for markups and returns to scale also fit with the recent literature on the de-
cline of the labor share, and, more broadly, the changing division of value added. For
instance, a large literature documents a thirty-year decline in labor’s share of value added
both for the United States and for other economies [e.g Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013),
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Barkai (2016)]; we find this decline to be even larger
for the U.S. manufacturing sector. Within that literature, using different approaches, both
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Barkai (2016) suggest that the decline in labor’s
share of value added might not have been offset by an equivalent increase in the capi-
tal share. The resulting implication is that the share of profits in value added increased
over time. Indeed, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) find evidence of rising profit rates
both among U.S. publicly traded firms and in the national income accounts. For the U.S.
manufacturing sector, we find that the rising profit share has been driven primarily by the
decline in the returns to scale.
After presenting the main results, we generalize our model further, in the spirit of Atke-
son and Burstein (2008), and introduce markups that vary across establishments in an
industry; this added generality supplements the work of a growing literature that con-
tinues to refine the measurement of distortions (see Hopenhayn (2014) for a review). We
show that, conditional on an industry-specific demand elasticity, the additional variation in
markups changes the marginal revenue products of establishments and hence their mea-
sured distortions. Taking this additional feature to the data, we find that the levels of
misallocation are lower, and that the divergent trends in misallocation between out model
and the Hsieh-Klenow model persist. In changing the level of measured misallocation, the
generalization to variable markups within an industry is similar to other work where richer
depictions of establishment behavior reduce the level of measured misallocation [e.g. Bar-
telsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2013), Asker, Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2014),
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Gopinath et al. (2017)], and those who emphasize measurement issues that make inferring
misallocation challenging [e.g. White, Reiter and Petrin (2016), Bils, Klenow and Ruane
(2017), Haltiwanger, Kulick and Syverson (2018)].
Within the recent literature on misallocation, our paper’s closest counterparts are two
works that emphasize the importance of measurement within the Hsieh-Klenow model:
Bils, Klenow and Ruane (2017) and Haltiwanger, Kulick and Syverson (2018). The former
explains the upward trend in U.S. manufacturing misallocation as an artefact of measure-
ment error that increased over time. While we think measurement error is an important
topic to address in the microdata, we show in Appendix A.4 that the Bils, Klenow and
Ruane (2017) procedure risks conflating measurement error with model misspecification
if returns to scale are not constant: ignoring a decline in returns to scale, like the one
we document, could lead an econometrician to infer an increase in measurement error.
The latter paper, Haltiwanger, Kulick and Syverson (2018), uses eleven manufacturing
products to show that deviations from production and demand assumptions in the Hsieh-
Klenow model lead to estimates of establishment-level distortions that behave differently
than the distortions in the baseline model. We share their emphasis on deviations from
standard Hsieh-Klenow assumption and view the works as complementary.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we derive a measure
of misallocation in a model that allows for variation in markups and returns to scale;
we then develop a toolkit to understand the discrepancies in measured productivity and
misallocation that arise from ignoring the variation in these parameters. We map the
model to the data, detail the estimation procedure, and present the estimates of markups
and returns to scale in section 3. Section 4 presents our measure of misallocation and
uses the toolkit to explain why our measure deviates from the Hsieh-Klenow measure
that assumes a common markup and constant returns. Section 5 highlights the robust
difference between the trends in misallocation in the two models by showing that this
difference persists for six meaningful changes in model structure and estimation. Section
6 concludes.
1.2 Model
We build a model that features industry-specific markups, industry-specific returns to
scale, and establishment-specific distortions. We then show how ignoring the variation in
markups and returns to scale leads to measures of productivity that conflate productivity
and distortions, and leads to incorrect measures of misallocation.
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1.2.1 Deriving a Measure of Misallocation
In this section, we derive a measure of misallocation for the aggregate economy, ac-
counting for industry variation in markups and returns to scale. We measure misallocation
as the distance between aggregate productivity and a frontier where inputs are reallocated
so that marginal revenue products are equal across establishments in each industry. We
proceed in three steps. First, we show the aggregation in the model, allowing us to map
from the distortions that establishments face to aggregate misallocation. Second, we show
how establishments optimally respond to the distortions they face; these expressions al-
low us to characterize establishment behavior when we reallocate resources and change
the distortions that they face. Third, we derive a measure of misallocation by compar-
ing aggregate productivity before and after resources are reallocated. Since much of this
derivation is standard in the literature, here we highlight the structure of the model and
the key inputs into the measure of misallocation. We refer interested readers to appendix
A for more details.
Aggregation
A representative firm aggregates the output Yi of I different industries using a Cobb-
Douglas production technology, and sells the aggregate output Y in a perfectly-competitive
market, as in (1.1):
Aggregate Y =
I∏
i=1
Y θii with
I∑
i=1
θi = 1 P =
I∏
i=1
(Pi/θi)
θi = 1. (1.1)
Cost minimization by this aggregating firm implies that the elasticities θi from the produc-
tion function correspond to the share of each industry’s value added (PiYi) in aggregate
value added (PY ). This insight allows us to define the aggregate price index P , which we
choose as the numeraire.
Within each industry, an aggregating firm combines the output Yie of Ni differentiated
establishments using a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) technology, as in (1.2):
Industry Yi =
(
Ni∑
e=1
Y
σi−1
σi
ie
) σi
σi−1
Pi =
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
1
Pie
)σi−1] −1σi−1
. (1.2)
The CES aggregator implies that each establishment in the industry faces a downward-
sloping demand curve for its output. Cost minimization by the industry aggregating firm
leads to the standard CES price index Pi. Note that that the elasticity σi can potentially
vary across industries.
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Each establishment in the industry produces value-added output Yie by combining its
total factor productivity Aie, capital Kie, and labor Lie using the Cobb-Douglas production
function in equation (1.3):
Establishment Yie = AieK
αKi
ie L
αLi
ie , αi = αKi + αLi . (1.3)
The returns to scale in production are αi, the sum of output elasticities αKi and αLi; when
returns to scale differ from unity, we have non-constant returns to scale. Moreover, returns
to scale can differ across industries.
Optimization
Each establishment maximizes profits piie by choosing how much capital and labor to
hire:
piie = PieYie − (1 + τLie)wiLie − (1 + τKie)RiKie. (1.4)
The establishment takes as given the input prices Ri and wi from perfectly competitive
input markets; however, the effective cost of an input varies across establishments, with
τKie and τLie capturing the input-specific distortions for capital and labor. Consider, for
instance, regulations that mandate the benefits that establishments have to provide to
workers. These regulations change the effective cost of hiring labor. If two establishments
are subject to different regulations, then these establishments also differ in their τLie.
Establishments that face large distortions have high marginal revenue products. The
first-order conditions from profit maximization, shown in equation (1.5) for capital and
equation (1.6) for labor,
MRPKie =
αKi
σi
σi−1
PieYie
Kie
= (1 + τKie)Ri (1.5)
MRPLie =
αLi
σi
σi−1
PieYie
Lie
= (1 + τLie)wi, (1.6)
show that establishments trade off the marginal contribution to revenue of a given input
(MRPKie or MRPLie) against the effective cost of hiring it. For instance, an establish-
ment facing a cost-increasing labor regulation has a large τLie; this establishment will hire
labor until the contribution to revenue of the last unit hired, MRPLie, exactly offsets the
effective cost of hiring labor (1 + τLie)wi. In short, faced with larger distortion, the estab-
lishment requires larger marginal revenue products to justify hiring inputs. Moreover, in
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the absence of distortions, marginal revenue products are equalized across establishments
in an industry. This notion will help us define a productivity frontier and subsequently
misallocation.
Optimal responses to larger distortions lead establishments to charge higher prices.
The establishment price in equation (1.7) is a markup over marginal cost:
Pie =
σi
σi − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
[(
Ri
αKi
)αKi ( wi
αLi
)αLi] 1αi (
Yie
) 1−αi
αi
[
(1 + τKie)
αKi (1 + τLie)
αLi
Aie
] 1
αi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Cost
. (1.7)
The model allows the markup σi/(σi−1) in equation (1.7) to be industry specific. Further-
more, the introduction of potentially non-constant returns to scale allows the marginal cost
to change with the establishment’s scale of production. Under the standard assumption of
constant returns to scale (αi = 1), marginal cost is constant and independent of output Yie.
However, if returns to scale deviate from unity (αi 6= 1), then marginal cost is increasing
in output for decreasing returns to scale, and vice versa. Lastly, larger distortions increase
the marginal cost of production and thus force the establishment to charge a higher price.1
An establishment responds to large distortions by choosing a smaller input bundle and
shrinking in size. Since much of this paper is about the allocation of resources across
establishments in an industry, the relevant measure of size captures the establishment’s
value added relative to the value added of the industry, sie in equation (1.8):
sie =
PieYie
PiYi
=
[
Aie
(
1 + τK,i
1 + τKie
)αKi ( 1 + τL,i
1 + τLie
)αLi] 1σi
σi−1−αi
Ni∑
e=1
[
Aie
(
1 + τK,i
1 + τKie
)αKi ( 1 + τL,i
1 + τLie
)αLi] 1σi
σi−1−αi
. (1.8)
For instance, if the labor distortion faced by the establishment (1 + τLie) increases relative
to the average labor distortion in the industry (1 + τLi), the establishment declines in size.
We can also see from equation (1.8) that the size of the establishment after we real-
locate resources depends solely on its productivity Aie. From the earlier first-order con-
ditions, we know that equalizing marginal products is akin to equalizing distortions. The
reallocation of resources would then eliminate the relative distortions in equation (1.8),
and the counterfactual size of the sie|τ=τ would be strictly increasing in productivity Aie.
1Formally, this statement is based on a rewriting of the price that eliminates the output term Yie; we show
that Pie = ΩPi
[
(1 + τKie)
αKi (1 + τLie)
αLi
Aie
] 1σi−1
σi
σi−1−αi with ΩPi an industry-specific constant.
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Misallocation
By combining the model aggregation with the establishment responses to distortions,
we follow the literature and measure misallocation as the distance between aggregate
productivity and its frontier. At this frontier, all establishments in the industry have the
same marginal revenue products. The more that actual productivity lags from its frontier,
the larger is the measure of misallocation.
Φi =
TFPi
∣∣
τ=τ¯
TFPi
=
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
Aie × ΩTFP,τ=τ¯ ,ie
)σi−1] 1σi−1
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
Aie × ΩTFP,ie
)σi−1] 1σi−1 . (1.9)
Formally, industry misallocation Φi in equation (1.9) captures the distance between ac-
tual industry total factor productivity TFPi and its frontier where distortions, and hence
marginal revenue products, are equalized across establishments TFPi|τ=τ¯ . Since indus-
try output is produced using a CES technology, as per equation (1.2), the industry total
factor productivity TFPi is also a CES aggregate of establishment productivity Aie. The
scaling factor ΩTFP,ie captures the extent to which each establishment shapes industry
productivity. When we reallocate resources to equalize marginal revenue products, each
establishment’s scaling factor changes from ΩTFP,ie to ΩTFP,τ=τ¯ ,ie. We now provide some
intuition about this change in scaling parameters and then define them in terms of model
objects.
Since a highly distorted establishment becomes more integral to industry productivity
when its distortions are removed, the extent of misallocation depends on which establish-
ments bear the greatest distortions. If the most productive establishments also bear the
largest distortions, we measure more misallocation than if less productive establishments
bear the same distortions. In short, the correlation between productivity and distortion
shapes the extent of misallocation, a notion first emphasized by Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008).2 In our model, this notion relies on the claim that the scaling factor ΩTFP,τ=τ¯ ,ie
increases more relative to the scaling factor ΩTFP,ie when an establishment is highly dis-
torted. We substantiate this claim below after relating the scaling factors to model objects.
The scaling factors are based on establishments’ revenue productivity TFPRie, which
2Hopenhayn (2014) makes clear that a discussion of correlations in this setting requires the comparison
of the same proportional distortion. In his summary and re-framing of the literature, correlations matter
because the same proportional distortion τLie would displace more labor at a productive establishment than
at an unproductive one.
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summarizes the impact of distortions on the establishments. As in Foster, Haltiwanger and
Syverson (2008), TFPRie measures an establishment’s ability to generate revenue per
input bundle:
TFPRie =
PieYie
K
αKi
ie L
αLi
ie
= PieAie. (1.10)
Equation (1.10) highlights the implication that, when comparing two establishments with
the same physical productivity Aie, a higher revenue productivity TFPRie reflects a higher
price. As we showed earlier, a higher price reflects larger distortions.
As the model focuses on the allocation of resources across establishments, the scaling
factors compare the average revenue productivity of the industry, TFPRi, with the rev-
enue productivity of an establishment, TFPRie. Equation (1.11) shows that this relative
revenue productivity depends on the size of the establishment and the relative distortions
that it faces. In a comparison of two equally productive establishments, the more distorted
establishment would have a smaller TFPRi/TFPRie ratio. Equation (1.12) shows that
the relative revenue productivity after equalizing marginal products is a function of the
post-reallocation size of the establishment.
ΩTFP,ie =
TFPRi
TFPRie
=
(
PieYie
PiYi
)αi−1( 1 + τK,i
1 + τKie
)αKi ( 1 + τL,i
1 + τLie
)αLi
(1.11)
ΩTFP,τ=τ¯ ,ie =
TFPRi
TFPRie
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
=
(
PieYie
PiYi
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
)αi−1
=

[
Aie
] 1
σi
σi−1−αi
Ni∑
e=1
[
Aie
] 1
σi
σi−1−αi

αi−1
. (1.12)
Before formally characterizing how the scaling factors in equations (1.11) and (1.12)
differ from each other, we want to emphasize how they are shaped by variations in markups
and returns to scale. First, deviations from constant returns to scale (i.e. αi 6= 1) im-
ply that the size of the establishment affects its revenue productivity. By contrast, in the
Hsieh-Klenow model, returns to scale are constant and the size term drops out of the scal-
ing factors; for instance, the counterfactual TFPR ratio in equation (1.12) is then unity
for all establishments, regardless of industry. Second, the difference between the markup
σi/(σi − 1) and the returns to scale αi shapes the counterfactual size of the establishment
in (1.12). In our model, two industries could be populated by equally productive estab-
lishments, and yet different wedges between markups and returns to scale would lead
the industries to differ in their counterfactual size distributions. Under the Hsieh-Klenow
assumptions, the counterfactual size distribution would be the same in both industries.
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We examine the impact of these types of differences on misallocation in greater detail in
section 1.2.2.
Returning now to the measure of misallocation, we show that, when rid of its distor-
tions, a more distorted establishment becomes more integral to industry productivity. In
equation (1.13) we isolate the establishment-specific components of the relative scaling
factors:
ΩTFP,τ=τ¯ ,ie
ΩTFP,ie
∝
[(
1 + τKie
1 + τK,i
)αKi (1 + τLie
1 + τL,i
)αLi] σiσi−1−1σi
σi−1−αi . (1.13)
Since establishment productivity Aie enters both scaling factors in the same manner, the
only establishment-specific difference between the two comes from distortions. Note that
the exponent on the distortions in (1.13) is positive, so that the derivative of ΩTFP,τ=τ¯ ,ie/ΩTFP,ie
with respect to the distortions is positive. In other words, the relative increase in scaling
factor ΩTFP,τ=τ¯ ,ie is greater for a more distorted establishment.
Having defined all elements of industry-level misallocation, we use the model structure
to express the economy-wide misallocation Φ as the geometric average of the industry
measures Φi, as per equation (1.14):
Φ =
∏
i∈I
Φθii . (1.14)
Misallocation here captures the aggregate productivity loss from distortions faced by es-
tablishments within industries.
While this measure is standard within the literature, its construction implicitly relies on
some additional assumptions. For instance, by focusing on equalizing distortions within
industries, we leave average distortions unchanged across industries. This assumption
overlooks the potential productivity improvement from reallocating resources across in-
dustries. Moreover, this measure of misallocation assumes no changes in entry and exit of
establishments when we alter distortions. Another potential concern might be the absence
of taste (i.e., demand) shocks from the benchmark model. For that particular case, how-
ever, we show in appendix A.3 that the measure of misallocation is unchanged for a simple
extension where we allow establishment-specific taste parameters. In short, misallocation
is a counterfactual that holds all non-distortion parameters—including tastes—fixed; the
measure of misallocation above would correctly capture productivity losses even in that
extended model.
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1.2.2 Ignoring the Variation in Returns to Scale and Markups
In this section, we show that inappropriately imposing constant returns to scale and a
common markup leads to incorrect measures of productivity and misallocation. Imposing
constant returns to scale when returns to scale are decreasing, or understating the markup
of price over marginal cost, leads us to measure more distorted establishments as more
productive. This spurious positive correlation between productivity and distortion leads
us to overstate misallocation. We use the expressions we derive in this section to help us
explain in section 3.3 why and when the divergent trends in misallocation arise.
The discrepancies we highlight arise from inappropriate mappings from the observable
establishment revenue to the unobservable establishment productivity. As we emphasized
in the introduction, mapping from revenue to productivity is a two-step process: first we
map revenue to output with the help of a pricing model, and then we map output to
productivity with the help of a production function. We begin to formalize this notion
by combining the demand for establishment output with the establishment production
function, and derive the expression for establishment productivity Aie in equation (1.15):
lnAie =
σi
σi − 1 ln
(
PieYie
PiYi
)
− αi ln
[
K
αKi
αi
ie L
αLi
αi
ie
]
+ lnYi. (1.15)
This expression clarifies the first mapping by showing the markup σi/(σi−1) as the elastic-
ity of productivity with respect to the revenue-based measure of size PieYie/(PiYi). Further-
more, returns to scale in production αi highlight the second mapping, as αi is the elasticity
of productivity with respect to the input bundle under the assumption of constant returns
to scale K
αKi/αi
ie L
αLi/αi
ie . We now explore the discrepancies in measures of productivity and
misallocation from imposing constant returns to scale and a common markup.
Discrepancy from Imposing Constant Returns to Scale
To measure total factor productivity Aie, we need to impose a production function
on the data; as suggested by equation (1.15), if we mismeasure the returns to scale in
production, we incorrectly measure productivity. We formalize this notion in equation
(1.16) by comparing the productivity Âie measured under constant returns to scale to the
productivity Aie measured under returns to scale αi:(
Âie
Aie
)
CRTS Discrepancy
=
(
K
αKi
αi
ie L
αLi
αi
ie
)αi−1
. (1.16)
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For example, if we impose constant returns to scale on an industry where returns to scale
are decreasing, then the exponent on the input bundle in equation (1.16) is negative. As a
result, if we compare two equally productive establishments in this decreasing returns to
scale industry, then the more distorted establishment with the smaller input bundle would
be perceived as more productive. The discrepancy works in the opposite direction when
returns to scale are increasing: more distorted establishments with smaller input bundles
appear less productive than they are.
These discrepancies in measured productivity lead us to discrepancies in measured
misallocation. In equation (1.17) we compare the misallocation Φ̂i derived under the
imposition of constant returns to scale with the misallocation Φi derived under the returns
to scale αi:
(
Φ̂i
Φi
)
CRTS Discrepancy
=
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
Aie
TFPRi
TFPRie
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
Ξcrts,ie
1−αi
)σi−1] 1σi−1
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
Aie
TFPRi
TFPRie
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
)σi−1] 1σi−1 , (1.17)
where Ξcrts,ie =
{[
1 + τKie
1 + τK,i
]αKi
αi
[
1 + τLie
1 + τL,i
]αLi
αi sie|τ=τ¯
sie
}
When returns to scale are constant so that αi = 1, then the exponent on the establishment-
specific scaling factor Ξcrts,ie is 0, and the ratio in (1.17) collapses to 1: the two measures
of misallocation are identical. However, deviations from constant returns to scale lead to
incorrect measures of misallocation.
The size of the discrepancy in misallocation depends on the extent to which returns to
scale are not constant, and on the correlation between productivity and distortion. Note
that the scaling factor Ξcrts,ie takes values above 1 for heavily distorted establishments;
each of the three ratios defining the scaling factor exceeds 1 for a heavily distorted estab-
lishment. Under decreasing returns to scale, the positive exponent on Ξcrts,ie puts larger
weights on the distorted establishments. If productivity and distortions are positively cor-
related, then the numerator in (1.17) exceeds the denominator, and we overstate misal-
location. For the same positive correlation of productivity and distortion, an industry in
which returns to scale are increasing would induce a negative exponent on Ξcrts,ie and lead
us to understate misallocation if we inappropriately impose constant returns. After esti-
mating returns to scale, we use these expressions to understand how imposing constant
returns leads the Hsieh-Klenow measure of misallocation to deviate from our measure.
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Discrepancy from Imposing a Common Markup
We also need the markup so as to map establishment revenue to establishment produc-
tivity; as hinted by equation (1.15), an incorrect markup leads to incorrect measures of
output and productivity. We formalize this notion in equation (1.18) where we compare
the productivity Âie, measured under the markup generated by σ̂i, with the productivity
Aie, measured under the true markup σi:(
Âie
Aie
)
Markup Discrepancy
=
(
PieYie
PiYi
) σ̂i
σ̂i−1−
σi
σi−1
. (1.18)
In short, imposing an incorrect markup leads to a measure of productivity that is a function
of the establishment size PieYie/(PiYi). For instance, when the imposed markup overstates
the true markup, then the exponent on establishment size is positive. Consequently, if we
compare two equally productive establishments, then the more distorted establishment
will be smaller in size, and would be incorrectly perceived as less productive. In this
respect, overstating the markup induces similar discrepancies in measuring productivity as
does understating the returns to scale in equation (1.16).
The imposition of an incorrect markup results in an incorrect measure of misallocation.
To anticipate our subsequent decomposition, we formalize this notion under the assump-
tion of constant returns to scale. In equation (1.19), we compare the misallocation Φ̂i
measured under the incorrect markup to the misallocation Φi measured under the true
markup:
(
Φ̂i
Φi
)
Markup Discrepancy
=
[
Ni∑
e=1
sie|τ=τ¯ Ξmarkup,ie
σ̂i−σi
σi−1
] 1
σ̂i−1
, (1.19)
where Ξmarkup,ie =
sie|τ=τ
sie
If the markup is measured correctly, so that σ̂i = σi, then the establishment-specific scaling
factor Ξmarkup,ie disappears; and, since the relative establishment sizes sie|τ=τ¯ sum to 1
by definition, there is no error in measuring misallocation. However, deviations from the
correct markup lead to discrepancies in measured misallocation.
The magnitude of the discrepancy in measured misallocation depends on the direction
in which we mismeasure the markup, and the correlation of productivity and distortion.
We note that the scaling factor Ξmarkup,ie takes values greater than 1 for distorted estab-
lishments since distorted establishments grow larger in size when the distortions are re-
moved. Consider a setting in which productivity and distortion are positively correlated.
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If we understate the markup, the scaling factor puts more weight on the large, productive
establishments, and puts less weight on the small, unproductive establishments. This re-
scaling of establishment size makes the expression in equation (1.19) exceed 1, leading to
a measure of misallocation that is too large. By contrast, overstating the markup makes
the exponent on the scaling factor negative, reversing the impact of the scaling on the rel-
ative establishment sizes, and leading us to understate misallocation. Below we use these
expressions to understand the forces that differentiate our measure of misallocation from
the Hsieh-Klenow measure that imposes a common markup and constant returns to scale.
1.3 Mapping the Model to Data
In this section, we show how to map the available U.S. Census microdata to mea-
sure distortions and productivity in U.S. manufacturing. With data only on establishment
revenue—not output or prices—we emphasize the need for an estimating equation that
jointly estimates returns to scale and price markups. We show that the reduced-form elas-
ticities from this estimating equation inform us about profit shares, and that the model
can be used to translate these reduced-form elasticities into returns to scale and markups.
We then provide estimates of returns to scale and markups that are consistent with the
estimated profit shares.
1.3.1 Data
Our analysis relies on two core data sets from the U.S. Census Bureau: the Census of
Manufactures (CMF) and the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). The Census data sets
provide us with the establishment-level variables from which we infer productivity and dis-
tortions. The CMF is conducted every five years (for years ending in 2 and 7) and contains
information about all manufacturing establishments in the United States. The ASM is con-
ducted in all non-Census years and covers establishments with at least 250 employees, as
well as a randomly sampled panel of smaller establishments. On average, the ASM surveys
50,000–65,000 establishments selected from the approximately 350,000 establishments in
the CMF. From these datasets, we obtain measures of value added, hours worked, ma-
terials expenditures, capital stock, and the relevant price deflators.3 Our sample period
spans 1977 through 2007. We exclude establishments whose information is imputed from
administrative records, as well as those with missing information.
3The industry price deflators come from the NBER-CES database, and the capital stocks are constructed
by the Census staff, following Foster, Grim and Haltiwanger (2016).
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As industry classification in the U.S. changed during the sample period, we build off the
concordance made by Fort and Klimek (2015) that assigns establishments a time-consistent
NAICS (North American Industrial Classification System) 2002 code. For a small number
of the 400+ 6-digit NAICS industries, we identify discontinuities in industry employment
and establishment counts around the years where industry classification changed.4 If the
NAICS dictionaries suggest that the industries in question are cross-listed, we attempt to
merge them into a single industry. When the merging eliminates discontinuities, we use
the merged industries; otherwise, we exclude the industries from analysis. We also exclude
industries that contain fewer than five establishments in any given year.
To construct more comprehensive industry measures of expenditures on labor, we sup-
plement the Census data on salaries and wages with BLS measures of benefit payments.
While the ASM and the CMF exhaustively cover many aspects of manufacturing establish-
ments, the U.S. Census microdata on total labor compensation is much sparser; only direct
payments to labor for services in production (i.e., salaries and wages) are widely docu-
mented. By contrast, for a smaller sample of establishments, the BLS-run National Com-
pensation Survey collects data on wages, paid leave, insurance, retirement contributions,
legally required benefits, and supplemental pay. From these data, the BLS constructed for
us unpublished estimates of the hourly wage and the hourly total benefit cost. Using these
data, we construct a BLS Adjustment with which we can adjust the Census industry labor
payment to reflect payments to labor:
BLS Adjustmenti,t =
BLS hourly wagei,t + BLS hourly benefitsi,t
BLS hourly wagei,t
.
Given the survey size, to pass BLS disclosure review, our BLS Adjustment factors are con-
structed at the NAICS 3-digit level for five-year intervals spanning 1983–2007.5
1.3.2 Step 1: Measuring Distortions
To measure misallocation, we need to know the distortions faced by an establishment
relative to the average distortions in the industry. We derive relative distortions by re-
arranging the first-order conditions from equations (1.5) and (1.6) and dividing by their
4We construct mid-point growth rates, and flag growth rates of establishment counts or hours worked
that exceed 0.5 in absolute value.
5We apply the BLS Adjustment factors created with data from 1983–1987 to the Census data in both 1987
and 1982.
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weighted averages over all establishments in the industry:
1 + τKie
1 + τK,i
=
PieYie
Kie[
Ni∑
e=1
PieYie
PiYi
(
PieYie
Kie
)−1]−1 =
Value Addedie
Capital Stockie[
Ni∑
e=1
Value Addedie
Value Addedi
(
Value Addedie
Capital Stockie
)−1]−1 (1.20)
1 + τLie
1 + τL,i
=
PieYie
Lie[
Ni∑
e=1
PieYie
PiYi
(
PieYie
Lie
)−1]−1 =
Value Addedie
Labor Hoursie[
Ni∑
e=1
Value Addedie
Value Addedi
(
Value Addedie
Labor Hoursie
)]−1 . (1.21)
The resulting expressions, in equations (1.20) and (1.21), are independent of the returns
to scale and markup parameters, which are common to all establishments in the industry,
and map transparently to Census data.6
The model interprets high revenue productivity in inputs as an indicator for the pres-
ence of distortions. In a world without distortions, this model suggests that all estab-
lishments hire inputs so as to equalize their average capital PieYie/Kie and average labor
PieYie/Lie revenue productivities. If an establishment has a high revenue productivity in a
certain input, it would maximize profits by continuing to hire that input until this measure
of revenue productivity declined and equaled that of the other establishments in the in-
dustry. If an establishment in the data has a high average revenue productivity in a given
input, it must have been prevented from hiring more of the input; hence, the model assigns
this establishment a high distortion.
These strong assumptions identify distortions and reflect the model’s attempt to de-
scribe a steady-state economy. In a dynamic setting, we can think of frictions that might
prevent an establishment from hiring the steady-state profit-maximizing quantity of an in-
put. Asker, Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2014), for instance, focus on adjustment costs
in the hiring of capital as one reason that an establishment’s choice might deviate from
these steady-state predictions. Nonetheless, for the purpose of measuring misallocation
across longer periods of time, we think these assumptions are a reasonable starting point.
To match this view of the model’s purpose, our estimates of model parameters and mis-
allocation are based on five-year periods; we also document the robustness of the main
results in section C.2 by extending this estimating window to ten years.
6Aggregation in the model leads to expressions that make it more natural to define the average 1/(1 + τ).
Therefore we define 1 + τ as the inverse of the average 1/(1 + τ). We present the details in appendix A.
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1.3.3 Step 2: Measuring Productivity
With data on establishment revenue, not output and prices separately, we cannot di-
rectly estimate the returns to scale and markup we need to infer productivity. Instead,
the revenue elasticities from our estimating equation inform us about the division of value
added among labor, capital, and profits. Nonetheless, using model equations we can indi-
rectly map these reduced-form revenue elasticities into returns to scale and markups, and
then infer establishment productivity.
A common approach to measuring returns to scale in data sets with establishment rev-
enue entails creating a proxy for output by dividing revenue PieYie with an industry price
index Pi; this common practice leads to a downward bias in estimated returns to scale that
was first pointed out by Marschak and Andrews (1944) and later made particularly salient
by Klette and Griliches (1996). Intuitively, this bias arises because we expect the most
productive establishments to hire the largest input bundles, to produce the most output,
and—when output markets are imperfectly competitive—to charge the lowest prices. If
the most productive establishments charge the lowest prices, then the proxy for output
is likely to understate output most for these productive establishments. A cross-sectional
estimator using this output proxy would understate the increase in output from having the
large input bundles, and hence underestimate returns to scale.
The derivation of our estimating equation highlights this downward bias in returns-
to-scale estimates. Specifically, we follow De Loecker (2011) and combine two model
equations: the establishment’s production function and the demand for its output. Re-
arranging this combined expression to solve for the ratio of revenue PieYie and the price
index Pi, and taking logs, we derive the estimating equation (1.22):
ln
(
PieYie
Pi
)
= βKi ln(Kie) + βLi ln(Lie) + βYi ln(Yi) + βAi ln(Aie), (1.22)
where βKi =
αKi
σi
σi−1
, βLi =
αLi
σi
σi−1
, βYi =
1
σi
, and βAi =
σi − 1
σi
and PieYie = Value Addedie, Kie = Capital Stockie, Lie = Labor Hours,
7
Pi = NBER-CES Industry Price Indexi, PiYi =
Ni∑
e=1
Value Addedie, Yi =
PiYi
Pi
.
The revenue elasticities βi,L and βi,K are quotients of the returns-to-scale parameters and
the markup of price over marginal cost. Since we expect establishments to price at or above
7We compute total labor hours as the sum of the reported production-worker hours and the calculated
non-production-worker hours following Kehrig (2011).
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marginal cost, the gross markup exceeds 1. As a result, even when correctly estimated, the
revenue elasticities understate the returns-to-scale parameters.
Although they do not directly estimate returns to scale, the revenue elasticities βKi and
βLi are useful descriptors of differences across industries: they correspond to capital’s and
labor’s share of value added and together imply an industry’s profit share. Rearranging
the first-order conditions from equations (1.5) and (1.6), and summing across establish-
ments within an industry, we show in (1.23) that βKi and βLi are the distortion-inclusive
expenditures on inputs as a share of value added:
βKi =
Ni∑
e=1
(1 + τKie)RiKie
PiYi
and βLi =
Ni∑
e=1
(1 + τLie)wiLie
PiYi
. (1.23)
In addition, we show in equation (1.24) that industry profits are the residual share of value
added (i.e., the difference between one and the sum of the revenue elasticities):
Πi
PiYi
= 1− (βKi + βLi). (1.24)
Since we expect establishments to earn weakly positive profits, the expression in (1.24)
emphasizes that the sum of revenue elasticities is bounded from above by 1 in this model.
This is yet another way to see the bias emphasized by Klette and Griliches (1996): if this
model correctly characterizes the world, and if we lived in a world with returns to scale
αi in excess of 1, the standard estimating equation would still produce revenue elasticities
that sum to less than 1.
The third revenue elasticity βYi, the elasticity of establishment revenue with respect to
industry output, is key to identifying the returns to scale and markup parameters from
the revenue elasticities βKi and βLi. Specifically, the inverse of βYi is the elasticity of
substitution σi, from which we can construct the markups σi/(σi − 1). With the estimated
markup we can then back out the returns to scale parameters αKi and αLi as the products
of the markup and the respective revenue elasticities. With the parameters for the markup
and the returns to scale in hand, we can infer productivity.
We estimate β̂Li, the first of the three key elasticities, using the rearranged first-order
condition for labor in expression (1.23). We map this expression to the data by multiplying
the sum of salaries and wages reported in the U.S. Census microdata by the BLS Adjustment
factors we detailed in section 1.3.1. In this way, our measure of industry labor expenditures
attempts to capture not only the wage payments to labor, but also the benefits and indirect
payments, from insurance to retirement contributions, that are not widely reported to the
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Census. We then divide this measure of labor costs by the industry value added, as in
equation (1.25):
β̂Li =
[
Ni∑
e=1
Salaries and Wagesie
]
× BLS Adjustmenti
Ni∑
e=1
Value Addedie
. (1.25)
This estimate implicitly assumes that the labor distortions faced by establishments are
priced into the wages and benefits that establishments pay workers. While we think this
a reasonable assumption, we cannot rule out the possibility that some distortions are not
priced. As a robustness check in section C.2, we also estimate this elasticity from the varia-
tion in labor usage across establishments. Even under these different assumptions required
to thus estimate the elasticity, we find the path of U.S. manufacturing misallocation to look
very different under the assumptions of our model and those of the Hsieh-Klenow model.
We estimate the remaining two elasticities βKi and βYi using a two-step Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure based on the control-function approach in Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003). This approach addresses the issue that productivity is unob-
served in the estimating equation (1.26) by substituting out the unobserved productivity
with a function of observable variables. Specifically, the control function is the choice
of intermediate inputs, assumed to increase in establishment productivity: ln(Mie) =
m(lnKie, lnYi, lnAie). If we can invert the expression characterizing this choice to ex-
press productivity as a function of the intermediate inputs, then we can substitute the
unobservable Aie in equation (1.22) with observables Kie, Mie, and Yi as follows:
ln
(
PieYie
Pi
)
− β̂Li ln(Lie)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pynetie
= βKi ln(Kie) + βYi ln(Yi) + βAim
−1(lnKie, lnYi, lnMie) + uie, (1.26)
where uie represents idiosyncratic shocks to production. For this substitution to be feasible
and useful, we need to assume that the choice of intermediate inputs is invertible, and that
productivity is the only unobservable component in the choice of intermediate inputs.8 The
first step of the procedure regresses the left-hand-side term of equation (1.26) pynetie on
a flexible polynomial of the observables to construct the predicted p̂ynetie.
The second step of the procedure uses the assumption that log productivity lnAie
evolves following a general first-order Markov process to construct moment conditions
8While common, these assumptions are strong and not directly testable. For instance, the second assump-
tion eliminates the possibility that there are distortions in the intermediate input markets that are correlated
with establishment productivity.
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with which to estimate the elasticities βKi and βYi. Specifically, we let εie,t correspond to
the mean-zero innovations in productivity realized at time t. For a given guess (β̂Ki , β̂Yi) of
the elasticities, we construct an implied measure of log productivity by differencing p̂ynetie
and β̂Ki ln(Kie) + β̂Yi ln(Yi). Regressing the implied productivity on a polynomial of its past
value gives us the implied innovation to productivity εie,t(β̂Ki , β̂Yi), and the following mo-
ment conditions with which to estimate the two key elasticites:
1
N
1
T
∑
e∈Ni
∑
t∈T
(
ε̂ie,t(β̂Ki , β̂Yi) lnKie
ε̂ie,t(β̂Ki , β̂Yi) lnYi
)
= 0. (1.27)
To estimate the elasticities in a model-consistent way, we constrain the parameter space
to meet three criteria. First, to ensure that industry profits are weakly positive and less than
1 as a share of value added, we impose that β̂Ki and β̂Li sum to a value between 0 and 1.
Second, to estimate labor and capital shares of value that are strictly positive, we require
that β̂Ki and β̂Li are strictly positive. Third, to back out gross markups with values between
1 and 2, we impose that β̂Yi be strictly positive and less than 0.5.
9 We implement these
parameter restrictions by modifying the code made available by Jagadeesh Sivadasan for
implementing the Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) variant of the Levinson-Petrin pro-
cedure, which refines the assumptions for identifying the model parameters and updates
the estimator accordingly.
1.3.4 Division of Value Added in U.S. Manufacturing
By our estimates in panel A of table 1.1, labor’s share of value added in U.S. manu-
facturing declined from 64% in 1982 to 39% in 2007; over the same period, the capital
share increased from 20% to 25%. Together, these changes in the labor and capital shares
imply that the profit share increased 20 percentage points, rising from 16% in 1982 to
36% in 2007. While, to our knowledge, this is the first paper to document these dynamics
of industry profits for U.S. manufacturing, the findings are broadly consistent with other
recent work. The decline of the labor share has been widely documented for the U.S. and
for the global economy [e.g. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin
(2013), Barkai (2016)].10 Moreover, using data on the U.S. non-financial corporate sector,
Barkai (2016) finds that both the labor and capital shares declined, leading to an increase
9We think this is a reasonable parameter range as common choices for the elasticity σi range between 3
and 11, and imply markups between 1.1 and 1.5.
10The economy-wide decline has been of a smaller magnitude, around 6%. The much more pronounced
decline of the labor share in the U.S. manufacturing sector that we document with the combined Census and
BLS data is consistent with recent work by Autor et al. (2017) who also use U.S. Census data.
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Table 1.1: U.S. Manufacturing – Division of Value Added
Panel A Weighted Average across Industries
Capital Share Labor Share Profit Share
βKi βLi 1− (βLi + βKi)
1982 0.20 0.64 0.16
1987 0.21 0.61 0.18
1992 0.27 0.55 0.18
1997 0.25 0.49 0.26
2002 0.31 0.46 0.23
2007 0.25 0.39 0.36
Panel B Standard Deviation across Industries
Capital Share Labor Share Profit Share
βKi βLi 1− (βLi + βKi)
1982 0.19 0.20 0.17
1987 0.20 0.19 0.20
1992 0.25 0.20 0.20
1997 0.23 0.18 0.24
2002 0.25 0.19 0.21
2007 0.26 0.19 0.30
Note: Reported values in panel A are weighted averages of industry-level coefficients, with the
weights comprising industry value added. The underlying coefficients are estimated using five-
year panels. Data for the estimation comes from the Annual Survey of Manufactures from the
U.S. Census and the National Compensation Survey from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
in profits over the last 30 years. Complementary exercises in Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) also suggest that the capital share increased insufficiently to offset the decline in
the labor share, implying that profits increased.
In addition to documenting the evolution of these shares across time, we document in
panel B large variations in capital, labor, and profit shares across industries. At all points
in time, the standard deviation of profit shares across industries is roughly as large as the
average level of the profit shares. The standard deviations of capital and labor shares are
of quantitatively similar magnitudes. These large standard deviations imply that the U.S.
manufacturing sector is populated both by industries where profit margins are slim, as well
as by industries in which establishments earn large profits as shares of value added.
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1.3.5 Returns to Scale and Markups in U.S. Manufacturing
Accommodating these estimates of the profit shares requires deviating from the stan-
dard assumptions of constant returns to scale and a common markup. From Basu and
Fernald (1997) we know that profits drive a wedge between markups and returns to scale
under very general assumptions on the functional forms for production and demand. In
our model, this relationship takes the following form:
1− Πi
PiYi
=
αi
σi
σi − 1
, (1.28)
where the industry profit shares Πi/(PiYi) act as a wedge between the returns to scale
αi and markup σi/(σi − 1). By imposing constant returns to scale and a markup of 1.5
in every industry, the Hsieh-Klenow model implies that all establishments in all industries
earn a third of their value added as profits. We emphasize this point in figure 1.2. The
solid black line plots our estimated share of profits in value added. This rising measure of
profits contrasts with the invariance of profit shares in the Hsieh-Klenow model, plotted as
the dashed red line. The average profit share in 2007 of 0.36 roughly matches the Hsieh-
Klenow assumptions. However, the variation across industries and the smaller profit shares
throughout the 1980s and 1990s fit these assumptions less well.
To understand why markups and returns to scale can rationalize these variations in
profit shares, we focus on the fact that an establishment earns profits when its price exceeds
the average cost of production:
piie
Yie
=
σi
σi − 1Marginal Costie︸ ︷︷ ︸
Priceie
− Average Costie. (1.29)
The profits per unit sold, as per equation (1.29), can increase either if the markup increases
or if the returns to scale decline. First, an establishment could increase its profit margin by
charging a higher markup over marginal cost. Second, an establishment could increase its
profit margin if average cost falls relative to marginal cost. A reduction in returns to scale
drives such a shift in costs. For example, constant returns imply a constant marginal cost,
while decreasing returns imply a marginal cost that increases with each unit produced. As
a result, if returns to scale decline from constant to decreasing, the marginal cost for the
last unit would exceed the average cost of all units produced, increasing the profit margin.
Some combination of an increase in markups and a reduction in returns to scale drives the
increase in profit shares in the data.
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Figure 1.2: Profits as a Share of Value Added in U.S. Manufacturing
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In panel A of table 1.2, we show that, while markups increased from 1.46 to 1.48, the
decline in returns to scale from 1.23 to 0.96 is the primary driver of rising profit shares
between 1892 and 2007. In short, the U.S. manufacturing sector exhibited meaningfully
increasing returns to scale in the early 1980s. Since then, returns to scale have declined,
driving up marginal cost relative to the average cost of production. By increasing the profit
margin on each unit sold, this decline in returns to scale led to the rise in profit shares for
U.S. manufacturing.11
11In a recent paper, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) explain the rise in profits as a consequence of rising
markups. Our paper and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) share a common idea: changes in the shares of
value added can be understood as either changes in markups or changes in returns to scale. In this paper,
we jointly estimate the parameters underlying demand and production, and we allow the parameters to
change over time. De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) estimate time-invariant production parameters and infer
markups as residuals that explain the observed value-added shares. However, if profits increase but returns-
to-scale are kept time invariant, then increasing markups are the only way to rationalize increasing profits.
This methodological difference, coupled with different data coverage in terms of sectors and aggregation,
likely explains the different findings.
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Table 1.2: U.S. Manufacturing – Returns to Scale and Markups
Panel A Average Level across Industries
Returns to Scale Markups
αi
σi
σi−1
1982 1.23 1.46
1987 1.20 1.44
1992 1.20 1.44
1997 1.12 1.51
2002 1.11 1.47
2007 0.96 1.48
Panel B Standard Deviation across Industries
Returns to Scale Markups
αi
σi
σi−1
1982 0.42 0.41
1987 0.46 0.40
1992 0.48 0.41
1997 0.49 0.43
2002 0.44 0.42
2007 0.58 0.42
Note: Reported values in Panel A are weighted averages of industry-level coefficients, with
the weights comprising industry value added. Data for the estimation comes from the Annual
Survey of Manufactures from the U.S. Census, and the National Compensation Survey from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Much like profit shares, both returns to scale and markups vary widely across indus-
tries. The standard deviations of both measures range between one third and one half the
average values of their respective variables. For returns to scale, this variation suggests
that, even as returns to scale have declined on average, the U.S. manufacturing sector
is still comprised of both increasing and decreasing returns-to-scale industries. Similarly,
while the average markup may be large, there are many industries with markups low
enough to approximate perfect competition, as well as many industries where the degree
of imperfect competition, and hence the markup, is large.
While table 1.1 showed how changing capital and labor shares drive the evolution of
profits, here we show how the same evolution can be understood in terms of changing
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returns to scale and markups:
∆
Πi
PiYi
= −∆αKi
1(
σi
σi−1 |2007
) −∆αLi 1(
σi
σi−1 |2007
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contribution of Returns to Scale
+
(
∆
σi
σi − 1
) 1− ( Πi
PiYi
|1982
)
(
σi
σi−1 |2007
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contribution of Markup
. (1.30)
An increase in an industry’s profit share between 2007 and 1982, ∆Πi/(PiYi), is driven
either by a decline in returns to scale−∆αi or an increase in the markup ∆σi/(σi−1), as per
equation (1.30). Applying this decomposition to the manufacturing-sector data in tables
1.1 and 1.2, we show that of the 20-percentage-point increase in the manufacturing profit
share, 18 percentage points come from the decline in returns to scale and 1–2 percentage
points from the rise in the markup.12 We can further decompose the 18 percentage points
to emphasize separately the contributions of the capital and labor elasticities, αKi and
αLi. The increase in the capital elasticity, reflected principally by the rising capital share,
put downward pressure on the profit share of about –6 percentage points. Meanwhile,
the sharp decline in the labor elasticity, reflected in the falling labor share, contributed
24 percentage points to the increase in the manufacturing profit share. We next turn to
misallocation and emphasize the importance of incorporating this variation in markups
and returns to scale.
1.4 Misallocation
In this section, we present our measure of misallocation and contrast it with the Hsieh-
Klenow measure that ignores variation in markups and returns to scale. We then decom-
pose the discrepancy in measurement and show that the divergent trends in misallocation
are driven by the decline in returns to scale over time.
1.4.1 Misallocation Has Not Been Increasing
Our estimates suggest that misallocation in U.S. manufacturing decreased over the last
30 years. Figure 1.3 quantifies misallocation as the potential increases in U.S. manufac-
turing TFP from equalizing the distortions establishments face within an industry, as per
12A Jensen’s inequality term leads to the small discrepancy. The manufacturing profit share in table 1.1
is the weighted average of industry profit shares, which is equal to 1−
∑
i∈I
θi
αi
σi
σi−1
. Meanwhile, the average
returns to scale and markup reported in table 1.2 are also weighted averages and do not imply exactly the
same manufacturing profit share 1−
(∑
i∈I
θiαi
)
/
(∑
i∈I
θi
σi
σi − 1
)
.
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Figure 1.3: Misallocation in U.S. Manufacturing
Change in U.S. Manufacturing TFP from Equalizing Within-Industry Distortions
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equation (1.9). The solid blue line depicts our model while the dashed red line depicts
the Hsieh-Klenow model. By our estimates, the level of misallocation declined from 135%
in 1982 to 104% in 2007. Meanwhile, misallocation increased under the Hsieh-Klenow
assumptions, so that in 2007 the U.S. manufacturing sector could have been 83% more
productive, nearly twice the potential increase of 42% in 1982. Figure 1.1 presented the
same results expressed as changes relative to 1982.
We focus on trends in misallocation, rather than levels, because the model is static and
consequently imposes the long-run steady state at each point in time. As we described
in section 1.3.2, the model infers distortions by assuming that, in a world without mis-
allocation, establishments hire inputs until their average revenue products are equalized
across establishments. Short-run considerations can change that inference: for instance,
adjustment costs or the time required to build productive capital could lead non-distorted
establishments to differ in their average revenue products at a point in time. Despite these
costs, we follow the literature and impose the steady-state assumption for two reasons.
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Figure 1.4: Misallocation in U.S. Manufacturing
Change in U.S. Manufacturing TFP from Equalizing Within-Industry Distortions
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First, by using a static model we can transparently document the role that industry-varying
markups and returns to scale play in changing the measure of misallocation. Second, while
these short-run considerations may lead us to misstate the level of misallocation, they likely
have a smaller impact on trends across long periods of time.
To understand the source of the divergent trends in misallocation, we next decompose
the discrepancy in measured misallocation into a component from imposing a common
markup across industries and a component from imposing constant returns to scale. In
figure 1.4 we preview the formal decomposition by plotting an intermediate measure of
misallocation in which we include only one source of industry variation. In the long-dashed
orange line we impose constant returns to scale, but maintain the estimated markups that
vary across industries. The discrepancy in measured misallocation between our model and
the Hsieh-Klenow model can now be split into two parts. The discrepancy from imposing
the common markup is the distance from the intermediate model’s long-dashed line and
the Hsieh-Klenow model’s short-dashed line. The discrepancy from imposing constant
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returns to scale is the distance between the our model’s solid line and the new intermediate
model’s long-dashed one.
As we formally show over the next two sections, the divergent trends in misalloca-
tion are driven by the reduction in returns to scale between 1982 and 2007. As the U.S.
manufacturing sector began to better approximate the assumed constant returns in the
Hsieh-Klenow model, the discrepancy from imposing constant returns declined, leading to
a perceived rise in misallocation. Figure 1.4 shows that most of the discrepancy in 1982
came from imposing constant returns to scale. By 2007, the discrepancy from imposing
constant returns was less than half its initial value in absolute terms, while the discrep-
ancy from imposing a common markup remained relatively unchanged. This reversal is
reflected in the changing distances between the three lines. The shrinking distance be-
tween our solid blue line and the intermediate model’s orange long-dashed line reflects
the declining discrepancy in misallocation from imposing constant returns to scale. By
contrast, the relatively stable distance between the Hsieh-Klenow model’s and the interme-
diate model’s lines suggests a more stable discrepancy over time from imposing a common
markup.
1.4.2 Discrepancies in Establishment-Level Productivity
Incorrect measures of misallocation, both from imposing constant returns to scale and
from imposing a common markup, are rooted in spurious correlations between produc-
tivity and the distortions that establishments face. As we did in figure 1.4, we document
these spurious correlations in turn, focusing first on returns to scale and then on markups.
In panel A of table 1.3 we show that inappropriately imposing constant returns to scale
leads to measures of productivity that conflate productivity and distortion. The regressions
in panel A control for the productivity estimated when returns to scale vary, and compare
the constant-returns productivity of establishments with different input bundles. This con-
ditioning allows us to compare establishments that have the same productivity under our
model, but that face different distortions, and hence have different input bundles. The key
regression coefficients are conditional correlations of constant-returns productivity and in-
put bundles, shown separately for industries with decreasing and increasing returns. As
suggested by equation (1.16), these correlations should be opposite in sign.
Columns 2 and 3 support model predictions that imposing constant returns to scale on
industries where returns to scale are not constant leads to predictable spurious correlations
between productivity and distortions. Column 2 emphasizes that imposing constant re-
turns in place of decreasing returns leads us to perceive more distorted establishments (i.e.,
those with smaller input bundles) as more productive. Specifically, a 1-standard-deviation
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Table 1.3: Productivity Mismeasurement at the Establishment Level
Panel A: Imposing Constant Returns to Scale
Dependent Variable Normalized Log Productivity (Aie)
(Constant Returns to Scale)
(1) (2) (3)
Normalized Log Input Bundle 0.1460 -0.3238 0.4465
(0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0106)
Normalized Log Productivity (Aie) 0.8241 1.0527 0.7528
(Variable Returns to Scale) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0074)
Industry-Year Sample All Decreasing RTS Increasing RTS
Industry×Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 292000 126000 166000
R-squared 0.8130 0.9268 0.9338
Panel B: Imposing a Common Markup across Industries
Dependent Variable Normalized Log Productivity (Aie)
(Common Markup)
(1) (2) (3)
Normalized Log Value Added 0.2514 -2.0286 0.5993
(0.0243) (0.0566) (0.0137)
Normalized Log Productivity (Aie) 0.4839 2.3961 0.4678
(Heterogeneous Markups) (0.0155) (0.0436) (0.0104)
Industry-Year Sample All
Understated
Markup
Overstated
Markup
Industry×Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 292000 116000 176000
R-squared 0.5630 0.7099 0.9143
Note: Unit of observation is an establishment-year. The time period comprises 1982, 1987,
1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level. To
normalize the values within each industry, we demean the variable and divide by its standard
deviation.
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decrease in the log input bundle leads to a measure of productivity that is 0.32 standard
deviations larger under the constant returns to scale model. Column 3 emphasizes the op-
posite pattern for increasing-returns industries. Following a 1-standard-deviation decrease
in the log input bundle, productivity is 0.45 standard deviations smaller under constant
returns to scale. In this case, imposing constant returns on industries where returns to
scale are increasing leads us to perceive more distorted establishments as less productive.
In panel B of table 1.3, we show that understating the markup in an industry leads us to
perceive more distorted establishments as more produtive, while overstating the markup
leads us to perceive more distorted establishments as less productive. We document this
pattern through the predictions from equation (1.18) by linking the mismeasurement of
productivity to establishment size. In a parallel with panel A, we control for the pro-
ductivity measured under the estimated markup, and then compare the common-markup
productivity of establishments that differ in distortions, and hence in their sizes.
Columns 2 and 3 partition the sample by estimated markup size and back the model
predictions. In particular, column 2 suggests that, indeed, understating the markup leads
us to a spurious positive correlation between productivity and distortions: a 1-standard-
deviation decrease in size (i.e. an increase in distortion) leads us to a 2.03-standard-
deviation increase in common-markup productivity. Column 3 presents the opposite result
for instances where we overstate the markup: a decrease in size leads to a 0.60-standard-
deviation decrease in common-markup productivity.
1.4.3 Aggregate Decomposition
Having emphasized in the last section that incorrect markups and returns to scale lead
to spurious correlations between productivity and distortion, we now show how those
spurious correlations lead to discrepancies between our measure of misallocation and the
Hsieh-Klenow measure. We emphasize that these discrepancies are positive when we over-
state the correlation of productivity and distortion, and that the discrepancies are negative
when we understate the correlation of productivity and distortion.
In the following schematic, we present the theoretical decomposition where the second
row splits the aggregate discrepancy into one component from imposing constant returns
to scale and another component from imposing the common markup. The aggregate dis-
crepancy measures the difference in misallocation between the Hsieh-Klenow model (con-
stant returns to scale [CRTS] and a common markup of 1.5 everywhere [σ = 3]) and
our own (returns to scale [VRTS] and markups [σ̂] can both vary). We first capture the
component from imposing constant returns by comparing the CRTS and VRTS measures
of misallocation under the estimated markups σ̂. We then capture the component from
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the common markup by comparing the common markup (σ = 3) misallocation to the vari-
able markup (σ̂) misallocation under CRTS. We can further decompose each component
to understand the contribution of decreasing versus increasing returns to scale, as well as
understating versus overstating the markup.
Aggregate Discrepancy
ln
ΦCRTS,σ=3
ΦV RTS,σ̂
↙ ↘
Driven by Constant Returns to Scale Driven by the Common Markup
ln
ΦCRTS,σ̂
ΦV RTS,σ̂
ln
ΦCRTS,σ=3
ΦCRTS,σ̂
↙↘ ↙↘
Decreasing RTS Increasing RTS Understated Overstated
ln
∑
DRTS
θi
(
Φi,CRTS,σ̂
Φi,V RTS,σ̂
)
ln
∑
IRTS
θi
(
Φi,CRTS,σ̂
Φi,V RTS,σ̂
)
ln
∑
σ̂>3
θi
(
Φi,CRTS,σ=3
Φi,CRTS,σ̂
)
ln
∑
σ̂≤3
θi
(
Φi,CRTS,σ=3
Φi,CRTS,σ̂
)
Table 1.4 decomposes the aggregate discrepancy in misallocation and shows that a
decline in returns to scale explains why the discrepancy is smaller in 2007 than in 1982.
The first two rows of panel A show that the 50% difference in misallocation between the
Hsieh-Klenow model and our own in 1982 is split rather evenly between the imposition of
constant returns to scale and the imposition of a common markup. By 2007, the aggregate
discrepancy of 12% is split unevenly: the returns-to-scale component is half its previous
value in absolute terms, while the markup component is essentially unchanged in size.
These values quantify the visual decomposition from figure 1.4; the values in 1982 and
2007 capture the vertical distances among the three lines in the figure.
The third row of table 1.4 relates the discrepancy in misallocation to spurious correla-
tions of productivity and distortion. In parentheses, the third row reports the difference
in the correlation of productivity and distortion between the Hsieh-Klenow model and our
own. For instance, the top of panel A indicates that imposing constant returns to scale
on decreasing-returns industries in 1982 leads us to overstate the correlation of produc-
tivity and distortion by 0.13. By overstating this correlation, the constant-returns model
also overstates misallocation, in this instance by 17%.13 Across all deviations from the
Hsieh-Klenow assumptions and across both years, inducing spurious positive correlation
13The 17% is scaled by the size of industries with decreasing returns to scale in U.S. manufacturing. By
contrast, not as many industries have their markup understated relative to the Hsieh-Klenow markup of
1.5. Hence, even though understating the markup leads to a larger 0.28 overstatement of the productivity-
distortion correlation, the overstated misallocation in those industries amounts to a smaller 3%.
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Table 1.4: Decomposing the Differences in Misallocation
Panel A: 1982
Aggregate Discrepancy
-0.4968
Driven by Constant Returns to Scale Driven by the Common Markup
-0.2589 -0.2378
Decreasing RTS Increasing RTS Understated Overstated
0.1761 -0.4470 0.0317 -0.2599
(0.1315) (-0.2805) (0.2847) (-0.2218)
Panel B: 2007
Aggregate Discrepancy
-0.1212
Driven by Constant Returns to Scale Driven by the Common Markup
0.1249 -0.2461
Decreasing RTS Increasing RTS Understated Overstated
0.4676 -0.3349 0.0455 -0.2853
(0.1850) (-0.2641) (0.1290) (-0.2891)
of productivity and distortion leads us to overstate misallocation, and inducing spurious
negative correlations leads us to understate misallocation.
1.5 Robustness
In this section, we argue that different trends in misallocation persist even when we
incorporate additional modifications to the model and the data. The resulting trends in
misallocation are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our baseline results. We
then present ongoing work to estimate model parameters under different assumptions and
with different estimators. Although different parameter estimates lead to different point
estimates for the growth in misallocation, the stark qualitative differences between our
model and the Hsieh-Klenow model remain.
In our first robustness exercise, we emphasize the need for time-varying model param-
eters for capturing the evolution of the profit shares. While our estimates match the rising
profit shares through a decline in returns to scale, we consider an alternative parametriza-
tion: we impose constant returns to scale, and calculate hypothetical markups that account
for all the industry and time variation in profit shares. In panel A of table 1.5, we show that
matching industry profits through markups alone also does away with the increasing trend
in misallocation from the Hsieh-Klenow model. By this alternative calculation, misalloca-
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tion between 1982 and 2007 is virtually unchanged, increasing by 3%. By contrast, the
baseline misallocation from the Hsieh-Klenow model increased 29% over the same period.
We view the elimination of this upward trend in misallocation as evidence that accounting
for industry profits is of first-order importance for measuring misallocation.
In our second robustness exercise, we allow establishments to charge different markups
within an industry. Formally, we follow Atkeson and Burstein (2008) in assuming that es-
tablishments sell their output in oligopolistically competitive markets instead of monopo-
listically competitive ones. In this setting, an establishment is aware that its choice of how
much to produce affects both its own price and also the price level of the whole industry.
Larger establishments exert a larger impact on the industry price level and this influence
is reflected in larger markups. This establishment-specific markup depends on the elastic-
ity of substitution σi, which is common to all industries in the Hsieh-Klenow model and
varies across industries in our model. We present full details of the model in appendix
A.2. The key challenge in this extension is to solve for the establishment-specific markup
in the counterfactual where we eliminate distortions. This problem is akin to a contraction
mapping, and we solve it by iterating on an initial guess.
Panel A of table 1.5 shows that the additional generalization to markups that vary
within the industry leaves trends in misallocation essentially unchanged. Relative to the
baseline 29% increase and the 13% decline, allowing markups to vary across establish-
ments leads to a 28% increase and an 11% decline, respectively, in the Hsieh-Klenow
model and in our own. While the trends in misallocation remain unchanged, the levels
of misallocation decline with heterogeneous markups within the industry. The decline is
more notable in our model, with misallocation some 10% lower per year (e.g., from 104%
to 96% in 2007), while the level in the Hsieh-Klenow model declines about 3% (e.g., 83%
to 81% in 2007).
In a third robustness exercise, also reported in panel A, we argue that the different pat-
terns of misallocation are robust to accounting for sample selection in the Annual Survey of
Manufactures. The survey covers all large establishments and a random sample of smaller
ones. Our baseline estimates of misallocation account for this sample selection by weight-
ing establishments by their Census-provided sampling weights in calculating industry and
aggregate misallocation. For this exercise, we construct the measure of misallocation using
the full Census of Manufactures in 1982 and 2007, two of the years for which we have such
data available. At a 27% increase and a 9% decline, the results of this extension replicate
the baseline patterns.
We next consider alternative ways, and sets of assumptions, for estimating markups
and returns to scale, and argue that introducing industry and time variation in these pa-
rameters continues to remove the sharp increase in misallocation from the Hsieh-Klenow
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Table 1.5: U.S. Manufacturing Misallocation Relative to 1982, Robustness
Panel A: Baseline Estimates
Hsieh-Klenow Model Our Model
Baseline 0.29 -0.13
Model Change:
0.03
impose constant returns to scale with im-
plicit markups to match profit shares
Model Change:
0.28 -0.11
allow markups to vary across establish-
ments in an industry
Sample Change:
0.27 -0.09
use Census of Manufactures instead of
Annual Survey of Manufactures
Panel B: Alternate Estimates
Hsieh-Klenow Model Our Model
Estimation Change:
0.22 0.09
estimate labor share of value added using
Ackerberg et al (2015) instead of FOC
Estimation Change:
0.26 -0.32
define industries more broadly as NAICS
4-digit instead of NAICS 6-digit
Estimation Change:
0.18 -0.02
use ten-year panels instead of five-year
panels and compare 2007 to 1987
model. First, instead of calculating the labor share of value added βLi directly as the share
of labor expenditures, we estimate βLi in a control-function procedure alongside the two
other elasticities. Second, we estimate markups and returns to scale for more broadly
defined industries. Lastly, we lengthen the time frame of the estimation, using ten-year
panels instead of five-year panels of data to estimate markups and returns to scale.
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While our baseline estimates directly measure the labor share as the ratio of labor costs
to value added, at the top of panel B we instead estimate the labor share as a revenue elas-
ticity using the Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) correction to the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) control-function procedure. To estimate this labor elasticity, we need additional
assumptions that justify the use of intermediate inputs as proxies for productivity. One
possibility is that some unobserved component of productivity is realized after an estab-
lishment chooses its labor and before it chooses its intermediate inputs. Hence, we now
have to assume that establishments choose the labor they hire before they choose their
intermediate inputs, and that unobserved productivity is realized before the intermediate-
input choice. Our estimates of this labor elasticity suggest an 11% decline in labor’s share
of value added, compared to our direct calculation of a 25% decline. With a smaller de-
cline of the labor share, we also find a smaller reduction in returns to scale over time.
Ultimately, this more modest change in returns to scale over time leads to a smaller de-
parture from the Hsieh-Klenow model’s trend in misallocation; these alternate estimates
imply a 9% increase in misallocation, a bit less than half the increase in the Hsieh-Klenow
model.
We next estimate markups and returns to scale for more broadly-defined industries,
and find that the divergent patterns of misallocation are amplified. Specifically, we use the
NAICS-4 industry code instead of the more detailed NAICS-6. For instance, an industry
now corresponds to “Dairy Product” instead of “Ice Cream and Frozen Dessert.” The sec-
ond entry in panel B shows that while misallocation in the Hsieh-Klenow model increases
a bit over of 20%, misallocation in our model falls 32%, more than twice our baseline
decline. This larger decline reflects an interaction of two forces. First, our measure of
misallocation focuses on within-industry reallocation of resources. When we broaden the
industry definition, we implicitly allow resources to be allocated across the NAICS-6 in-
dustries that comprise a NAICS-4. Second, returns to scale determine how large an estab-
lishment grows as a share of the industry when its distortions are removed. The larger
are the returns to scale, the greater is the share of industry revenue generated by the most
productive establishment. The interaction of larger industries and the reduction in returns
to scale over time amplifies the decline in misallocation relative to our baseline results.
Lastly, we use ten-year instead of five-year panels to estimate the model parameters;
this procedure attenuates the differences in parameter values across time and hence re-
duces the differences in misallocation trends between the two models. Under these pa-
rameter estimates, our model suggests that misallocation decreased 2% between 1987
and 2007 while the Hsieh-Klenow model implies an increase of 18%. We contextualize
these estimates by reference to table 1.2, panel A, in which we document a continuous de-
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cline in returns to scale over the same period. By pooling the last decade of data together
in this robustness exercise, our estimate of the decline in returns to scale is smaller than
when we compare returns to scale only using the first five and the last five years of the
sample. Nonetheless, even this smoothing of parameter estimates preserves the divergent
trends in misallocation.
1.6 Conclusion
We argue in this paper that accounting for industry and time variation in markups and
returns to scale leads to a measure of misallocation in U.S. manufacturing that is decreas-
ing over time; this result stands in contrast to the increasing measure of misallocation
under the widely-applied assumptions of a common markup and constant returns to scale,
as in the Hsieh-Klenow model. To quantify these differences, we use five-year panels of
restricted U.S. Census microdata to estimate markups and returns to scale across manu-
facturing industries. We find that industries differ meaningfully in these parameters at a
given point in time, and that the average returns to scale in U.S. manufacturing declined
between 1982 and 2007.
We decompose the differences in misallocation between the two models, and identify
the decline in returns to scale as the primary driver of the divergent trends in misallocation.
The Hsieh-Klenow measure on average understates our measure of misallocation. The
assumption of constant returns to scale is a better fit for the data in 2007 than it is for
1982. Consequently, as the U.S. manufacturing sector began to reflect more closely the
assumption of constant returns, the discrepancy in measuring misallocation declined. As
this discrepancy declined, the Hsieh-Klenow measure of misallocation asymptoted toward
our measure from below and hence drove the upward trend in misallocation.
We formalize the source of these differences in misallocation and show that, by ig-
noring the variation in markups and returns to scale, the Hsieh-Klenow model measures
productivity in a way that conflates productivity and distortions. These spurious correla-
tions lead us to incorrectly infer the extent to which the most productive establishments
bear the most burdensome distortions, and hence to an incorrect measure of misallocation.
We think the patterns we identify in markups and returns to scale, and the discrepancies
we highlight in measuring productivity, could be of broader interest. Outside the literature
on misallocation, the measurement of establishment-level productivity is a key input in
other attempts to trace the impacts of policies and shocks from affected establishments to
aggregate outcomes.
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CHAPTER II
Globalization and Top Income Shares
From a work with Lin Ma
Abstract
This paper documents empirically that access to global markets is associated with a higher
executive-to worker pay ratio within the firm. It then uses China’s 2001 accession to the
World Trade Organization as a trade shock to show that firms that exported to China prior
to 2001 subsequently exported more, grew larger, and grew more unequal in terms of
executive-to-worker pay. To analytically and quantitatively evaluate the impacts of glob-
alization on top income inequality, this paper builds a model with heterogeneous firms,
occupational choice, and executive compensation. In the model, executive compensation
grows with the size of the firm, while the wage paid to ordinary workers is determined in
a country-wide labor market. As a result, the extra profits earned in the foreign markets
benefit the executives more than the average workers. We calibrate the model to the U.S.
economy and match the income distribution closely in the data. Counterfactual exercises
suggest that trade and FDI liberalizations can explain around 52 percent of the surge in
top 0.1 percent income shares in the data between 1988 and 2008.
JEL Codes: E25 F12 F62 J33
Keywords: trade, income inequality, occupational choice, CEO compensation
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2.1 Introduction
The real income of the top 0.1 percent of the population increased by 85.8 percent
between 1993 and 2011 in the United States; the real income of the bottom 99 percent
increased by only 5.8 percent over the same period.1 At the same time, the past several
decades witnessed the fastest pace of globalization since the start of the First World War.
The existing literature does not provide a clear link between globalization and the runaway
top income shares. Researchers working on the distributional effects of trade usually focus
on wage inequality and especially on the “skill premium,” the wage difference between
skilled and unskilled workers.2 However, the income of the top 0.1 percent—which usually
consists of executive compensation, business profits, and capital gains—cannot be easily
explained using the “skill premium.”3
Complementing the literature on the skill premium, this paper examines how global-
ization shapes the income gap between the very rich and the rest of the population. We
first document a novel empirical pattern: income gaps between the top executives and
the average workers are higher among exporting firms than among non-exporting firms
in the United States. We then provide causal evidence on this relationship using China’s
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a trade shock: firms that benefit
from lower trade barriers export more, grow larger, and grow more unequal. Motivated
by the empirical findings, we develop a new model that incorporates occupational choice
and executive compensation into a heterogeneous firms model of trade. The model re-
produces the empirical patterns we documented at the firm level, and generates income
and firm size distributions that closely resemble the aggregate U.S. data. We then perform
a quantitative assessment of the impacts of globalization on the CEO-to-worker pay ratio
within a firm and on the top income shares within the country as a whole. Counterfactual
simulation suggests that globalization can explain up to 52 percent of the surge in top 0.1
percent income shares in the U.S. between 1988 and 2008.
To establish a link between globalization and the income gap between the very rich
and the rest, we create a new dataset that matches executive compensation to confidential
U.S. Census microdata on payroll and international transactions. The resulting dataset
focuses on publicly-listed firms and provides detailed information on executive compensa-
1Piketty and Saez (2003), with data updated to 2011.
2Among many others, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010), and
Burstein and Vogel (2012).
3For example, numerous studies have shown that education level, a widely used measure of skill, has
no clear correlation with CEO compensation (Belliveau, O’Reilly and Wade, 1996; Geletkanycz, Boyd and
Finkelstein, 2001) .
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tion, employment, payroll, and export sales.4 We focus on the top executives because they
constitute a large fraction of the top earners. Around 40 percent of the top 0.1 percent
income earners in the U.S. are professional executives, and these 0.04 percent earners are
responsible for about 4 percent of the national income (Bakija et al., 2012). To our knowl-
edge, this is the first dataset assembled that can be used to study the relationship between
international trade and the CEO-to-worker pay ratio.
With this new dataset, we document that globalization disproportionately benefits the
top executives relative to the workers within the same firm. Specifically, the gap in com-
pensation between the CEO and the average worker in the firm—the CEO-to-worker pay
ratio—is 50 percent larger for exporting firms compared to domestic firms. This glob-
alization premium for the CEO-to-worker pay ratio holds for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms, for multinationals as well as exporters, for private as well as public
firms, for comparisons across firms, and for comparisons within firms as they transition
to exporting. As in the simplest Melitz (2003) model of trade, the impact of globaliza-
tion is intermediated through firm size. We show that accounting for the firm-size chan-
nel is sufficient to explain the differential in CEO-to-worker pay ratios between exporters
and non-exporters. One can imagine other channels—special CEO skill for exporting or
compensation for greater risk—that would increase the exporting CEO premium over and
above what is implied by size. We do not find evidence of a meaningful premium in excess
of that explained by size. Hence, our quantitative assessment focuses on the size channel.
We use China’s 2001 accession to the WTO to provide direct evidence from a trade
shock to firm exports, firm size, and CEO-to-worker pay ratios. Following its accession to
the WTO, China gradually lowered import tariffs from an average of 15 percent in 2000 to
10 percent by 2007 (Lu and Yu, 2015). The tariff reductions potentially benefit firms with
existing export links to China more than those without such existing relationships. Using a
difference-in-differences methodology, we compare a treatment group of firms with China-
specific trading relationships prior to 2001 to control groups drawn from the remaining
firms. We find that, in the aftermath of China’s WTO accession, the firms in the treatment
group exported 57 percent more, grew 40 percent larger in terms of employment and
payroll, and grew 13 percent more unequal as measured by the CEO-to-worker pay ratio.
These results suggest that globalization might be responsible for the widening income gaps
between the rich and the poor through within-firm inequality.
To evaluate the aggregate implications of the firm-level findings, we develop a frame-
work that bridges the heterogeneous firm trade model based on Melitz (2003) with the
4Appendixes B.1 and B.2.1 construct the data and repeat the analysis for a limited set of privately-held
firms.
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literature on occupational choice and executive compensation. The model world consists
of two countries. Each country is populated by a fixed measure of individuals who are
endowed with different levels of human capital. An individual chooses between different
occupations, as in Lucas (1978). She can either (1) create a new firm and become the
founder and CEO of the firm or (2) work for an existing firm. If she chooses to create
a new firm, her human capital determines the productivity of the firm, and her income
depends positively on the size of the firm.5 If she chooses to be a worker, her human cap-
ital determines the amount of efficiency labor she supplies to the market. The wage rate
of efficiency labor is determined in a competitive countrywide labor market and equalized
across firms within the same country. In equilibrium, only the individuals with human cap-
ital above a certain threshold choose to create firms, while the majority of the population
chooses to work for an existing firm. Each firm produces a distinct variety and sells it in
a monopolistically competitive market. Firms can choose to export to the foreign market
after incurring fixed costs.
The model replicates the new empirical pattern documented in this paper; in equilib-
rium, within-firm inequality is higher among the firms that sell to the foreign market. The
key mechanism is that the extra profits earned in the foreign market are not distributed
evenly within the same firm. The compensation paid to the CEO of a firm is linked to the
sales of the firm, while the wage rate of a typical worker is determined in a countrywide
labor market. Any extra profits earned in the foreign market benefit the CEO directly, but
benefit the workers only through general equilibrium effects. In the end, as the firm sells
to the foreign market, its within-firm inequality will be higher. At the aggregate level,
trade creates a gap in within-firm inequality between the exporting and domestic firms.
Consistent with the empirical patterns described above, in the model, the size of the firm
solely determines the level of within-firm inequality; once the size is controlled for, the
exporting status of a firm has no impact on its CEO-to-worker pay ratio.
Before using the model to quantify the impact of globalization on top income shares,
we show that the model can parsimoniously and precisely characterize the U.S. income
and firm distributions at the same time. Empirically, the U.S. income distribution is well
approximated by an exponential distribution for the majority at the left end and a Pareto
distribution for the right tail.6 At the same time, the U.S. firm size distribution can also be
5In the appendix, we provide an extension of the model to micro-found a market in which existing het-
erogeneous firms match with potential entrepreneurs. The micro-foundation delivers assortative matching
between the CEOs and the firms, which in turn leads to the same compensation function that is exogenously
assumed in the benchmark model.
6See Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko (2001a), Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko (2001b), Clementi and Gallegati
(2005), and Yakovenko and Silva (2005) for details.
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well described by a fat-tailed Pareto distribution (Axtell (2001)). These two distributions
are captured simultaneously within the model by two assumptions: (1) human capital
is distributed exponentially, and (2) firm productivity is an exponential function of the
founder’s human capital. The model then features a Pareto firm size distribution and
a two-class-structured income distribution. The workers’ wage depends on their human
capital, which implies an exponentially distributed income outside of the very rich. The
individuals at the right tail of the income distribution are the CEOs, whose income is
linked to the size of the firm they manage. This implies that the right tail of the income
distribution will follow the firm size distribution and thus be Pareto. Once the model is
calibrated, it reproduces both the firm size and the income distribution observed in the
data with reasonable precision.
Model counterfactuals suggest that trade liberalizations can explain 52 percent of the
surge in the top 0.1 percent income shares in the United States between 1988 and 2008.
To arrive at these values, we match one country in the model to the U.S. economy and the
other to the rest of the world; we then calibrate their trade barriers and their relative TFP
to match the data for each year. Targeting these moments alone, we compare the income
distribution in the model to the income distribution in the data to quantify the potential
explanatory power of our channel, linking globalization, firm size, and inequality. In other
counterfactual exercises, we also study how income inequality responds to changes in
trade barriers as we move from autarky to the observed level of trade openness. For 2008,
this latter exercise more than triples the CEO-to-worker pay ratio at the largest firms in the
United States. At the aggregate level, this opening to trade skews the income distribution
rightward: the top 0.1 percent income share increases from 9.1 percent to 10.2 percent
between autarky and trade.
By linking globalization and top income shares, this paper contributes to the literature
on the distributional effects of globalization and the discussion on rising income inequal-
ity in the United States. The majority of the existing research in the international trade
literature focuses on how globalization affects wage inequality, and particularly the wage
and income gap between skilled and unskilled workers.7 Top income inequality, such as
the income gap between top managers and workers or the overall top income shares, is
often overlooked in the trade literature. At the same time, researchers working on income
inequality documented that the rising income inequality in the U.S. is mainly driven by the
7For example, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Manasse and Turrini (2001),Yeaple (2005), Helpman,
Itskhoki and Redding (2010), and Egger and Kreickemeier (2012). Bernard and Jensen (1997) documented
that exporting is associated with higher within-firm inequality in terms of the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled workers. This paper focuses on another dimension of within-firm inequality: the wage gap
between top managers and workers.
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widening gaps between the top 1 percent and the bottom 99 percent, not by the income
inequality within the bottom 99 percent themselves. Moreover, papers in this literature
showed that a substantial part of the rise in U.S. top income inequality is due to the rise
in labor income inequality, especially when business income is included in the category of
labor income.8 This current paper bridges the gap between the two literature by focusing
on the impact of globalization on top income inequality. It is the first paper to show em-
pirically that the access to the world markets increases CEO-to-worker pay ratio within the
same firm, and thus trade can potentially affect top income shares. This paper also quanti-
tatively shows that a large part of the surge in top income shares in the United States can
potentially be attributed to globalization.
In broadening the focus to inequality between the very rich and the rest of the popula-
tion, this paper complements an existing literature on inequality across executives. Monte
(2011) and Meckl and Weigert (2011) developed models exploring the effects of trade on
income inequality among the managers. By contrast, the model here is designed to gener-
ate a realistic income distribution that spans the entire population in general equilibrium,
which has not been done before in the trade literature. This broader scope enables quanti-
tative analysis of the aggregate impacts of globalization on income inequality, both within
the right tail, and over the entire population.
By introducing Census data to the study of executive compensation, this paper also
interfaces with the large literature on corporate governance and executive compensation
(Roberts, 1956; Baker and Hall, 2004; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Frydman and Saks,
2010). Compared to the existing literature, which mostly focuses on the level of execu-
tive compensation, the census data allow us both to measure the magnitude of executive
compensation relative to the wages of ordinary workers within the same firm, and to do
so on a large and comprehensive sample. In the process, we provide a new perspective
to understand the implications of surging executive pay on inequality.9 This paper is also
the first to study executive-to-worker pay ratio among privately-held firms. A small strand
of this literature, such as Sanders and Carpenter (1998), Oxelheim and Randøy (2005),
Cuat and Guadalupe (2009), and Gerakos, Piotroski and Srinivasan (2009) documented
that executive compensation in public firms increases as the firms start to participate in
the global markets. This paper further documents that the positive link between executive
compensation and globalization can also be observed at privately-held firms, though the
magnitude is smaller.
8Among many others, see Piketty and Saez (2003) and Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011).
9It is possible to measure CEO-to-worker pay ratio without using the Census data as well. However, this
usually leads to a biased and small sample of firms. This is discussed in detail in Section 2.2.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the empirical results.
Section 2.3 presents the model and Section 2.4 focuses on the analytical results. Section
2.5 provides details of the calibration and quantitative results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence: Trade and Within-Firm Inequality
In this section, we first describe a new data set linking executive compensation to
administrative firm-level data; we then document the robust relationships among within-
firm inequality, export status, and size; finally, we provide direct evidence that trade shocks
drive within-firm inequality using China’s access to the WTO. These new empirical patterns
motivate our modeling choices in section 2.3.
2.2.1 Data
Our empirical evidence focuses on public firms and is based on a linked data set that
has three components: ExecuCompustat from Standard & Poor, the Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD) from the Census Bureau, and the Longitudinal Firm Trade Transactions
Database (LFTTD) from the U.S. Customs and the Census Bureau. Appendix B.1 details
the construction of the data set used in the body of the paper, and introduces the data on
privately held firms to which we return later.
This novel linked data set provides more comprehensive coverage of both payroll and
export statistics relative to the data used in the existing literature. First, U.S. public firms
are not required to disclose non-executive compensations. As a result, the majority of
firms do not report total payroll expenditure in SEC filings, making it almost impossible to
compute wages at the firm level and within-firm inequality. For example, as reported by
Faleye, Reis and Venkateswaran (2013), around 87 percent of firms have to be dropped
from ExecuCompustat due to this missing value problem in their study of the CEO-to-
worker pay ratio. The under-reporting also leads to distortions of sectoral representation
in the sample. For example, around 43 percent of the sample in ExecuCompustat are
manufacturing firms, but they only constitute 16 percent of the sample in Faleye, Reis and
Venkateswaran (2013). By contrast, the LBD provides universal coverage of employment
and payroll and thus minimizes the loss of observations. Overall, around 50 percent of
the ExecuCompustat observations can be matched with the linked LBD-LFTTD, which is
on par with most studies that use the Compustat-SSEL bridge provided by the census. The
sectoral representation in ExecuCompustat is also preserved in the data set used in this
paper (See Table B.1 for details). For example, in the linked data set, manufacturing firms
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constitute 47 percent of the sample, a significant improvement over the sample used in
the existing literature. Second, as firms are not required to report export sales separately,
the missing value problem is prevalent in non-administrative data sets, forcing researchers
to discard a large proportion of the data in studies that involve exporting behavior. By
using the LFTTD, which provides universal coverage of U.S. international transactions, we
minimize this reduction in sample size.
The final linked data set contains a sample of 17,233 firm-year observations between
1992 and 2007 with 2,561 unique firms. A total of 13,169 firm-year observations are
classified as exporters and the remaining 4,054 as non-exporters. Overall the combined
dataset contains around half of the US public firms over the period. Due to the nature
of publicly-traded firms, large firms are over-represented in the dataset, as compared to
the universe of U.S. firms. As a result of this, this dataset is also heavily skewed toward
exporting firms: around 76 percent of the observations are exporting firms, and this is
higher than the overall percentage of firms that export in the U.S.10 Over-representation
of large firms naturally leads to problems if one wish to make inferences for the overall
economy. This problem is mitigated here, since it is reasonable to believe that the CEO-to-
worker pay ratios are much smaller and less variable in small firms, and thus the results
for the overall economy will be mainly driven by large firms.
The key variable of interest is the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. We construct this ratio
as the total realized compensation (TDC2) divided by the average non-executive wage.
To construct the average non-executive wage we subtract the salary and bonus of the
CEO from the firm’s total payroll for the year and then divide this difference by the total
employment less the CEO. We rationalize this construction of the non-executive wage as
follows: “Total payroll” as reported in the LBD comes from the Business Register, which is
in turn based on IRS tax records. The salary and bonus of the CEO are reported as part
of the total payroll for tax purposes, while the income earned from stock options is not.11
Therefore, we need subtract only the salary and bonus of the CEO when computing the
non-executive wage. The denominator is one less the total employment to account for the
fact that the CEO is also counted as an employee in tax filings.
2.2.2 Export Status and Within-Firm Inequality
Over the course of our sample, an average CEO earns 89 times more than an average
worker in the same firm; this CEO-to-worker pay ratio varies by exporting status: it is on
10For example, Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2009) reports that 18 percent of U.S. manufacturing firms
exported in 2002.
11The “total payroll” and “employment” items in LBD are compiled from filings of IRS Form-941/943. See
IRS Publications 15, 15-A, and 15-B for the details of tax deductions and exemptions.
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average 92 for exporting firms and 81 for non-exporting firms. Appendix table B.2 reports
these and other summary statistics.
We test these differences in within-firm inequality across exporters and non-exporters
by estimating the following equation on the pooled panel data:
log (CEOit/WAGEit) = β0 + β1EXPit + b
′
2 · g + b′3 · y + it. (2.1)
We define CEOit/WAGEit as the CEO-to-worker pay ratio, EXPit as the exporter status
indicator for firm i at year t, g as a vector of group fixed effects (e.g., four-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, or firm identifiers), and y as a vector of year fixed
effects. The standard errors are clustered at the year-sector level in the baseline specifica-
tion. The coefficient of interest is β1: if the CEO-to-worker pay ratio is significantly higher
for exporters, we expect this parameter to be positive.
Table 2.1 shows that the CEO-to-worker pay ratio is higher among exporters than
among non-exporters across a variety of specifications. Column 1 looks at manufactur-
ing firms, includes sector fixed effects and finds that this measure of within-firm inequality
is 73.3% higher for exporters than for non-exporters. Column 2 repeats the comparison
across all firms and finds an exporter premium of 50.7% for within-firm inequality. We look
Table 2.1: Within-Firm Inequality and Export Status
Dependent Variable Log CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter 0.733*** 0.507*** 0.093***
0.108 (0.030) (0.028)
Log Exports 0.119***
(0.005)
Sample Manufacturing All All All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Fixed Effects Sector Sector Sector Firm
Observations 8,000 17,000 13,000 17,000
R-squared 0.219 0.270 0.323 0.628
Note: The left-hand side variable for each of the regressions is the (log of) CEO-to-worker pay
ratio. “Exporter” is the exporter indicator computed from LFTTD. Exports are dollar values of
shipments from LFTTD. The unit of observation is firm-year and year varies between 1992 and
2007. See Table B.1 for sector distribution of the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the
year-sector level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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at the intensive margin of exporting in column 3 by replacing the indicator EXPit with the
log of firm exports. In that setting we find that a 1-percent increase in firm exports is as-
sociated with an 0.12-percent increase in within-firm inequality. Lastly, column 4 replaces
sector-level fixed effects with firm-level fixed effects to identify the key correlation from
the time-series variation in export status within a firm; we find the exporter premium on
within-firm inequality drops drastically to 9.3% in that case, suggesting firm characteristics
can explain a large proportion of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. All the estimates are sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels. In appendix table B.5, we show that the strong
positive correlation between within-firm inequality and export status holds for changes in
data (e.g., private firms, other executives, different components and different measures of
CEO compensation) as well as changes in the specification of the estimating equation (e.g.,
different clustering choices, different fixed effects, inclusion of firm-specific time trends).
Table 2.2 suggests that differences in firm size drive most of the differences in the
CEO-to-worker pay ratio. We proceed in two steps. First, we show in panel A that larger
firms have greater within-firm inequality. Specifically, we replace the exporter indicator
in equation 2.1 with measures of firm size: employment and payroll in the United States.
Column 1, focusing on the manufacturing sector, suggests that a 1% increase in the firm’s
employment is associated with a CEO-to-Worker pay ratio that is 0.39% larger. In the
sample with all firms, the same 1% increase in employment also coincides with a 0.39%
increase in our measure of within-firm inequality, as per column 2. The remaining two
columns affirm that this size-inequality relationship is positive and robust when we use the
firm’s payroll as a measure of size. Second, in panel B we include in equation 2.1 both the
exporter indicator and a measure of firm size. In each specification, the coefficient on the
size measure is positive, statistically significant, and dwarfs in magnitude the coefficient on
exporter status. Furthermore, the coefficients on exporter status are close to zero and only
sometimes significant. For instance, including employment as a measure of size reduces
the coefficient on exporter status in column 2 by an order of magnitude: column 2 now
suggests that exporters have a 5.0% larger CEO-to-Worker pay ratio than non-exporters,
while same coefficient was 50.7% in table 2.1 when we did not control for firm size. These
patterns repeat throughout the table, both when we change the sample of firms, as well as
when we replace employment with payroll as the measure of firm size. In appendix table
B.6, we show that the results also hold for firm sales and asset holdings, measures of firm
size from COMPUSTAT.12
12We focus primarily on measures of employment and payroll from the LBD because these measures reflect
a firm’s size in the United States. For COMPUSTAT, it is not clear whether a given data point reflects a firm’s
global or U.S.-based sales and assets; consequently, we relegate the analysis of COMPUSTAT size measures
to the appendix.
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Table 2.2: Within-Firm Inequality, Export Status, and Firm Size
Panel A: Within-Firm Inequality and Firm Size in the United States
Dependent Variable Log CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Employment 0.388*** 0.391***
(0.010) (0.007)
Log Payroll 0.378*** 0.370***
(0.010) (0.008)
Sample Manufacturing All Manufacturing All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Fixed Effects Sector Sector Sector Sector
Observations 8,000 17,000 8,000 17,000
R-squared 0.376 0.407 0.362 0.385
Panel B: Within-Firm Inequality and Export Status, Controlling for Firm Size
Dependent Variable Log CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter -0.060 0.050* 0.049 0.070***
(0.095) (0.026) (0.101) (0.027)
Log Employment 0.389*** 0.388***
(0.010) (0.007)
Log Payroll 0.377*** 0.364***
(0.011) (0.009)
Sample Manufacturing All Manufacturing All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Fixed Effects Sector Sector Sector Sector
Observations 8,000 17000 8,000 17000
R-squared 0.376 0.407 0.362 0.385
Note: The left-hand side variable for each of the regressions is the (log of) CEO-to-worker pay
ratio. “Exporter” is the exporter indicator computed from LFTTD. Exports are dollar values of
shipments from LFTTD. Employment is the total annual employment reported in LBD. Payroll
is the total annual payroll reported in LBD. The unit of observation is firm-year and the time
period spans 1992 through 2007. See Table B.1 for sector distribution of the sample. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the year-sector level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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These exercises convey a consistent message: the “exporter premium” for within-firm
inequality is driven by the size of the exporters. Larger firms have higher within-firm
inequality, and the reason we observe higher within-firm inequality among exporters is
precisely because those firms are larger – a stylized fact confirmed by the empirical trade
literature that motivated the new generation of heterogeneous firms trade models.13 These
results suggest that within-firm inequality can be naturally incorporated into a Melitz trade
model, where exporting behavior and size are linked.
The insignificance of exporting status conditional on size does not imply that trade is
irrelevant for within-firm inequality. Without trade, many of the large firms in the sample
would not have been able to grow to the size that we observe in the data. In a counterfac-
tual world where all the firms can only sell to the domestic market, many of the large firms
would be smaller and, thus, their within-firm inequality would be lower. The insignificance
of the exporter dummy implies only that whatever effect trade might have on within-firm
inequality, the main channel goes through the size of the firm. In some cases, the coeffi-
cient on the exporter dummy is significantly positive after controlling for size, indicating
that there are other factors that predict higher within-firm inequality among exporters. For
example, exporting firms might need different managerial skills than domestic firms and
thus are recruiting their CEOs in a different market. However, as the size of the coefficients
suggests, no matter what these factors are, their explanatory power is small relative to firm
size. Therefore, the model presented in Section 2.3 focuses solely on the size of the firm
and leaves the other factors to future research.
2.2.3 Within-Firm Inequality: Evidence from a Trade Shock
Having shown that within-firm inequality is higher for exporters than for non-exporters,
we now provide causal evidence on this channel using a trade shock: China’s 2001 acces-
sion to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Around the time of its accession, China
agreed to lower its import tariffs. Following a 6-percentage-point tariff reduction to 17%
between 1996 and 1997, China’s average tariff rate remained stable until the WTO acces-
sion, whereupon the average tariff declined to 10% by 2007 (Lu and Yu, 2015). Moreover,
when China became a WTO member on December 11, 2001, it received permanent, re-
ciprocal access to the most favored nation status, which reduced policy uncertainty and
the threat of trade wars (Handley and Lima˜o, 2017). These changes in trade policy made
China a more attractive destination for U.S. exporters and contributed to a rise in exports
to China. We next show that the reductions in China’s import tariffs primarily benefit the
U.S. firms that export to the Chinese market, increasing their export sales, firm size, and
within-firm inequality.
13For example, see Bernard and Jensen (1999).
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To estimate the causal effects of this trade shock, we compare the outcomes of firms
that had existing trading relationships with China prior to its WTO accession to firms
that did not have China-specific trading relationships. Our starting point is a standard
difference-in-differences regression specification, e.g., Angrist and Pischke (2008):
Outcomeit = δ0 + d′1 · f + d′2 · y (2.2)
+ δ1Treatmenti × Post China WTO Accessiont + it,
where Outcomeit is firm i’s exports, CEO-to-Worker pay ratio, or firm size in year t; f and y
are respectively the vectors of firm and year fixed effects; Treatmenti is an indicator taking
value one for firms that exported to China prior to the WTO accession, and zero otherwise;
and, “Post China WTO Accessiont” is an indicator taking value one for years 2002 and
onward, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest, δ1, captures the differential impact
of China’s accession to the WTO for firms that had a China-specific trading relationships
prior to the event.
We rely on the “parallel trends” assumption to give this comparison a causal interpre-
tation. Specifically, we posit that the observed outcomes of the untreated firms after the
shock parallel the counterfactual outcomes of the treated firms had the shock never taken
place. The causal effect is then the difference between the change in outcome for the firms
with a China-specific trade relationship and the change in outcome for the firms without
such a relationship. In appendix B.2.2, we provide more details on the timing of the shock,
the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption, and robustness for the results that fol-
low. Note also that—unlike the cross-sectional comparison in the previous section—the
estimating procedure we use here relies on within-firm variation in the CEO-to-worker pay
ratio. Since the variation within firms is meaningfully smaller than the variation across
firms, this procedure is more demanding of the data.14
China’s accession to the WTO resulted in increased exports and higher within-firm
inequality for firms that exported to China prior to 2001, as per panel A of Table 2.3. We
begin by focusing on the manufacturing sector and in columns 1 and 2 we define firms
as “treated” if they exported to China in the three years between 1998 and 2000.15 For
firms with this pre-existing China-specific relationship, China’s accession to the WTO led
to a 56.8% increase in exports and a 12.5% increase in the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. In
14The cross-sectional variance of ln(CEO-to-Worker pay ratio) is 1.205; the within-firm variance is roughly
half the size at 0.659.
15We choose a three-year window based on the work of Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2016), who
document that import-export relationships in the United States that last at least three years account for 47%
of the value of trade. We show in appendix B.2.2 that shifting the treatment window to include 2001, the
year of the WTO accession, does not change our conclusions.
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Table 2.3: China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization and Within-Firm Inequality
Panel A: Exports and CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio
Dependent Variable (log) Exports
CEO-to-
Worker Pay
Ratio
Exports
CEO-to-
Worker Pay
Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment × Post 0.568*** 0.125** 0.768*** 0.076*
China WTO Accession (0.120) (0.060) (0.112) (0.043)
Treatment
Exporter to China
1998-2000
Exporter to China
1998-2000
Sample Manufacturing All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,000 8,000 13,000 17,000
R-squared 0.908 0.714 0.932 0.755
Panel B: Employment and Payroll
Dependent Variable (log) Employment Payroll Employment Payroll
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment × Post 0.385*** 0.406*** 0.505*** 0.500***
China WTO Accession (0.067) (0.067) (0.061) (0.062)
Treatment
Exporter to China
1998-2000
Exporter to China
1998-2000
Sample Manufacturing All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,000 8,000 17,000 17,000
R-squared 0.926 0.917 0.937 0.922
Note: The left-hand side variable for each of the regressions is the (log of) CEO-to-worker pay
ratio. “Exporter” is the exporter indicator computed from LFTTD. Exports are dollar values of
shipments from LFTTD. Employment is the total annual employment reported in LBD. Payroll
is the total annual payroll reported in LBD. The unit of observation is firm-year and the time
period spans 1992 through 2007. See Table B.1 for sector distribution of the sample. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the year-sector level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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columns 3 and 4 we expand the sample to cover firms in all sectors, and we estimate a
76.8% increase in exports and a 7.6% increase in within-firm inequality.
The pass-through of trade shocks to within-firm inequality takes place through firm
size. Complementing the evidence in panel A that exports increased, panel B shows that
China’s accession to the WTO also led to increases in employment and payroll for firms
with China-specific relationships. Columns 1 and 2 focus on the manufacturing sector and
document that China’s accession resulted in roughly 40% increases in both employment
and payroll for those firms. Maintaining the same 1998-2000 treatment window and ex-
panding the sample to all firms, as in columns 3 and 4, increases these estimates to roughly
50% increases in employment and payroll for the treated firms. For both sets of firms, the
trade shocks increase employment and payroll by roughly the same magnitude, suggesting
that the average firm wage is not responsive to the trade shocks. This in turn implies that
the observed surge in CEO-to-worker pay ratio is driven by the fact that the trade shocks
primarily increase executive compensation but not the average wage.
Taking the ratio of our estimates for trade-driven changes in inequality and firm size,
we derive an implied elasticity: a 1% increase in firm size leads to a 0.2-0.3% increase
in within-firm inequality and executive compensation. This range falls slightly below the
elasticity of 0.4 that we estimated by regressing log size on log inequality directly in panel
A of table 2.2. As we argued above, the workers’ wages are unaffected by the trade shocks;
hence, this elasticity also describes how CEO compensation changes with firm size, a re-
lationship that is known as Roberts’ Law (Roberts, 1956). In fact, Gabaix (2009) lists the
standard range of Roberts’ Law elasticities as 0.2-0.4, which encompasses our trade-driven
estimates.
2.3 The Model
In this section, we build a model of heterogeneous firm in which international trade
shapes within-firm inequality by changing firm size. The model setup is based on Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004). We introduce occupational choice and executive compensation
into the framework. The contribution of the model is two-fold. First, it offers a tractable
framework to analyze the effects of trade on the CEO-to-worker pay ratio within each firm
and overall income inequality. Second, the simple framework is also empirically relevant:
it is able to generate income distribution and firm-size distribution with full support that
closely resemble the data. Within this framework, we then carry out a quantitative analysis
to evaluate the impacts of globalization on income inequality, both within the right-tail of
the income distribution, and between the right-tail and the general population.
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2.3.1 Model Setup
The model world consists of two countries indexed by i. Each country i is populated by
individuals with measure ni. People in each country are endowed with human capital x.
As x uniquely identifies each individual, with a slight abuse of notations, we also use x as
index for individuals within a country. The distribution of human capital in each country
follows an exponential distribution with shape parameter λ. The cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of human capital is as follows:
F (x) = 1− e−λx.
We use the exponential distribution, together with other assumptions explained later in
this section, to capture the structure and shape of the income distribution and the firm size
distribution at the same time. We characterize the distributions in more detail when we
present the analytical results in section 2.4.
An individual can choose between two careers. She can either work for an existing
firm or she can create a new firm. If she chooses to be a worker, then her human capital
directly translates into the amount of efficiency labor that will be inelastically supplied to
the market. In this case, the individual’s income will be wix, where wi is the prevailing
wage rate per efficiency unit of labor in country i. Individuals cannot move between
countries and the wage rate wi is determined in a country-wide competitive labor market.
The individual can also create a new firm to start producing a new variety of good.
In doing so she becomes the founder and CEO of the firm. The productivity of the firm,
denoted by Ai(x), depends on the human capital of the founder and takes the following
form:
Ai(x) = bie
x, (2.3)
where bi is the total factor productivity (TFP) in country i. With the assumption on the
distribution of x, the above function implies that firm productivity, Ai, follows a Type-I
Pareto distribution with location parameter bi and shape parameter λ (see appendix for the
proof). Subsequently this also implies that firm sales, employment, and profit distributions
will also be Paretian.
The payoff to the founder and CEO of the firm is a function of the profit of the firm,
denoted as k(pi) ≤ pi, where pi is the profit. For simplicity, we assume that the residual
profit after the CEO compensation is distributed back to the entire population in country
i evenly (i.e. all the people in the country own the firms through a mutual fund). This
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assumption does not affect the analysis of income inequality, and the main results of the
paper do not change meaningfully if we relax this assumption.
Reflecting Roberts’ Law (Roberts, 1956) from the corporate governance literature, we
assume that k(pi) is exogenously determined, monotonically increasing, and regularly-
varying in pi. By definition, a function k(pi) is regularly-varying with tail index β if and
only if for any z > 0, the following relationship holds:
lim
pi→∞
k(zpi)
k(pi)
= zβ.
Intuitively, regularly-varying functions are functions that behave like power functions at
the limit.16 In our context, the assumption of regular variation delivers the empirically
robust Roberts’ Law so CEO compensation is proportional to a power function of firm
profits asymptotically. The assumption of regular variation also implies that the right-tail
of the income distribution will exhibit Paretian behavior, though the vast majority of the
distribution follows an exponential distribution — again, an empirically relevant result,
which will be discussed in detail in the next section.
We show in appendix B.5 how these stylized, tractable features of the labor market
emerge from richer microfoundations. In the extended model, CEOs and firms match in
the market, and endogenously determine a compensation function for managerial talents,
k(x), much like in Gabaix and Landier (2008). In equilibrium, CEOs with higher talents
will be matched with firms with higher productivity, and thus the compensation function
will be monotonically increasing and regularly varying in both the managerial talent and
the size of the firm. Positive assortative matching also implies that the matching pattern
between CEOs and firms in equilibrium will be the same as if the best managers founded
the best firms and remained as CEOs thereafter, the assumption that we relied on in the
baseline model. As the endogenous labor market for CEOs delivers compensation func-
tions and matching patterns identical to those exogenously assumed, the extension can be
considered orthogonal to other parts of the model. For this very reason, we abstract away
from a full-fledged labor market and compensation model for the CEOs in the baseline
model, and refer the readers to appendix B.5 for more details.
The production side of the economy is modeled after Melitz (2003), with firms that are
heterogeneous in their productivityAi(x) each producing a single variety of a good indexed
by x. Each firm produces a quantity qi(x) of its variety using the following production
function:
qi(x) = Ai(x) · [Li(x)− fii],
16For more details, see Resnick (1987).
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where Li(x) is the labor demand and fii is the fixed cost of production, paid in the units
of labor of country i. The firms operate in a monopolistically-competitive market and earn
positive profit in equilibrium.
Firms in country i can export to country j by paying a fixed cost fji, denominated in
units of labor, to set up the distribution network. Trading incurs an iceberg cost of τji > 1:
in order to supply country j with one unit of good from country i, the firm needs to ship
τji units.
Individuals in country i consume a CES aggregate of all the varieties available in coun-
try i. Their utility function is as follows:
Ui =
(∫
m∈Θi
qi(m)
−1
 dm
) 
−1
,
where  is the elasticity of substitution, and Θi is the set of goods that are available in
country i.
2.3.2 Solution and Equilibrium Conditions
The solution to the firm’s problem is similar to Melitz (2003). Denote the total spending
in country i as Hi and the ideal price index as Pi. The maximum profit a firm in country i
can earn in its domestic market is:
piii(x) =
Hi

[
− 1

Pi
wi
]−1
Ai(x)
−1 − fiiwi.
The additional profit a firm in country i can earn from exporting to country j is:
pieji(x) =
Hj

[
− 1

Pj
τjiwi
]−1
Ai(x)
−1 − fjiwi, (2.4)
The details of the solution to the firm’s problem can be found in Appendix B.3.
Similar to Melitz (2003), under some loose parameter restrictions, firms sort into two
groups. All the firms founded in country i serve the domestic market first. Moreover, the
least productive firms only serve the domestic market. The more productive firms serve
the domestic market and the foreign market through export. Denote the human capital of
the founder of the least productive exporting firm in country i as xeji, the cutoff must be
the solution to the following equation respectively:
pieji(x
e
ji) = 0. (2.5)
The condition means that the marginal exporter earns zero profit from exporting.
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The solution of the occupational choice problem is a single cutoff rule. There exists
a human capital level x∗i in country i such that all the individuals with human capital
smaller than x∗i choose to be workers and all the other individuals choose to create firms.
The cutoff x∗i is the solution to the following equation:
k(pi(x∗i )) = wix
∗
i , (2.6)
which requires that in equilibrium the founder of the marginal firm to be indifferent be-
tween creating a new firm or working for an existing firm. The sufficient and necessary
condition for the existence of the solution is that k(pii(0)) < 0, which means that the indi-
vidual with the least amount of human capital must find creating a new firm unprofitable.
Figure 2.1 presents the solution in a simple setting where k(pi) = pi. The solid line is the
income of a worker as a function of his/her human capital. The dashed line is the income
of a CEO as a function of his/her human capital. Under the assumption that k(pi(0)) < 0,
the two curves cross once and only once at the cutoff human capital level x∗i .
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Figure 2.1: Solution of the Occupational Choice Problem
The graph plots the solution of the occupational choice problem. The black solid line is
the income of a worker, and the blue dashed line is the income of a CEO. The vertical line
indicates the cutoff human capital that is indifferent between being a worker or a CEO.
This graph assumes that k(pi) = pi.
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The equilibrium of the world economy is a vector of wages, {wi}, a vector of the oc-
cupational choice cutoffs {x∗i }, a vector of exporting cutoffs {xeji}, a vector of ideal price
levels {Pi}, and a vector of total expenditures {Hi} such that for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2:
1. Every individual in country i maximizes their income by solving the occupational
choice problem (equation (2.6) holds).
2. Every firm optimally chooses to be a non-exporter or exporter, (equations (2.5)
holds).
3. Total income equals to total expenditure in each country:
Hi = niwi
∫ x∗i
0
xfi(x)dx+ ni
∫ ∞
x∗i
pii(x)fi(x)dx. (2.7)
4. Aggregate price level and the individual prices satisfy the rational expectation condi-
tion:
Pi =
(∫
m∈Θi
p(m)1−dm
) 1
1−
. (2.8)
5. Labor market clears in each country.
Equation (2.7) is the income-expenditure identity in country i. In equilibrium, the total
expenditure in country i must equal the total income in country i, which is the sum of all
the wage and profit income17. Equation (2.8) is the definition of the ideal price index,
which is the cost of one unit of utility in country i. Appendix B.3 provides the details
on these two equilibrium conditions, as well as the details on the labor market clearance
condition.
2.4 Analytical Results
2.4.1 Firm Size Distribution and Income Distribution
As we detailed in the previous section, the distribution of firm productivity arises from
the distribution of entrepreneurs’ human capital; this productivity distribution in turn leads
to plausible and tractable distributions of firm sales, employment and profits. Specifically,
17The CEO compensation function does not enter the total income function, because the difference be-
tween profit and CEO compensation at a given firm will be distributed back to the individuals in country i,
which implies that we only need to consider total profit when accounting for total income in a given country.
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the productivity distribution in country i follows a Type-I Pareto distribution with shape
parameter λ and location parameter biex
∗
i , where x∗i is the marginal entrepreneur. Firm
sales are linear functions of A−1. As a result, the distribution of sales follows a Type-I
Pareto distribution with shape parameter λ/( − 1). Moreover, as noted in di Giovanni,
Levchenko and Rancire (2011), international trade systematically changes the size distri-
bution of firms. In our framework, this influence of international trade on the distribution
is reflected in the location parameters: the location parameters are small for domestic and
large for exporting firms. Firm employment and profit are affine functions of A−1 due to
the fixed costs of operating and exporting. They follow Type-II Pareto distributions with
shape parameter λ/(−1). As in the distribution of sales, location parameters in the distri-
butions of employment and profits vary by the market size accessible to a firm. Appendix
B.3 provides details on the distributions of firms.
Individual income is ranked by occupations: the workers earn the lowest income, fol-
lowed by the CEOs at domestic firms, and the CEOs at exporting firms. The income distri-
bution follows a two-class structure. All the workers earn the same wage rate per efficiency
labor unit; therefore, their income distribution is exponential with a shape parameter λ/wi.
The income of the CEOs depends on the CEO compensation function. By assumption, the
compensation function k(pi) is monotonically increasing in pi and regularly varying. Under
these two assumptions, the income distribution of the CEOs adopts the following CDF:
U(y) = 1− y− λβ(−1)R(y), y > 0,
where y is the income, β is the tail index of k(pi), λ
β(−1) is the shape parameter of the
distribution, and R(y) is a slowly-varying function.18 Distributions with this form of CDF
are Pareto-Type distributions and exhibit fat-tail behavior at the right end similar to Type-I
Pareto distributions. Appendix B.3 provides details on the derivation of the income distri-
butions of different groups of individuals.
2.4.2 Partial Equilibrium
The main mechanism of the model is most clearly demonstrated in partial equilibrium
with wages, prices and total expenditures fixed at their autarky levels: following an open-
ing to trade, the most productive firms export, grow larger, and the compensation of the
exporting CEOs far outpaces the domestic wages, leading to increased inequality.
In figure 2.2 we present these partial equilibrium results for a simplified model where
the CEO compensation equals profits, k(pi) = pi. The black solid line and the blue dashed
18Slowly-varying functions are regularly-varying functions with tail index of 1. Intuitively, slowly-varying
functions are functions that behave like linear functions at the limit.
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Figure 2.2: Trade and Top Income Shares in Partial Equilibrium
This graph plots the income of different individuals against their human capital for dif-
ferent occupations under autarky and under trade. The black solid line is the income of
a worker. The blue dashed line is the income of CEOs at non-exporting firms. The red
circled line is the income of CEOs at exporting firms. The shaded area is the extra profit
earned from exporting. This partial equilibrium assumes that k(pi) = pi and that wage,
total expenditure, and prices are all fixed. It also abstracts away from FDI.
lines are the same as in figure 2.1: they are respectively the incomes of workers and
CEOs in autarky for the home country. When the world opens up to trade, only the most
productive firms export. In the graph, the right end of the CEO income function tilts up
into the red circled line, which is the income of CEOs at the exporting firms. The shaded
area between the red circled line and the blue dashed line is the extra profit (and extra
compensation to the CEO) earned in the foreign country. In this simple case, all the benefits
of globalization are claimed by the CEOs at the exporting firms, and none of the benefits
trickle down to the workers in those firms. At the aggregate level, top income shares will be
higher because the CEOs at the exporting firms are originally the richest people in autarky.
2.4.3 General Equilibrium
The main mechanism discussed in partial equilibrium above persists in general equilib-
rium as well. We first present a simple result characterizing the cross-sectional intra-firm
inequality of the model in general equilibrium:
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Proposition 1 If the set of exporting firms in country i is non-empty, then the average CEO-
to-worker pay ratio among domestic firms is strictly smaller than the average CEO-to-worker
pay ratio among exporting firms.
Proof 1 See Appendix B.4.
Proposition 1 replicates in general equilibrium the empirical findings from section 2.2.
If an econometrician observes the model world and estimates equation (2.1) without any
size control, she will find that the CEO-to-worker pay ratio is significantly higher among
firms that sell to the foreign market than those who do not. In addition, in general equilib-
rium, the CEO-to-worker pay ratio is proportional to the size of the firm. Therefore, if the
econometrician can also observe the size of the firm and controls for it when estimating
equation (2.1), the observed between-group difference will disappear, just the same as we
observed in the U.S. data.
In the next proposition, we show that the cutoff points of human capital among dif-
ferent groups of firms — x∗i for firms that produce domestically and x
e
ji for exporters —
are sufficient statistics for the profit-to-wage ratios, which in turn shape the within-firm
inequality measured as CEO compensation relative to worker wages.
Proposition 2 In general equilibrium, the domestic-profit-to-wage ratio, defined as
piii(x)
wi
=
Hi
wi
(
Pi
wi
− 1

)−1
Ai(x)
−1 − fii,
will be lower when x∗i is higher; The exporting-profit-to-wage ratio, defined as
pieji(x)
wi
=
Hj
wi
(
Pj
τjiwi
− 1

)−1
Ai(x)
−1 − fji,
will be lower when xeji is higher.
Proof 2 See Appendix B.4.
Intuitively, as the trade costs τji decrease, bilateral trade between i and j increases. The
increased access to a foreign market makes exporting profitable for more firms, low-
ering the productivity cutoff for exporting xeji. Proposition 2 then establishes that the
exporting-profit-to-wage ratio will be higher among all the exporters as a result of the
lower trade costs. Consequently, those whose income is linked to the profit of the firm—
the top executives—will see their income increasing faster than the income of the workers.
Trade liberalization also puts competitive pressures on the least productive domestic firms,
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leading them to exit and leading the domestic-production cutoff x∗i to rise. Higher x
∗
i in
turn leads to lower CEO-to-worker pay ratio among the domestic firms. This proposition
suggests that the top executives at the exporting firms stand to benefit from from trade
liberalization, which might lead to higher top income shares at the aggregate level. We
formally establish this result in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 In a symmetric-country setup of the model, if τji = τij drops, then there exists
a percentile p∗ ∈ (0, 100) such that the top p∗-percent income share will be higher. Specifically:
p∗ = 100× (eλxeji),
where xeji is the exporting cut-off before the changes in τji and τij
Proof 3 See Appendix B.4.
Proposition 3 establishes that bilateral trade liberalization leads to higher income concen-
tration at the right tail of the income distribution. Put differently, CEOs of exporting firms
benefit more from trade than both the CEOs of domestic firms and the workers. As the
CEOs of the exporting firms were already richer than the other groups of people before the
trade liberalization, lower τij = τji will lead to higher income shares at the top. Outside of
a symmetric country setup, analytical results on top income shares are difficult to establish;
for this reason, we next turn to the quantification of our model to study the relationship
between globalization and top income shares.
2.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we quantify the impact of trade liberalizations on top income inequality
in general equilibrium. We first extend the benchmark model to incorporate multinational
firms (MNEs), a choice motivated both by the relevance of MNEs for understanding inter-
national flows and by the fact that their CEOs are also well-paid relative to their workers,
as per appendix table B.5. We then calibrate the model to resemble the U.S. economy in
the 2000s, and show that the model provides a reasonably good approximation for the
U.S. income distribution. We then study how different measures of income inequality re-
spond to changes in trade barriers, and show that globalization might be responsible for a
substantial part of the surge in top income shares in recent decades. In the end we show
that the main results of the model are robust to changes in certain parameter values.
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2.5.1 Multinational Firms
As multinational firms are important players in both international trade and capital
flows, we first extend the model to allow for MNEs before we carry out the quantitative
analysis. In addition to exporting, the firms in country i can also serve country j via hori-
zontal foreign direct investment (FDI), as in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). In order
to serve country j from country i through FDI, the firm needs to pay the fixed overhead
costs gji in units of labor in country i. The labor costs are interpreted as the overhead costs
of starting operation, as well as the costs introduced by policy barriers. The additional
profit a firm in country i can earn from FDI in country j is:
pifji(x) =
Hj

[
− 1

Pj
wj
]−1
Ai(x)
−1 − gjiwi. (2.9)
Subject to some standard parameter restrictions, firms sort into three groups in the
extended model. All the firms founded in country i serve the domestic market first. More-
over, the least productive firms only serve the domestic market. The more productive firms
serve the domestic market and the foreign market through export. The most productive
firms serve the domestic market and the foreign market through FDI. Denote the human
capital of the CEO in the least productive MNE in country i as xfji. The cutoff between
exporters and MNEs must be the solution to the following equation:
pieji(x
f
ji) = pi
f
ji(x
f
ji), (2.10)
which says that the marginal MNE finds it equally profitable to serve the foreign market
by FDI and by exporting.
Through proposition 4, we show that the cutoff xfji for serving the foreign market
through FDI is a sufficient statistics for the ratio of FDI profits to the wage ratio:
Proposition 4 In general equilibrium, the FDI-profit-to-wage ratio, defined as:
pifji(x)
wi
=
Hj
wi
(
Pj
wj
− 1

)−1
Ai(x)
−1 − gji,
will be lower when xfji is higher.
Proof 4 See Appendix B.4.
As with the cutoffs for domestics production and exporting, we can use this relationship to
understand the impact of FDI liberalization on inequality by tracking the changes in xfji.
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2.5.2 Calibration
We interpret the two countries in the model world as the United States and the rest-
of-the-world (ROW). We treat 109 economies combined as the ROW. These countries,
together with the U.S., are responsible for around 74 percent of the world population and
82 percent of the world GDP in 2008. The selection of countries is due to data availability,
and the countries included in ROW are reported in Table B.8.19
In our measure of population, ni, we want to account for differences in worker pro-
ductivity across countries, difference that arise from the variation in both human capital
and the physical capital associated with each worker. As a result, we follow the methods
outlined in Caselli (2005) and first compute the “quality-adjusted workforce” using the
Penn World Table 7.0 and the educational attainment data from Barro and Lee (2010). We
then augment this measure of total workforce with the estimated capital stock and arrive
at the final measure of the size of “population.” For details on the population measures,
see Appendix B.6.
With this measure of population, we then calibrate the country TFP bi to match the
relative size of the United States and the ROW. We normalize U.S. TFP to 1 and report the
calibrated bi for ROW in Table B.9. Furthermore, we set the elasticity of substitution to
4 so that the average markup charged by firms is 33 percent. This level of mark-up is in
the middle of plausible estimates, and we provide robustness checks with  between 2 and
6 in a later section.20 The shape parameter of the human capital distribution, λ, is set to
3.18. This implies that the Pareto shape parameter of the firm employment distribution is
λ/(− 1) = 1.06, the estimation provided by Axtell (2001).
We calibrate the fixed costs of operation and export using the Doing Business database
from the World Bank following the methods outlined in di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012a,
2013). Specifically, we use the days of starting a business in the U.S. as the raw measure of
the fixed costs of operation in the home country. The fixed costs of operation in the ROW
are the average across the rest 109 countries weighted by GDP. We use the Trading across
Borders module of the Doing Business Indicators database to measure the fixed costs of
international trade. Define φij as the sum of days required to export a 20-foot dry-cargo
container from country i and to import the same kind of container into country j. The
19A country is included in the sample if and only if its data from 1988 to 2008 are available both in Penn
World Table 7.0 and Barro and Lee (2010).
20For example, Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) estimated the average markup for U.S. manu-
facturing firms to be 0.37. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) used steady-state markups between 0.2 and
0.6, while Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) estimated the average markup to be 0.3 in 2005 in the U.S. The
elasticity of substitution used here is slightly lower than the estimates based on gravity equations, which are
usually between 5 and 10, as reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Robustness checks show that
the main results of the paper hold true with higher levels of .
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fixed cost of exporting from the U.S. to the ROW is computed as the weighted average of
φi,US, i = 1, 2 · · · , 109:
f21 =
∑109
i=1Ei,US · φi,US∑109
i=1 Ei,US
,
where the weight, Ei,US, is the export from the U.S. to country i. Similarly, the fixed cost
of export from the ROW to the U.S. is:
f12 =
∑109
i=1EUS,i · φUS,i∑109
i=1 EUS,i
,
where the weight, EUS,i, is the export from country i to the U.S. The fij matrix at this
stage is measured in the unit of time. At the end, we normalize the entire fij matrix so
that around 0.83 percent of individuals in the U.S. choose to create firms. This statistics
matches the ratio of chief executives to working population in 2000 Public Use Microdata
Series (PUMS) 5 percent sample obtained from IPUMS.21
To capture differences in ownership structures of firms, we use the following functional
form of k(pi) as CEO compensation:
k(pi) =
{
pi if pi ≤ α
α1−βpiβ if pi > α
, (2.11)
This function is monotonically increasing in pi and regularly varying; therefore, all the an-
alytical results in Section 2.4 carry over. Intuitively, the function captures the idea that
firms with profit less than or equal to α are “sole proprietorship” firms: the founder and
CEO owns the firm and claims all the profit. Firms with profit larger than α are “corpo-
rations,” and the founder can only claim a proportion of the profit. The power function
form for larger firms implies that the right tail of the income distribution follows a Pareto
distribution with tail index λ
(−1)β .
As noted in Section 2.3, equation (2.11) is based on the empirical findings in the litera-
ture that CEO compensation is proportional to the power function of the firm size, k ∼ piβ,
otherwise known as the “Roberts law” (Roberts, 1956). This function also arises naturally
as an equilibrium compensation function from a matching model where the managers with
higher ability are matched with larger and more productive firms in equilibrium. Specif-
ically, this function is a special case of the duo-scaling equation in Gabaix and Landier
21This statistics measures chief executives, not self-employed to working population ratio, which around
10.9 percent as reported in Hipple (2010). See Ruggles et al. (2010) for details.
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(2008), where α is the size of the reference firm. Within the context of this paper, the
reference firm is the smallest corporation in each country. The calibration strategy de-
scribed below ensures that the smallest firm in the model is always smaller than α in the
benchmark model. This further implies that both types of firms exist in equilibrium.
We calibrate the ownership threshold α to match the ratio of sales of all the corpora-
tions to the sales of all the firms; this ratio is 62 percent in the U.S. in 2007.22 We calibrate
β to match the right tail index of the U.S. income distribution. Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko
(2001b) documents that the Pareto index of the U.S. income distribution is around 1.7.
This implies that in this model, conditional on the tail index of the firm size distribution,
β is 1.06
1.7
≈ 0.747.
We impose an upper bound, s, on the human capital distribution to eliminate unreal-
istically large corporations. We calibrate s to match the highest CEO-to-worker pay ratios
in the data. We first compute the ratio between the highest CEO compensation in Execu-
Compustat and the average U.S. wage from national income and product accounts (NIPA)
in each year between 1992 and 200723. We then set s = 3.249 so that the same ratio in the
model is matched to the median of the data sequence, which is around 2,903.
We assume that both the iceberg trade costs and the fixed costs of starting foreign
subsidiaries are symmetric: τ12 = τ21 and g12 = g21. We then jointly calibrate the two
cost parameters, {τ21, g21}, to match the exports-to-GDP ratio and the multinational-firm-
sales-to-GDP ratio in the U.S. in year 2008. The first moment condition can be directly
estimated using GDP data from NIPA. The second moment condition come from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis’s Direct Investment and Multinational Corporations data set.24 These
two parameters have to be jointly calibrated because iceberg trade costs affect not only the
volume of trade but also the multinational sales through the extensive margin. Similarly,
the fixed costs of FDI affect the volume of trade as well through the extensive margin. At
the end we have τ21 = 1.720 and g21 = 1020. All the above parameters are reported in
Table 2.4.
22The sales of U.S. firms by legal form come from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses, 2007 from the Census
Bureau. The definition of “corporation” in this paper follows the legal form of “corporation” used by the
Census. The other legal forms in the Census definition are classified as “proprietorship”, which includes
“S-corporations”, “tax-exempt corporations”, “partnership”, “sole proprietorship”, “other” and “tax-exempt
other”. The receipts of “government” are subtracted from the total firm sales.
23The wage data comes from NIPA Table 6.6A-D. The census does not allow disclosure of extreme values
(maximum and minimum) that involve confidential data. Therefore we use the ratio between CEO compen-
sation and the average U.S. wage instead of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio at the firm level in the empirical
part.
24We use “All non-bank foreign affiliates” sales data up to 2008 as the estimate for the sales of multinational
firms.
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Parameter Benchmark Target/Source
λ 3.81 Axtell (2001)
 4.0 Average mark-up
α 23.2 Corporate sales as a percentage of all firms sales
β 0.747 Tail index of income dist., Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko (2001b)
f11 6.0 World Bank Doing Business Index
f12 19.6 World Bank Doing Business Index
f21 24.6 World Bank Doing Business Index
f22 38.9 World Bank Doing Business Index
f -Scale 0.756 Percentage. of chief execu. in work force.
nROW 6.0 Caselli (2005), Barro and Lee (2010)
bROW 0.58 Relative country size
s 3.249 Highest-CEO-to-average-wage ratio among public firms
τ 1.720 Export-GDP ratio in 2008
g 1020 Multinational-sales-GDP ratio in 2008
Table 2.4: Calibration Targets and Results
Note: λ is the shape parameter of the exponential distribution.  is the elasticity of substi-
tution in the utility functions. α is the size of the smallest public firm. β is the tail index of
the compensation function. fij is the fixed cost of exporting from country j to country i.
f -Scale is the normalizing factor of the entire fij matrix. We divide the fij matrix by this
number. ni is the measure of capital-adjusted endowment of human capital in country i.
bi is the TFP in country i. s is the upper bound of human capital distribution. See Section
2.5.2 and the appendix for the details of calibration. See Table B.9 for the calibrated values
of τ , g and TFP by year used in the counter-factual.
2.5.3 Model Fit
Even though it is calibrated to the tail index of U.S. income distribution, the model
generates a good fit for the overall U.S. income distribution in general equilibrium. Figure
2.3 compares the model-generated income shares with the data in 2008.25 The model pro-
vides a good approximation of the U.S. income distribution for the right tail. For example,
the top 0.01 percent income share is 3.4 percent in the data and 4.2 percent in the model
in 2008. The top 5 percent income share is 33.8 percent in the data and 29.6 percent in
the model. Outside of the top income decile, the model also captures the overall shape
of the income distribution reasonably well. The top 25 and 50 percent income shares in
the model and the data only differ within a few percentage points. Overall, the difference
between the model and the data for the top income shares reported in Figure 2.3 is around
7.8 percent when measured in Euclidean 2-norm.
25The data for income shares above the top 10 percent come from the updated Table A.1 in Piketty and Saez
(2003). The income share outside of the top 10 percent comes from the Tax Foundation report (Greenberg,
2017), which is in turn based on IRS tax return data.
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Figure 2.3: Top Income Shares: Model vs. Data (2008)
Note: This graph compares the top income shares between the model and the data in 2008.
The top income shares in the model are described by the dark grey bars and those in the
data described by light gray bars. The parameters behind the model simulation can be
found in Section 2.5.2. The source of data is the updated Table A.1 from Piketty and Saez
(2003). The average difference between the model and the data across the six top income
shares is measured in Euclidean 2-norm. The differences are reported in percentage terms.
The model also compares favorably to the other moments of the data not targeted in
the calibration; table 2.5 presents these comparisons for the mean-median ratio of the U.S.
income distribution, the workers’ share of income, and the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. The
mean-to-median ratio of the U.S. economy in the model is 2.79, and the counterpart in the
data is 1.61(Rodriguez et al., 2002). The second row in table 2.5 compares the workers’
share of income in the model and the data. In the model the corresponding statistics
is computed as the total wage payment to workers (CEO not included) divided by total
output. In the data the statistics is computed as wage compensation divided by the gross
domestic income of the private sector.26 Again, the model closely resembles the data: the
workers’ share of income is 0.76 in the model, and 0.71 in the data. The last row compares
the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. The model statistics is computed for the sample of “public”
26These data come from NIPA table 1.10. The gross domestic income of the private sector is defined as
compensation of employees plus net operating surplus of private enterprises.
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firms whose profit is higher than α. The counter-part in the data is based on the dataset
described in Section 2.2. In the model the CEO-to-worker pay ratio is 95 while in the data
it is 89.
Moments Model Data
Mean-to-median ratio, income 2.70 1.61
Workers’ share of income 0.760 0.711
CEO-worker pay ratio 95 89
Table 2.5: Model Fit, Additional Measures
Note: The Mean-to-median ratio and the percentile location of the mean come from Ro-
driguez et al. (2002). The workers’ share of income is computed from NIPA. Table 1.10.
The CEO-worker pay ratio is computed in Section 2.2.
2.5.4 Openness and Income Inequality
While the benchmark calibration used the iceberg trade costs τ and the fixed cost of
starting foreign subsidiaries g to match the moments of trade volume and multinational
sales in the data, we now examine how different measures of income inequality vary with τ
and g. The first set of results compare the autarky equilibrium with the benchmark model,
and the second set of results report the sensitivity of income inequality to continuous
changes in the openness of trade.
Autarky and Trade We first show that opening to trade widens within-firm inequality.
To do so, we compare the income of different individuals between autarky and the bench-
mark model. In “autarky,” we set τ and g matrices high enough such that no trade and
foreign investment takes place, while keeping all the other parameters the same as in the
benchmark model. The first three panels in Figure 2.4 compare the income of the CEO and
a worker with average human capital across three different firms in autarky and in trade.
The firm in panel (a) is a domestic firm in trade equilibrium, the firm in panel (b) an ex-
porter, and the firm in panel (c) a multinational firm.27 The income of the average worker
increases by around 9.1 percent from 0.22 to 0.24 in all three firms between autarky and
trade. However, different CEOs see different income paths. The CEO at the domestic firm
sees his/her income decrease by around 4.6 percent, the CEO at the exporting firm sees
his/her income increase by around 23.3 percent, while the CEO at the multinational firm
sees his/her income surge by as much as 225 percent. As a result, trade widens within-firm
27To keep the results comparable between this section and the robustness check sections, we report the
income of the CEO from the largest domestic, exporting, and multinational firm respectively in each graph.
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Figure 2.4: Income Inequality between Autarky and Trade, Benchmark Model
Note: The first three panels of the figure compares the income of the CEO and a worker
with average endowment of human capital at three different firms in the economy. The last
panel plots the income of top 0.1 percent in autarky v.s. in trade. “Autarky” means both τ
and g are set to a large number so trade and FDI fall to 0. “Trade” means the benchmark
model when both τ and g are calibrated so the exports-to-GDP ratio and multinational-
sales-to-GDP ratio match the U.S. data in 2008.
inequality for the large firms that sell to ROW: the CEO-to-worker pay ratio increases from
340 to 388 in the exporting firm, and from 928 to 2,769 in the multinational firm.
Higher within-firm inequality translates into higher top income shares. The last panel in
figure 2.4 compares the income of the top 0.1 percent of the population between autarky
and the benchmark model. The income distribution is already skewed to the right in
autarky, with the top 0.1 percent of the population claiming around 9.1 percent of total
income. In trade equilibrium, the distribution is even more skewed to the right, with
the top 0.1 percent income share increasing to 10.2 percent. This is a 1.1 percentage
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point change in absolute income shares, or a 12 percent increase in relative terms. In
comparison, the top 0.1 percent income share increased by 2.6 percentage points between
1988 and 2008 in the U.S. data. Overall, the model seems to be able to explain a significant
proportion of the change in top income share using the change in the volume of trade and
FDI sales.
Top Income Shares, τ , and g In the next set of simulations, we study how different
income shares respond to gradual changes in τ and g. We first gradually increase τ from
the benchmark value, τ = 1.72, by 50 percent to τ = 2.08, while keeping all the other
parameters at the benchmark value. As τ increases, the exports-to-GDP ratio drops from
0.129 (2008 value) to 0.042, which is roughly the level in early 1970s. Panel (a) of figure
2.5 presents how top 0.1 and top 0.01 income shares in the U.S. respond to changes in
τ . Higher trade barriers hurt the top earners more than the rest of the distribution and
lead to lower top income shares. For example, the top 0.1 percent income share drops
by 0.53 percentage point, and the top 0.01 income share drops by 0.19 percentage point.
Similarly, Panel (b) in the same figure presents the changes in income shares responding
to the changes in g. Again, higher fixed costs to set-up foreign subsidiaries hurt the top
income earners more: top 0.1 percent income share decreases by 0.22 percentage point,
while the top 0.01 percent income share decreases by 0.39 percentage point, when g is 50
percent higher than the benchmark model.
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Figure 2.5: Income Shares and Barriers to Trade, Model Simulations
Note: This figure plots how income shares respond to changes in trade barriers τ and g.
The vertical axis is the change in income shares as compared to the benchmark model. The
horizontal axis is the percentage changes in τ and g as compared to the benchmark model.
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Top Income Shares between 1988 and 2008 To quantify the impact of globalization
on top income shares, we calibrate the model to match data on trade flows, multina-
tional sales, and GDP and then compare the predicted income shares to those in the data.
Specifically, we calibrate τ and g to match the export-to-GDP ratio and the multinational-
sales-to-GDP ratio, and bi to match the GDP ratio between ROW and the U.S. in each year
between 1988 and 2008. All the other parameters are fixed at the benchmark value. The
values of τ , g and bi are reported in Table B.9. Conditional on the calibrated τ , g, and bi in
each year, we solve the general equilibrium of the model, compute the measures of income
inequality, and compare them to the data.
The model captures changes in top income shares between 1988 and 2008: the cor-
relation between the annual changes in top 0.1 percent income shares in the model and
the data is 0.71, and the adjusted R-squared of regressing the data series on the model
series is 0.48. Panel (a) in figure 2.6 compares the data and model series over the 20-year
period. The red dashed line is the change in the income share data between the year on
the x-axis and 1988, expressed in percentage points, with the data coming from Table A.1
in Piketty and Saez (2003) updated through 2008. For example, the last point on this
curve indicates that compared to 1988, the top 0.1 percent income share in 2008 is 2.61
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Note: This graph shows the change in top 0.1 percent and top 0.01 percent income shares
in percentage points between 1988 and 2008. In the model simulation τ and g are cal-
ibrated to match the imports-to-GDP ratio and multinational-sales-to-GDP ratio in each
year. For other model parameters behind this simulation, see Section 2.5.2. The source of
the data is Table A.1 in the updated tables of Piketty and Saez (2003). Two measures of
model fit are computed: the Pearson correlation between the two curves and the adjusted
R-squared of estimating a linear relationship with data sequence on the left-hand-side and
model sequence on the right (with constant term).
Figure 2.6: Top Income Share and Globalization over the Years
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percentage points higher. The blue solid line is the same measure in the model. Each point
on the blue solid line is based on the top income share computed with the calibrated τ ,
g, and bi in that year. The last point on the graph with the parameters calibrated to the
moments in 2008 is the benchmark model.
Our model explains roughly half of the changes in top 0.1 percent income shares in the
data. For example, between 2008 and 1988 the top 0.1 percent income share increased
by 2.61 percentage points in the data and 1.37 percentage point in the model, indicating
that 1.37/2.61≈ 52 percent of the change in top income shares can be explained using the
changes in trade volumes and relative productivity. This result suggests that a large pro-
portion of the observed change in aggregate income inequality can be explained through
the channel of within-firm inequality: better access to foreign markets benefits the top
executives more than it benefits the average workers, widening the income gap between
the rich and the poor.
The explanatory power of the model varies from period to period. During the first
period, from the beginning of the sample to around 1994, the top income shares fluctuate
greatly from year to year in the data. This variation is largely driven by the short and
long term effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act.28 This tax reform drastically changed the
marginal tax rates and tax brackets for the top income earners, thus changing the tax
reporting incentives. The short-term consequences of the 1986 TRA are reflected in the
sharp increase in top income shares measured in the tax return data between 1986 and
1988 (not shown in the graph). The long-term consequences of the tax reform are less
clear, but they can still be observed in the volatility of the data curve in Figure 2.6 before
1994. By contrast, the model economy exhibits a steady increase in income shares driven
by the slow increases in trade and multinational sales. The discrepancy between the model
and the data is expected because the model does not consider various effects of income tax.
In the second phase, starting from 1994 until the 2001-2002 stock market crash, we start
to observe a rapid increase in the top income share in the data, but only a modest increase
in the model. The surge in top income shares in the data can probably be attributed to the
rapid economic growth and the stock market boom. In the model world where no equity
market exists, top income shares only respond to the changes in the volumes of trade and
multinational sales, which grow slowly during this period. For example, the trade-to-GDP
ratio in the U.S. only increased by around 0.15 percent point each year between 1994 and
2002. The low explanatory power of the model is again, expected, because the model is
not designed to capture capital gains in the stock market. In the last phase from 2002
onwards, the explanatory power of the model is high. This is a period during which the
28See Slemrod (1996) and Poterba and Feenberg (2000) for details.
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trade-to-GDP ratio increases at the fastest pace (1.32 percentage points per year) after
World War II. As a result, the trade-induced inequality increases rapidly in the model,
matching the concurrent surge in top income shares in the data to a large extent.
Repeating this analysis for the top 0.01 percent of the income distributions returns
similar results as shown in panel (b) of figure 2.6. Between 1988 and 2008, the income
share of the top 0.01 percent increased by 1.38 percentage points in the data, while it
increased by 1.08 percentage points in the model; this suggests that the model can explain
a much higher (1.08/1.38 ≈ 78) percent of the change in the data in the top 0.01 percent
as compared to the top 0.1 percent. With the model designed to explain the income of
top executives in large corporations—executives who happen to occupy the pinnacle of
the income pyramid—the explanatory power of the model declines as we move down the
income ladder. For example, other occupations such as working professionals are among
the top 0.1 or 1 percent of the income ladder in the real world, and they are missing in
the model. The lower we move down the income ladder, the more frequent are these
cases, and the lower the explanatory power of the model will be. It is important to under-
stand how globalization affects different occupations differently, however, this is beyond
the scope of this paper. The model does not attempt to provide a comprehensive theory to
explain the surge of top income shares in developed countries. Instead, it highlights a par-
ticular channel through which globalization can affect the top income earners differently
from the way it affects the general population.
The two channels of globalization, exporting and multinational sales, exert roughly
equal influence on the top 0.1 percent income share. Figure 2.7 reports two counter-
factual simulations in which we only allow one channel of globalization to move while
fixing the other parameters. With the cost of starting foreign subsidiaries gij fixed, the
movements in trade costs τij can generate a 0.99 percentage point surge in the top 0.1
percent income share between 1988 and 2008. The movements in gij generate a similar
percentage (1.05 percentage points) in the top 0.1 percent income share. At the top 0.01
percent, the reductions in g are more effective than those in τ (0.97 v.s. 0.16 percentage
points), probably due to the higher concentrations of CEOs from the multinational firms
within the top 0.01 percent.
Lastly, we show that changes in relative TFP across countries cannot explain the dy-
namics of top income shares alone without the expansion of the volume of trade and
multinational sales. We run two counterfactual simulations to highlight this point. In the
first simulation, we fix both τ and g to their benchmark values, and allow only the TFP
vector bi to vary from year to year. Conditional on year-specific bi, we solve the model and
compute the top income shares for each year, and compare them to the data. Without the
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(a) Top 0.1 Percent, Export (b) Top 0.01 Percent, Export
(c) Top 0.1 Percent, FDI (d) Top 0.01 Percent, FDI
Note: This graph shows the change in top 0.01 percent and top 0.1 percent income shares
in percentage points between 1988 and 2008 while we only allow for export (τ) or FDI
(g) liberalization separately. For more details, see notes to Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.7: Exporting and FDI Liberalization
expansion of the volume of trade and multinational sales, top income shares in the model
do not follow the data as shown in the two two panels of Figure 2.8. The top 0.1 percent
income share barely moves over time, and the top 0.01 income share actually decreases
when τ and g are fixed at the benchmark value. In the second counter-factual, we do
exactly the opposite exercise: we fix TFP at the 1988 level and allow τ and g to move.
The results reported in the bottom two panels of figure 2.8 are basically identical to the
baseline simulations in figure 2.6. This confirms the message from the top two panels: it
is the the evolution of trade barriers, not the relative productivity that drives the pattern
of top income shares.
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Figure 2.8: The Effects of TFP Changes
Note: This graph shows the change in top 0.1 percent and top 0.01 percent income shares
in percentage points between 1988 and 2008. The change in the model is shown on the
left axis, and the change in the data is shown on the right axis. In the model simulation, τ
and g matrices are fixed at 1988 level, while TFP varies from year to year. For other model
parameters behind this simulation, see Section 2.5.2. The source of the data is Table A.1
in the updated tables of Piketty and Saez (2003). Two measures of model fit is computed:
the Pearson correlation between the two curves and the adjusted R-squared of estimating
a linear relationship with data sequence on the left-hand-side and model sequence on the
right (with constant term).
2.5.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we show that the earlier analysis is robust to different values of the
elasticity  and the implied markup. In the benchmark model we calibrate  = 4 to capture
the average markup. In this section we set  to 2 and 6 and repeat the earlier analysis. In
each of the robustness checks we re-calibrate every parameter to match the same moments
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as in the benchmark model; the re-calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2.6.
Parameter Benchmark High  Low  Target/Source
λ 3.81 5.3 1.06 Axtell (2001)
 4.0 6.0 2.0 Average mark-up
α 23.2 29.5 461.1 Corporate sales as a percentage of all firms sales
β 0.747 0.747 0.747 Tail index of income dist., Dra˘gulescu and Yakovenko (2001b)
f11 6.0 6.0 6.0 World Bank Doing Business Index
f12 19.6 19.6 19.6 World Bank Doing Business Index
f21 24.6 24.6 24.6 World Bank Doing Business Index
f22 38.9 38.9 38.9 World Bank Doing Business Index
f -Scale 0.756 0.0476 10.56 Percentage. of chief execu. in work force.
nROW 6.0 6.0 6.0 Caselli (2005), Barro and Lee (2010)
bROW 0.58 0.58 0.47 Relative country size
s 3.249 2.202 8.72 Highest-CEO-to-average-wage ratio among public firms
τ 1.720 1.566 3.323 Export-GDP ratio in 2008
g 1020 3548 702 Multinational-sales-GDP ratio in 2008
Table 2.6: Calibration Targets and Results
Note: λ is the shape parameter of the exponential distribution.  is the elasticity of substi-
tution in the utility functions. α is the size of the smallest public firm. β is the tail index of
the compensation function. fij is the fixed cost of exporting from country j to country i.
f -Scale is the normalizing factor of the entire fij matrix. We divide the fij matrix by this
number. ni is the measure of capital-adjusted endowment of human capital in country i.
bi is the TFP in country i. s is the upper bound of human capital distribution. See Section
2.5.2 and the appendix for the details of calibration. See Table B.9 for the calibrated values
of τ , g and TFP by year used in the counter-factual.
In general, when the elasticity of substitution is higher, the markup and profit margins
of the firms decrease, the income distribution is less concentrated in the hands of the
executives, and top income shares are less responsive to changes in trade barriers. Figure
B.2 in the appendix reports the results when  = 6. The main results of the benchmark
model carry through in this case with a smaller magnitude. In this case, the real income
of workers increase by around 4.7 percent between autarky and trade, while the CEO at
a multinational firm sees his/her income increasing by approximately 181 percent. The
impact of trade can also be observed at the aggregate level: top 0.01 percent income share
increases from 3.5 to 3.7 percentage points. Figure B.3 in the appendix reports the results
when  = 2. Again, the main results of the benchmark model are preserved and even
strengthened in this case due to the same reason outlined above. Between autarky and
trade, the real income of the workers increases by 39 percent, while the income of the
CEO at the multinational firm increases by 211 percent. At the aggregate level, the top
0.01 percent income share increases from 5.0 to 8.0 percentage points between autarky
and trade.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between globalization and income inequality with
a special focus on the gap between the rich and the poor. Empirically, this paper presents
a new fact that within-firm inequality is higher among the firms that have access to global
markets. On average, the CEO-to-worker pay ratio is about 50 percent higher among the
exporting firms than among domestic firms. The differences in within-firm inequality are
mainly driven by differences in firm size. Using China’s 2001 accession into the WTO as
a trade shock, we also show that the U.S. firms with prior linkage to the Chinese mar-
ket experienced higher exports and within-firm inequality during the years after China’s
accession using a difference-in-difference method.
This paper presents a new framework to study the distributional effect of trade. It
merges the heterogeneous firms trade model with a model of occupational choice and
executive compensation. The key mechanism to generate higher within-firm inequality
among exporters and MNEs is through the size effect. On the one hand, CEO compensation
is positively linked to the performance of the firm, and only the large and productive
firms find it profitable to sell to the global markets. On the other hand, the wage rate is
determined in a countrywide labor market and is not linked to each specific firm. These
two forces imply that within-firm inequality is higher among the firms that have access
to the global markets. We analytically show that trade liberalization leads to higher top
income shares in general equilibrium. Using counterfactual analysis, we argue that the
changes in trade barriers are able to quantitatively explain a large fraction of the surge in
top income shares in the U.S. data.
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CHAPTER III
Firms and Collective Reputation: the Volkswagen
Emissions Scandal as a Case Study
From a work with Ru¨diger Bachmann and Gabriel Ehrlich
Abstract
This paper uses the 2015 Volkswagen emissions scandal as a natural experiment to provide
causal evidence that group reputation externalities matter for firms. Our estimates show
statistically and economically significant declines in the U.S. sales and stock returns of,
as well as public sentiment towards, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Smart as a result of the
Volkswagen scandal. In particular, the scandal reduced the sales of these non-Volkswagen
German manufacturers by approximately 76,000 vehicles over the following year, leading
to a loss of approximately $3.7 billion of revenue. Volkswagen’s malfeasance materially
harmed the group reputation of “German car engineering” in the United States.
JEL Codes: D12, D90, F23, L14, L62.
Keywords: automobiles, collective reputation, country reputation, difference-in-
differences, event study, Google trends, firm reputation, natural experiment, reputation
externalities, Twitter sentiment, Volkswagen emissions scandal.
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3.1 Introduction
A group’s collective reputation can influence the outcomes for its members indepen-
dently of their individual characteristics or behavior. In a seminal paper, Tirole (1996)
develops a theoretical framework for modeling collective reputation showing how stereo-
types can arise through history dependence so that an original sin by elder group members
can have long-lasting effects on a group. Tadelis (1999), writing in the large theoreti-
cal literature on firm reputation, highlights the importance of names as intangible assets
conveying reputation. In this paper, we combine these two perspectives and investigate
empirically a case in which firms have a collective reputation by virtue of their association
with a particular country.
Despite the theoretical interest in the issue, there is limited empirical evidence that
group reputation and reputational externalities matter economically at the level of the
firm.1 This evidence is limited by many obstacles. First is the scarcity of large and promi-
nent shocks that directly implicate only a subset of group members so that the existence
of reputational spillovers on the other group members can be demonstrated. Second is
the difficulty of identifying natural and reputationally salient groups of firms. Third is the
rarity of direct measures of group reputation, which requires researchers to make indirect
inferences about the effects of reputation. To overcome these issues, we use the 2015
Volkswagen (VW) emissions scandal as a natural experiment, which directly implicated
VW but not the other German automakers. We study the scandal’s effects on their vehicle
sales, stock returns, and social media sentiment. In doing so, we provide empirical sup-
port for the theoretical literature and the existence of group reputation externalities in an
important setting.
On September 18, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) served a
Notice of Violation to the VW Group alleging that approximately 500,000 VW and Audi
diesel-engine cars sold between 2009 and 2015 in the United States contained a defeat
device that allowed these cars to comply with emissions regulations in the test box, while
1There is a growing empirical literature on reputation management on online platforms (e.g., Mayzlin,
Dover and Chevalier (2014), Fan, Ju and Xiao (2016) and Li, Tadelis and Zhou (2016)), but it does not
generally focus on collective reputation or reputational externalities. There is an agricultural economics
literature with an emphasis on group reputation effects of regional appellations such as Bordeaux Wines
(Castriota and Delmastra (2014) and Landon and Smith (1998)), but it typically does not include causal or
quasi-experimental analysis. As Castriota and Delmastra (2014) state: “Despite the ubiquity of the concept,
the economic literature concerning collective reputation is still in its infancy. [. . . ] to our knowledge, there
is no work that has tested the determinants of the process of collective reputation building.” Noskoy and
Tadelis (2015) provide a field experiment with an online platform that also includes an emphasis on causal
analysis of reputational spillovers.
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having higher on-road emissions.2 This date marks the public eruption of one of the major
industrial scandals in recent history, with a prolonged legal fallout in the United States.
Several features of the scandal make it an appealing natural experiment: (1) For the
general public the scandal was a clear surprise in September 2015, and it immediately gen-
erated extensive media coverage. There was also no concurrent notion in the public that
the non-Volkswagen German car manufacturers—BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Smart—were
manipulating vehicle emissions.3 (2) The German auto manufacturers featured the notion
of “German car engineering” prominently in their U.S. advertising, creating a natural rep-
utational group. Additionally, we show that pre-scandal trends in reputation and business
outcomes appear to have been similar among automakers from all countries, suggesting
that non-German automakers can serve as a control group for understanding the effects of
a German-specific shock. (3) Individual automotive makes are salient to consumers, en-
abling us to use novel company-specific data on U.S. social-media sentiment and internet
searches to directly establish the existence of reputational externalities.
Adding to its appeal as a natural experiment, the scandal occurred within an important
setting: (4) The car manufacturing industry is large and important in Germany. In 2014,
the year prior to the scandal, cars amounted to 18 percent of Germany’s total exports
according to the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis (2015)), and were thus Ger-
many’s largest export category. Also as of 2014, Germany captured by far the largest share
of world car exports in UN trade statistics (United Nations (2017)), with 22.7 percent in
dollar and 18.5 percent in unit terms, followed by Japan with, respectively, 12.5 percent
and 10.7 percent. (5) German vehicles are a large share of the U.S. market: in 2014
German car manufacturers comprised 8.1 percent of all U.S. light vehicle sales, making
Germany the second-largest source for foreign-branded vehicles. (6) The scandal’s repu-
tational consequences were amplified by the damage the excess emissions caused to the
public. Oldenkamp, van Zelm and Huijbregts (2016) estimate that the excess emissions
caused by VW diesel cars cost 45,000 disability adjusted life years, with a value of life lost
of approximately $39 billion.4 We add to this a calculation of the economic damage for
the other German car manufacturers. Finally, (7) the scandal also sparked a widespread
2The Volkswagen Group consists of Volkswagen proper plus Audi and Porsche.
3On September 22, 2015, CNN published (Petroff (2015)): “But before you start worrying about the
complete collapse of the German auto industry, it’s worth repeating that – at least for now – the scandal
is limited to Volkswagen. Other German automakers such as Daimler, which owns Mercedes-Benz, and
BMW have said they’re not affected.” Only in the summer of 2017, after our study period, was it suggested
that Mercedes-Benz had also manipulated emissions (Zeit Online (2017)), although Mercedes-Benz never
admitted wrongdoing in the United States.
4Barrett et al. (2015) estimate 59 premature deaths and a social cost of $450 million; Holland et al.
(2016) estimate similar numbers.
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public discussion regarding the mechanism at the center of our paper: country-related
reputational spillovers. Our paper provides numbers to this debate.
We find that the VW scandal caused a loss of 76,000 vehicle sales worth roughly $3.7
billion of revenue for the non-VW German car manufacturers along with a decline in their
stock returns relative to expected market outcomes. We reach these conclusions using a
difference-in-differences approach (e.g., Angrist and Krueger (1999)) that compares how
key outcomes changed over time for the treated group, non-VW German car manufactur-
ers, versus a control group of non-German car manufacturers. The differential responses
to the scandal provide causal evidence on the scandal’s economic consequences.
Our interpretation of these results is that the scandal harmed the collective reputation
of German automakers in the United States. To support this interpretation, we proceed in
several steps: First, we provide suggestive evidence that German car manufacturers consti-
tute a reputationally salient group under the umbrella of “German engineering.” Second,
we document that the scandal reduced the sales of each non-VW German automaker indi-
vidually. Third, we document a deterioration in positive public sentiment toward the non-
VW German automakers in the social media data.5 Fourth, we show that the results are not
primarily driven by diesel cars, despite the scandal’s origins in the diesel market. Fifth, we
use internet search data to argue that consumers did not engage in increased information-
seeking regarding the non-VW German automakers, which is inconsistent with suspicions
of malfeasance similar to VW’s.
Our results thus substantiate the opening claim in Tirole (1996) that: “Collective rep-
utations play an important role in economics and the social sciences. Countries, ethnic,
racial or religious groups are known to be hard-working, honest, corrupt, hospitable or
belligerent.” Further, we show that the actions of one member of a group can materially
damage the group’s reputation, producing reputation externalities from the standpoint of
individual firms. We are not aware of any systematic investigation into the reputational
spillover effects of major corporate scandals and their economic consequences, and thus
hope that this paper fills this lacuna in the literature.
Our study is also related to four additional strands of literature: First, a recent literature
in international macroeconomics, for instance di Giovanni and Levchenko (2012b), di Gio-
vanni, Levchenko and Mejean (2014) and di Giovanni, Levchenko and Mejean (2015)),
emphasizes granularity and the importance of large international firms; our results suggest
that misbehavior at such firms can damage the collective reputation of particular national
powerhouse industries. Second, the international economics literature has examined the
5The economic and reputational spillovers from the scandal on the non-VW German car manufacturers
are separate from the deterioration in economic outcomes and reputational measures for VW itself.
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extent to which taste shocks for domestic versus foreign goods can explain the comove-
ment of international business cycles (Stockman and Tesar (1995)). Our results suggest
that the misbehavior of large multinational firms might generate such taste shocks through
reputational spillovers. Third, our results provide a case study for the recent macroeco-
nomic literature on customer capital; our evidence shows how customer capital can de-
cline through reputational spillovers and quantifies the economic consequences of such a
loss (Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Gourio and Rudanko (2014)). Fourth, in what Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) call the “characteristics approach” to demand estimation, re-
searchers must specify what properties of products enter into consumers’ preferences. Our
results suggest that country of origin might be an important such attribute, consistent with
an existing marketing literature.6
Section 3.2 provides a more detailed timeline of the VW emissions scandal and de-
scribes the scandal’s effect on VW. It also introduces our main data sources. Section 3.3
quantifies the economic fallout from the scandal for the other German car manufacturers,
focusing on their vehicle sales and also examining their stock returns. Section 3.4 inter-
prets this economic fallout as evidence for the existence of reputational spillovers to the
non-VW German car manufacturers. A final section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The VW Emissions Scandal as a Natural Experiment
In this section, we describe the timeline of the VW emissions scandal in detail, and
argue that it represents a natural experiment with which to study the economic effects of
reputation. We show that the scandal was largely unanticipated, both in the media and by
stock market participants. We also document that the scandal was widely covered in the
media and that Volkswagens sales growth, stock price and reputation declined substan-
tially in the scandal’s aftermath.
3.2.1 Timeline of the Scandal
In May 2014, West Virginia University’s Center for Alternative Fuels Engines and Emis-
sions found discrepancies between high on-road emissions by VW diesel cars and earlier
test results. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) replication of the tests led
VW to order a voluntary recall of diesel cars in December 2014, citing a need to recalibrate
6This marketing literature has devoted substantial attention to “Country of Origin” (COO) effects on cor-
porate reputation, as summarized in Newburry (2012), who states: “While COO has been studied extensively
with respect to firm products, the impact of country on a firms overall reputation and the dimensions forming
a countrys reputation are less well understood.” In addition, Newburry (2012) calls for more causal analyses
of how firms can shape a country’s reputation and vice versa.
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engines. In May 2015, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) conducted new tests,
and again the on-road emissions failed to match the test-box results for VW diesel cars. In
July 2015, the agencies informed VW about these tests and threatened not to certify the
2016 diesel cars. On September 3, 2015, VW admitted to the EPA and CARB that they had
used a defeat device in their software which regulated emissions and produced fake test
results in the test box (see Breitinger (2016) for a more complete timeline). The scandal
entered its public phase on September 18, 2015, when the EPA served a Notice of Violation
to the Volkswagen Group.
Volkswagen’s culpability quickly became a matter of public knowledge: on September
20, two days after the start of the scandal, Volkswagen admitted publicly to the deception
and issued an apology. VW Chief Executive Officer Martin Winterkorn resigned three days
later. On September 28, German authorities opened a fraud investigation of the former
CEO, and in October they authorized a police raid on the VW headquarters. The U.S.
Congress called the VW U.S. CEO Michael Horn to testify on October 8, 2015, and he
formally resigned his post in early March 2016. In anticipation of the fines and settlements
associated with the scandal, VW set aside more than $18 billion in fiscal year 2015. The
scandal’s legal resolution in the United States began in April 2016. On July 26, 2016, VW
and a U.S. court agreed on a civil settlement amounting to $15 billion.
Major news outlets across many countries covered the scandal and its aftermath. On
September 19, the morning after the scandal, the front page of the New York Times read:
“U.S. Orders Major VW Recall Over Emissions Test Trickery.” The Wall Street Journal used
a more accusatory tone: “Volkswagen Faked EPA Exhaust Test, U.S. Alleges.” Spiegel On-
line and Zeit Online, the online platforms of two major German newspapers, frequently
reported about the scandal. The scandal quickly spilled over into popular culture. On
September 22, 2016, VW was awarded the satirical Ig Noble Prize in chemistry (Improb-
able Research (2016)), and on October 13, 2015, Paramount Pictures and Leonardo Di-
Caprio’s production company announced that they had secured the rights to shoot a film
about the scandal (Breitinger (2016)).
3.2.2 The Scandal’s Effect on Volkswagen and Its Reputation
We quantify the immediate and longer-term media prominence of the scandal using
data from the Newsbank news aggregator on print media mentions of “Volkswagen” in the
United States. This database covers roughly 5,000 U.S. newspapers, newswires, journals,
and magazines. Figure 3.1 shows that mentions of “Volkswagen” spiked after the scandal,
more than tripling from the preceding months to 5,500 in September 2015. This suggests
that the scandal came as a complete surprise to the general public. Media interest in
Volkswagen remained elevated for most of the following year.
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Figure 3.1: Monthly Print Media Mentions of “Volkswagen” in the United States
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Note: Dashed line shows the date of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, dated September 2015. Data come
from the Newsbank news aggregator, which covers roughly 5,000 U.S. newspapers, newswires, journals, and
magazines. Time period covered is January 2011 to August 2016.
Economic consequences quickly followed suit. Table 3.1 displays U.S. light vehicle sales
statistics over the period of January 2011 to August 2016, split into a pre-scandal period
through August 2015 and a post-scandal period beginning September 2015. Volkswagen’s
light vehicle sales declined by an average of 3,000 units per month in the 12 months
following the scandal relative to the pre-scandal average. Volkswagen’s average 12-month
natural log sales growth, ln Salest−ln Salest−12, was -0.12 in the year following the scandal,
compared to 0.07 prior to the scandal.7 By contrast, the sales of all automakers increased
by an average of 7,000 units per month and make relative to the pre-scandal average, and
their post-scandal log sales growth averaged 0.05.
7The VW Group shows increases in its average number of vehicle sales by month-make in the post-scandal
period relative to the pre-scandal period; this is explained by an increasing trend in vehicles sold over the
entire time period. More informative and relevant for our paper is the switch from positive average growth
rates for VW Group before the scandal (0.12) to negative average growth rates after the scandal (-0.01).
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Table 3.1: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales – Descriptive Statistics
Average Vehicle Sales
by Make-Month
Average 12-month
Log Sales Growth by
Make-Month
Number of
Make-Months
All Makes
Whole Sample 34,622 0.10 2,798
Pre-Scandal 33,567 0.11 2,378
Post-Scandal 40,595 0.05 420
Volkswagen
Pre-Scandal 29,751 0.07 68
Post-Scandal 26,481 -0.12 12
VW Group
Pre-Scandal 14,982 0.12 204
Post-Scandal 15,891 -0.01 36
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Volkswagen Group is defined as Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche. Pre-scandal
period is January 2011 to August 2015; post-scandal period is September 2015 to August 2016.
Sales are measured in units sold. Data come from Ward’s Automotive.
To construct these statistics, we obtain light vehicle sales data at the unit level from
WardsAuto, one of the premier automotive industry publications. WardsAuto receives
these unit-level sales data from all car manufacturers in the United States. It is thus in
principle a complete count of light vehicle. The car manufacturers themselves use Ward’s
data for their own analyses. In addition, the official U.S. car sales statistics in the national
accounting data are based on the same data we use. An individual observation underlying
the statistics in table 3.1 contains identifiers for the vehicle make (e.g., Honda or Volk-
swagen), the vehicle model (e.g., Civic or Jetta), and the vehicle powertype (e.g., gas or
diesel). The data set contains 37 makes, listed in appendix table C.1, and 357 distinct
models. We identify six makes as of German origin: Audi, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche,
Smart, and Volkswagen.8
Along with the adverse attention in the media and its reduced sales, VW’s stock price
declined precipitously following the EPA’s announcement; the visually evident discontinu-
ity on September 18 in figure 3.2 suggests that the scandal came as a surprise to market
participants. Volkswagen’s end-of-day stock price fell by 33 percent in the two trading
8Mini, the present-day incarnation of a line manufactured by the British Motor Corporation and its suc-
cessors between 1959 and 2000, is currently owned by BMW. Given its historical association with Britain,
we classify Mini as not of German origin. We consider alternative classifications in appendix C.2.1.
85
days following the scandal.9 The stock price subsequently recovered some of its losses
over the rest of the year, but at the end of August 2016 it remained 24 percent lower than
its pre-scandal closing price.
Figure 3.2: End-of-Day Stock Price for Volkswagen Group
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Note: Dashed line shows the date of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, dated September 2015. End-of-day
price shown for Volkswagen ADR listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Data come from the Bloomberg database.
Time period covered is January 2011 to August 2016.
Finally, we use novel sentiment measures from Networked Insights to measure the scan-
dal’s effect on Volkswagen’s reputation. Networked Insights is a data analytics company,
founded in 2006, that provides a platform for real-time semantic analyses of social media
posts; its primary clients are consumer-facing companies that use the platform to manage
their brands. We focus on sentiment data from Twitter, an online social media networking
service where some 300 million active monthly users share short messages. The sentiment
measures in our data set are calculated from a 10 percent random sample from Twitter.
9To focus on the effects within the United States and to avoid currency effects from the euro-based VW
listing on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, we use the price of the VW American Depository Receipt (ADR)
traded on U.S. markets. ADRs are issued by a U.S. depository bank and entitle the owner to shares in an
international security; they are priced and pay dividends in U.S. dollars, and are traded through broker-
dealers.
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Networked Insights categorizes tweets as displaying positive, neutral, or negative senti-
ment toward the mentioned company. Posts are excluded from the analysis if they are not
written in English or if the user accounts are associated with locations outside the United
States. Networked Insights also constructs brand identifiers. An identifier for Volkswagen,
for instance, is meant to collate mentions of “Volkswagen,” “VW,” “#Volkswagen,” and the
like. Given the size of the underlying data set, Networked Insights only retains the past 13
months of data. We requested the data in September 2016, so our time series begins on Au-
gust 10, 2015. We first create average daily sentiment shares (positive/negative/neutral)
for August 2015 for each vehicle make in our data. We then construct sentiment shares in
excess of this August baseline for each day.
Figure 3.3 displays these sentiment metrics for VW and the VW group two weeks before
and after the scandal: positive sentiment toward VW declined following the scandal, while
negative sentiment spiked. Panel A shows a decrease in positive sentiment toward VW,
from an average of 3 percentage points higher than its August baseline in the two weeks
prior to the scandal to an average of 8 percentage points below in the two weeks follow-
ing the scandal. Panel B displays an even sharper increase in negative sentiment toward
VW: from an average of 3 percentage points below to an average of 26 percentage points
above.10 The results for the entire Volkswagen group (which includes Audi and Porsche)
are similar. Together, these two panels suggest that Volkswagen’s reputation suffered in
the aftermath of the September 18 EPA announcement.
10The pre-scandal and post-scandal means are statistically different at the 1 percent significance level for
both positive and negative sentiment.
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Figure 3.3: Daily Twitter Sentiment Towards Volkswagen
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Note: Dashed vertical lines show the date of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, dated September 18, 2015.
Sentiment shares are normalized by subtracting the average sentiment share from August 10 to August
31, 2015. We show a window of ±14 days around September 18, 2015. Volkswagen Group is defined as
Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche. Data come from Networked Insights.
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3.3 The Scandal’s Economic Effects on BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and
Smart
In this section, we show that the Volkswagen emissions scandal had economically im-
portant spillovers on the other German auto manufacturers (BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and
Smart). First, we present our main result, that the scandal substantially reduced the U.S.
sales growth of the other German auto manufacturers relative to their non-German coun-
terparts. Second, we show that those German auto manufacturers’ U.S. stock returns fell
immediately after the scandal relative to the returns of non-German auto manufacturers.
In the ensuing section 3.4, we interpret these economic spillovers as reflective of reputa-
tional spillovers to the non-VW German car manufacturers.
We estimate the causal effects of the scandal on non-VW German auto manufacturers
using a standard difference-in-differences regression specification:
yit = α + βi + γt + δTit + εit, (3.1)
where yit is an outcome of interest for an individual vehicle make or company i at time t;
βi an individual-specific fixed effect; γt a time fixed effect; and Tit is an indicator taking
value one for the German manufacturers on and after the scandal date, and zero other-
wise. We exclude the Volkswagen Group from the sample to focus the analysis on the
economic consequences of reputation for German automakers not directly implicated by
the scandal, that is, reputational externalities. The coefficient of interest, δ, captures the
differential impact of being a non-VW German auto manufacturer after the scandal. To
interpret the estimated coefficient as a causal effect, we invoke and support the so-called
“parallel trends” assumption.
3.3.1 Sales Growth
To study the scandal’s spillovers on vehicle sales, we define the outcome variable
in equation (3.1) as the 12-month growth rate of unit sales, expressed in log points:
ln Salesit− ln Salesit−12. The unit of observation is the vehicle make-month (e.g., Honda in
January 2016), and the sample period is January 2011 to August 2016. In this setting, βi
is a make fixed effect, capturing potentially unobserved heterogeneity at the make level.
γt is a fixed effect for each month in the sample, capturing seasonality in car sales and the
potential impacts of time-varying gasoline and diesel prices. We estimate this equation as
a weighted regression, with the square root of sales volumes as weights, to dampen the
impact of highly volatile sales growth rates of small sales levels.
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Table 3.2: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales Growth
German vs. Non-German Manufacturers, Excl. VW Group
Dependent Variable 12-month Log Sales Growth
Baseline
No saturated
make effects
No saturated
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3)
German Manuf. × Post-Scandal -0.104 -0.110 -0.106
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033)
German Manuf. 0.020 0.017
(0.011) (0.010)
Post-Scandal -0.038
(0.011)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Make Fixed Effects Yes No No
R2 0.292 0.161 0.015
N 2150 2150 2150
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Standard errors clustered at vehicle make level in parentheses. Volkswagen Group
(Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche) excluded from all regressions. Volkswagen emissions scandal
dated September 18, 2015. Sales are measured in units sold. All regressions include a constant
and are weighted by the square root of sales volumes. Column (1) is based on a regression with
make and time fixed effects. Column (2) is based on a regression with time fixed effects, and an
indicator for non-VW German makes. Column (3) is based on a regression with an indicator for
non-VW German makes and an indicator for the post-scandal period (September 2015 through
August 2016). Data come from Ward’s Automotive.
We estimate that the scandal reduced the sales growth rates of the non-VW German
automakers by 10.4 percentage points, as shown in our baseline specification in table 3.2,
column (1). Columns (2) and (3) present specifications with a coarser treatment of the
time and make fixed effects. Specifically, in column (2) we replace the saturated make
fixed effects with an indicator variable for non-VW German makes. Column (3) presents
an even simpler difference-in-differences specification in which we additionally replace the
saturated time fixed effects with an indicator for the post-scandal period. The estimated
treatment effect δ is negative and stable across these specifications.11
Our estimates suggest that the scandal resulted in 76,070 fewer unit sales for the non-
Volkswagen German auto manufacturers between September 2015 and August 2016. We
11Appendices C.2.2 and C.2.3 show that the results are also robust to variations in the control group and
to several alternative econometric specifications.
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calculate this decline by multiplying the manufacturers’ total sales of 731,444 units during
the twelve month period prior to the scandal by negative 10.4 percent, our estimate of the
scandal’s effect on their sales growth rate (column (1) of table 3.2). Actual sales for these
manufacturers declined by 29,484 units in the twelve months after the scandal, suggesting
that sales would have risen by about 45,000 units in the absence of the scandal.
We quantify the joint revenue loss to BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Smart as $3.70 billion
dollars by multiplying the unit sales decline by the manufacturers’ suggested retail prices
(MSRPs) for calendar year 2015, also obtained from Ward’s. Because actual transaction
prices may have included post-scandal discounts not reflected in MSRPs, we view our
estimated decline in revenue as a likely lower bound of the scandal’s true revenue effects
on the non-VW German car manufacturers.12
To allay potential concerns about the key identifying assumption underlying our es-
timation procedure, we provide suggestive evidence in figure 3.4 that the parallel trends
assumption holds. Panel A plots the sales growth rates of the two groups, and panel B plots
the monthly differences in sales growth between non-VW German and non-German manu-
facturers. Both panels show that the growth rates of the two groups’ sales were essentially
indistinguishable prior to the scandal, consistent with the parallel trends assumption.
Two additional patterns in figure 3.4 are worth noting. First, the solid blue line in
panel A shows that the sales of the non-VW German automakers declined in the aftermath
of the scandal. One might have expected the sales of non-VW German makes to increase as
VW sales plummeted. The outright decline observed instead would be difficult to explain
without reputational spillovers from VW to the other German car manufacturers. Second,
panel B traces out the month-by-month sales differential between non-VW German and
non-German automakers after the scandal, providing a more dynamic picture of the effects
of the scandal: the sales declines were concentrated in the immediate aftermath in the
scandal, as evidenced by an inverted hump-shaped response that faded out to zero by
August 2016.
12More precisely, we calculate the revenue loss in the following manner: we first calculate model-level
revenue by multiplying the quantity sold of a model in the year prior to the scandal by its median MSRP
across its available trim levels for 2015. We use the median MSRP across trims for each model because
the Ward’s data does not break out sales volumes by trim. Second, we aggregate model-level revenues to
compute the total revenue for the non-VW German auto manufacturers. Third, we divide total revenue by
the total quantity sold to construct an average unit sales price for the non-VW German auto manufacturers.
Finally, we multiply the estimated unit decline in sales by this average unit sales price. The estimated decline
in revenue that we report here hardly changes when estimated using a difference-in-differences regression
with MSRP-based revenues directly as the outcome variable. Transaction prices are not readily available to
researchers (see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), who use MSRPs as well). By contrast, papers in the
literature that use transaction prices typically employ specifically designed and highly confidential surveys;
see, for instance, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004).
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Figure 3.4: Differences in U.S. Light Vehicle Sales Growth
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Note: Dashed vertical lines show the date of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, September 2015. Panel B dis-
plays estimated regression coefficients of the month-by-month differences of German vs. non-German manu-
facturers’ 12-month log U.S. light vehicle sales growth. These coefficients and the corresponding confidence
bands are estimated by a pooled (and sales-weighted) regression of the form: ln(Sales)it − ln(Sales)it−12 =
T∑
s=1
γs Months+
T∑
s=1
βsnon-VW Germani×Months+εit, where {Months}Ts=1 is a complete set of month dum-
mies, ranging from January 2011 to August 2016, and “non-VW German” is a dummy variable that takes a
value of one if the make i is BMW, Mercedes-Benz, or Smart. Data come from Ward’s Automotive.
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3.3.2 Stock Returns
We next show that the scandal’s effect on sales was mirrored in financial outcomes, as
measured by stock returns. To this end, we combine two complementary data sources.
We construct daily U.S. stock returns from the Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP) database, which covers primary listings on NYSE, NYSE MKT, NASDAQ, and NYSE
Arca.13 We supplement this data with American Depository Receipts (ADRs) for publicly-
listed auto manufacturers from other countries.14 By incorporating ADRs into our dataset,
rather than using the home-country listings, we can compare daily returns coming from
the same trading days and better capture the reaction of U.S. investors across a common
set of securities. ADRs allow us to calculate the daily returns for foreign car manufacturers
even on days when the underlying stocks are not traded in their home markets.15
We start by assuming that an individual stock’s expected return depends only on the
stock’s covariance with the market return, its beta. The difference between the expected
return on stock i at time t and its actual return is referred to as the “abnormal return,” ARit.
Formally, we measure each stock’s abnormal return by estimating the following regression:
Rit = αi + βiRmarket,t + εit (3.2)
where i indexes individual stocks and t represents market trading days. The regression
sample covers the trading year, approximately 250 trading days, ending thirty days before
the scandal. In equation (3.2), Rit is the daily stock return for stock i from day t − 1 to
day t, and Rmarket,t is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio (which does
not include the ADRs). The abnormal return is the difference between the stock’s actual
return and its return predicted from the regression: ARit = Rit − Rˆit. The cumulative ab-
normal return, CARit, is then defined as
∑t
s=0ARis. The starting point in our definition of
cumulative abnormal returns, s = 0, is September 16, 2015, two days before the scandal.
Figure 3.5 shows that the cumulative abnormal return for German auto manufacturers
excluding Volkswagen was negative 10 percent within two trading days of the scandal.
This decline contrasts sharply with the near-zero abnormal returns for the non-automotive
13NYSE is the New York Stock exchange and the premier market place. NYSE MKT is the marketplace
within the NYSE for small market capitalization companies. NASDAQ is the second largest marketplace for
stocks in the world after NYSE, with a certain specialization in high-tech companies. Finally, NYSE Arca is
another specialized electronic-trading marketplace for U.S. stocks.
14Appendix table C.2 lists the holding companies of car makes used in our analysis (ADRs for the holding
companies of some car makes in the Ward’s sales data were insufficiently frequently traded to be used). Ford,
General Motors, and Tesla are listed on U.S. stock exchanges; all remaining prices come from ADRs.
15For instance, the Tokyo Stock Exchange was closed for holidays September 21-23, 2015; U.S. exchanges
were open on those days. If we constructed daily returns of Japanese securities, e.g., Mazda or Nissan, from
the Japanese exchange, we would have no observations on those U.S. trading days.
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Figure 3.5: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns, Market Model
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Note: Dashed line shows the date of the VW emissions scandal, September 18, 2015. Automotive stock data
come from the Bloomberg database; CRSP index comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices.
stocks in the CRSP database during the five days around the EPA announcement. Similarly,
the non-German auto stocks exhibited only slight abnormal return movements on and
around the event date. As the three groups had similar cumulative abnormal returns prior
to the scandal date, the divergence of the non-VW German auto manufacturers’ returns
following the scandal reflects the scandal’s causal impact on this group. We formalize this
notion through two empirical exercises.
First, we use both the ARit and the CARit as outcome variables in our difference-in-
differences regression. Owing to the high-frequency nature of the data, we use data for
September 16 and 17, 2015, as the pre-scandal period, and data for September 18, 21,
and 22, 2015, as the post-scandal period.
Table 3.3 shows the results and quantifies the causal impact of the scandal: relative to
non-German car stocks, the non-VW German automakers experienced roughly 2 percent
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Table 3.3: Abnormal Stock Returns – German vs. Non-German Car Firms, Excl. VW Group
Cumulative
Dependent Variable Abnormal Returns Abnormal Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German × Post-Scandal -0.019 -0.019 -0.064 -0.061
(0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015)
Weighting None
Sales
Volume
None
Sales
Volume
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.687 0.600 0.882 0.799
N 60 60 24 24
Note: Unit of observation in columns (1) and (2) is the daily abnormal stock return, and in
columns (3) and (4) it is the cumulative abnormal returns for the periods before and after the
event date. Abnormal returns are calculated using a market model (equation (3.2)). Automotive
stock prices come from Bloomberg and include U.S.-listed stocks (Ford, General Motors, and
Tesla) and ADRs (all other care make holding companies). The weighted regressions are sales-
weighted, using the Ward’s Automotive sales data, because for ADRs we do not have meaningful
market capitalization data. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The pre-scandal period
comprises September 16 and 17, 2015, and the post-scandal period comprises September 18,
21, and 22, 2015 (September 18 was a Friday in 2015). All regressions include a constant,
company and time fixed effects.
lower daily abnormal returns. The latter two columns of the table compare cumulative
abnormal returns at the end of the pre- and post- scandal periods: the non-VW German
car stocks experienced roughly 6 percent lower cumulative abnormal return. Both results
are statistically significant. This evidence suggests that the Volkswagen emissions scandal
materially harmed the financial valuations of automakers linked to the scandal through
their collective reputation as German automakers.
Second, we corroborate this analysis through the event-study methodology more com-
monly used in the finance literature (e.g., MacKinlay (1997)). The market model assumes
that the return distributions are the same during the estimation period prior to the scan-
dal and during the event window surrounding it. As a result, the (cumulative) abnormal
returns for stocks on the three days of September 18, 21, and 22, 2015 should remain ap-
proximately zero if the scandal had no effect on stock returns. We can test this hypothesis
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by computing the following test statistic for each stock i:
CARiT(
T ∗ V ar[ARi]
) 1
2
, (3.3)
where CARiT is the cumulative abnormal return of stock i between September 16 and
September 22, 2015; T = 5 (trading) days in the event window; and V ar[ARi] is an esti-
mate of the variance of the abnormal return of stock i. Following MacKinlay (1997), we
use the abnormal return variance over the estimation window for equation 3.2. Assuming
that stock returns are normally distributed, this statistic is distributed approximately stan-
dard normal. BMW’s cumulative abnormal return of negative 7.2 percent and Daimler’s
negative 11.4 percent have respective test statistics of 2.42 and 4.17. We note that both
Mercedes-Benz and Smart are subsidiaries of Daimler.
The visual and statistical evidence in this section suggests that the scandal reduced
the stock returns of the non-VW German auto manufacturers. Furthermore, the evidence
here corroborates the notion that market participants did not anticipate the EPA’s notice of
violation.
3.4 Mechanism: the Scandal and Reputational Spillovers
In this section, we interpret the economic spillovers documented in the previous sec-
tion as evidence of the scandal’s harm to the group reputation of “German Engineering.”
We proceed in five steps. First, we provide suggestive evidence that German automakers
constitute a reputationally salient group under the umbrella construct of “German Engi-
neering” in both marketing and the media. Second, we emphasize the scandal’s collective
harm by showing that each non-VW German automaker suffered individually as a result
of the scandal. Third, we provide direct evidence of a decline in public sentiment toward
the non-VW German automakers. After documenting this evidence for the collective rep-
utation mechanism, we consider two alternative mechanisms for the scandal’s spillover
effects. We argue that neither can fully account for the scandal’s spillovers without the
collective reputation mechanism we document. To that end, we show in the fourth sub-
section that—despite the scandal’s origins in the diesel market—the non-VW German au-
tomakers experienced adverse spillovers in both their diesel and their non-diesel vehicle
sales. Lastly, we use differences in internet searches across German automakers to argue
that consumers are unlikely to have ascribed malfeasance similar to VW’s directly to the
other German automakers.
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3.4.1 “German Engineering” as a Group Identity
We first note that German manufacturing companies have historically leveraged the
broader reputation of “German engineering” in their marketing. For instance, a Volkswa-
gen commercial from 2014 states, “... Everyone knows that the best cars in the world come
from Germany.” The ad fades out to the question: “Isn’t it time for German engineering?”
Following the scandal, media attention to “German engineering” spiked, with 130 print
articles mentioning the term in September 2015, a five-fold increase over the preceding
months. We illustrate this increase with data from the Newsbank aggregator in figure
3.6. A recurring theme in this coverage was the notion that the scandal might tarnish the
broader reputation of German manufacturing firms. As part of this coverage of the scan-
dal, Reuters published an article on September 22, 2015, “VW scandal threatens ‘Made
in Germany’ image” (Chambers (2015)). A day later, Reuters doubled down with an arti-
cle entitled “Volkswagen could pose bigger threat to German economy than Greek crisis”
(Nienaber (2015)), which included the claim: “The broader concern for the German gov-
ernment is that other car makers such as Mercedes-Benz and BMW could suffer fallout
from the Volkswagen disaster.”16
16See also Bruckner (2015), Werz (2016), and Remsky (2017).
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Figure 3.6: Monthly Print Media Mentions of “German Engineering” in the United States
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Note: Dashed line shows the date of the Volkswagen emissions scandal, dated September 2015. Data come
from the Newsbank news aggregator, which covers roughly 5,000 U.S. newspapers, newswires, journals, and
magazines. Time period covered is January 2011 to August 2016.
3.4.2 Economic Spillovers to Individual German Manufacturers
As evidence of a change in collective reputation, we next document that the scandal re-
duced sales growth for each of the three non-VW German car manufacturers individually.
To arrive at this result, in table 3.4 we estimate parallel difference-in-differences specifica-
tions in which the treatment group includes only one non-VW German auto manufacturer
at a time; each regression excludes the others. Column (1) reproduces our baseline result
that the scandal reduced the non-VW automakers’ sales growth overall by 10.4 percent-
age points. Looking across the individual automakers, columns (2) through (4) show that
the scandal reduced BMW’s sales growth rate by 15.1 percentage points, Mercedes-Benz’s
by 6 percentage points, and Smart’s by 30.8 percentage points. These estimates translate
into sales losses of 53,000 units for BMW, 23,000 units for Mercedes-Benz, and 2,400
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Table 3.4: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales Growth
German vs. Non-German Manufacturers, Excl. VW Group
Dependent Variable 12-month Log Sales Growth
Baseline BMW
Mercedes-
Benz
Smart
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German × Post-Scandal -0.104 -0.151 -0.060 -0.308
(0.035) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Make Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.292 0.296 0.294 0.295
N 2150 2014 2014 2014
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Standard errors clustered at vehicle make level in parentheses. Volkswagen Group
(Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche) excluded from all regressions. Volkswagen emissions scandal
dated September 18, 2015. Sales are measured in units sold. All regressions include a constant,
make and time fixed effects, and are weighted by the square root of sales volumes. Data come
from Ward’s Automotive.
for Smart. We view these pervasive declines as evidence of a change in non-VW German
automakers’ collective reputation following the scandal.
3.4.3 Direct Reputational Spillovers of the Scandal
Next, we use Twitter sentiment data to show that perceptions of the non-VW German
automakers suffered in the aftermath of the VW emissions scandal. To show this result
formally and to estimate the causal reputational effects of the scandal, we compare the
outcomes of non-VW German and non-German auto manufacturers before and after the
scandal, adapting our difference-in-differences regression specification. The unit of obser-
vation is now a make-day, and the estimation sample is a window of ±14 days around
September 18, 2015. The outcome variables are, respectively, positive and negative Twit-
ter sentiment towards a particular make, relative to an August 2015 sentiment baseline.
Both regressions are weighted by tweet volume.17
Column (1) of table 3.5 documents a statistically significant decline of 3.5 percentage
points in positive sentiment toward non-VW German manufacturers as a result of the scan-
17Of the 37 auto makes with light vehicle sales in the Ward’s U.S. data (our data source for car sales), Alfa
Romeo, Saab, Suzuki and Tesla did not have identifiers in the Networked Insights database; see table C.3 in
the appendix for details.
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dal. To put that number in perspective, the share of tweets expressing positive sentiment
toward those companies averaged 12.3 percent in August 2015. By contrast, the share
of tweets expressing negative sentiment toward the non-VW German automakers did not
change meaningfully following the scandal, as seen in column (2).
Table 3.5: Twitter Sentiment – German vs. Non-German Manufacturers, Excl. VW Group
Dependent Variable Positive Sentiment Negative Sentiment
(1) (2)
German × Post-Scandal -0.035 0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Make Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 0.348 0.268
N 840 840
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-day. Sentiment shares are normalized by subtract-
ing the average sentiment share from August 10 to August 31, 2015. The estimation period
comprises 14 days before and after scandal date of September 18, 2015. Volkswagen Group is
defined as Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche. All regressions include a constant, make and time
fixed effects, and are weighted by tweet volume. Data come from Networked Insights.
We interpret these changes in social-media sentiment as reflecting a decline in the col-
lective reputation of German automakers, but as unlikely to reflect suspicions that the
other manufacturers were guilty of the same malfeasance as VW. The sentiment evidence
for VW shown in figure 3.3 suggests that evidence of malfeasance manifests mainly as an
increase in negative sentiment toward the wrongdoer. The absence of an increase in nega-
tive sentiment toward the other German manufacturers is inconsistent with a suspicion of
similar wrongdoing. The decrease in positive sentiment, however, suggests that the scan-
dal did adversely affect their reputations. Whereas the original instigator of a reputational
event suffers especially in terms of negative sentiment, the reputational spillover of that
event appears to manifest mostly in a decline in positive sentiment.
3.4.4 The German Effect Is Not a Diesel Effect
A natural concern given the scandal’s origins in the diesel market is that the sales
declines we document in section 3.3.1 were driven by the reputation of or new information
about diesel vehicles, rather than the collective reputation of German automakers. Indeed,
table 3.6 shows that diesel sales declined by 85 percent for the average month and make
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after the scandal, compared to a 6 percent increase for non-diesel vehicles. This decline
was driven primarily by the Volkswagen Group, which was legally prohibited from selling
diesel vehicles in the U.S. in the aftermath of the scandal. Nonetheless, even excluding the
Volkswagen group, diesel sales declined by 11 percent for the average make-month after
the scandal, compared to a 5 percent increase for non-diesels.
Table 3.6: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales – Diesel vs. Non-Diesel
Average Vehicle Sales
by Make-Month
Average 12-month
Log Sales Growth by
Make-Month
Number of
Make-Months
Non-Diesel
Pre-Scandal 32,589 0.11 2,378
Post-Scandal 39,548 0.06 420
Diesel
Pre-Scandal 3,836 0.11 606
Post-Scandal 3,577 -0.85 123
Non-Diesel, excl. VW Group
Pre-Scandal 34,475 0.11 2,174
Post-Scandal 41,782 0.05 384
Diesel, excl. VW Group
Pre-Scandal 4,197 0.13 433
Post-Scandal 4,169 -0.11 104
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Volkswagen Group is defined as Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche. Pre-scandal
period is January 2011 to August 2015; post-scandal period is September 2015 to August 2016.
Sales are measured in units sold. Data come from Ward’s Automotive.
To address the concern that the scandal’s spillovers were driven by the diesel market,
we document that the reputational consequences of the scandal are evident in both diesel
and non-diesel sales. Our difference-in-differences estimates in table 3.7 show that the
scandal reduced German automaker’ sales growth of non-diesel vehicles by 9.6 percentage
points and that of the diesel vehicles by 23.3 percentage points. We view the scandal’s
effect on non-VW automakers’ non-diesel sales as evidence that a change in the collective
reputation of diesel vehicles cannot be the sole driver of our results.
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Table 3.7: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales Growth
German vs. Non-German Manufacturers, Excl. VW Group, By Power Type
Dependent Variable 12-month Log Sales Growth
Power Type Baseline non-Diesel Diesel
(1) (2) (3)
German × Post-Scandal -0.104 -0.096 -0.233
(0.035) (0.038) (0.126)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Make Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.292 0.289 0.284
N 2150 2150 428
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Standard errors clustered at vehicle make level in parentheses. Volkswagen Group
(Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche) excluded from all regressions. Volkswagen emissions scandal
dated September 18, 2015. Sales are measured in units sold. All regressions include a constant,
make and time fixed effects, and are weighted by the square root of sales volumes. Data come
from Ward’s Automotive.
3.4.5 Information Seeking about German Automakers
Finally, we use internet search data to argue that consumers did not engage in increased
information-seeking regarding the non-VW German automakers, which is inconsistent with
suspicions of malfeasance similar to VW’s. This evidence suggests that the scandal’s effects
on non-VW German automakers are unlikely to be driven by informational spillovers. Fig-
ure 3.7 shows that the general public’s information-seeking regarding Volkswagen spiked
following the scandal, but did not change noticeably regarding BMW and Mercedes. Each
of the four panels plots a time series of a single Google search term (“Volkswagen”, “VW”,
“BMW”, and “Mercedes”). The underlying data on Google trends is weekly, and it is scaled
so that 100 corresponds to the largest number of searches per week in the search pe-
riod.18 We normalize the series and express weekly values as z-scores, deviations from
the mean that are scaled by the standard deviation. A z-score equal to 1 indicates a 1-
18For weekly data, Google trends only allows users to download a few pre-defined search periods. We
chose a five-year window from August 2011 to August 2016.
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standard-deviation increase over the mean. Both the means and the standard deviations
are constructed using the period prior to September 2015. Searches for “Volkswagen”
and “VW”, in panels A and B, show dramatic increases in information-seeking in the af-
termath of the scandal; the week of September 18, the date of the EPA announcement,
coincides with z-scores of 22 and 15. By contrast, searches for the two main non-VW
German makes, “BMW” in panel C and “Mercedes” in panel D, seem indistinguishable
from their regular fluctuations. Together, these panels suggest that rather than precipitat-
ing new information-seeking about the individual manufacturers, the scandal changed the
collective reputation of German automakers.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper uses the 2015 Volkswagen emissions scandal as a natural experiment to
study the economic consequences of collective reputation. By documenting the changing
outcomes of non-VW German car manufacturers relative to non-German car manufactur-
ers, we capture the “German engineering” reputation of BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Smart.
We find that non-VW German car manufacturers suffered in three dimensions from the
VW scandal: a loss of 76,000 vehicle sales worth roughly $3.7 billion of revenue; a sharp
decline in their stock returns relative to expected market outcomes; and a deterioration
in positive public sentiment toward them. We interpret these outcomes as demonstrating
the existence a country-specific collective reputation for German car manufacturing. We
thus provide empirical support for the theoretical literature on collective reputation and
the existence of group reputation externalities.
Our results also contextualize the economic harm of one of the largest U.S. industrial
and public health scandals in recent U.S. history. As a complement to the literature on the
public-health costs of the excess emissions, we trace the economic spillovers to companies
not directly tainted by the scandal. The economically substantial spillovers we document
suggest the need to understand what, if any, policy steps are required to address the cen-
trality of national companies to the reputation of the country as a whole. Our results could
thus provide an argument for policy instruments that would incentivize large companies
to internalize their potential reputation spillovers.
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APPENDIX A
Chapter I Supporting Material
A.1 Model Summary
Aggregation
We assume that the manufacturing sector is characterized by a representative establish-
ment selling its output Y in a perfectly competitive market. This firm aggregates the output
Yi of I different industries using a Cobb-Douglas production technology with elasticities
θi:
Y =
I∏
i=1
Y θii , with
I∑
i=1
θi = 1. (A.1)
Cost minimization by this aggregating firm implies that θi is also each industry’s share of
aggregate expenditure
PiYi = θiPY, (A.2)
where Pi is the price of an industry composite good, and P is the price of the final good
P =
I∏
i=1
(
Pi
θi
)θi
. (A.3)
An industry aggregating firm produces Yi from the output of Ni differentiated establish-
ments via a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) technology with elasticity σi
Yi =
(
Ni∑
e=1
Y
σi−1
σi
ie
) σi
σi−1
. (A.4)
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Cost minimization by the industry aggregating firm implies a standard CES price index Pi:
Pi =
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
1
Pie
)σi−1] −1σi−1
. (A.5)
Establishment Optimization
Each establishment in the industry produces value-added output Yie by combining its
TFP Aie, capital Kie and labor Lie in a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yie = AieK
αKi
ie L
αLi
ie , (A.6)
where the industry level returns to scale αi are the sum of the output elasticities αKi and
αLi. The establishment maximizes profits by taking as given the prices R and w from
perfectly competitive input markets. However, the effective cost of an input varies across
establishments, with the τKie and τLie capturing these input-specific distortions for capital
and labor, respectively
piie = PieYie − (1 + τLie)wLie − (1 + τKie)RKie. (A.7)
By internalizing the demand for its variety, the establishment charges a price that is a
constant markup over its marginal cost. Note that the marginal cost under variable RTS
depends on the scale of production:
Pie = ΩPi
[
(1 + τKie)
αKi (1 + τLie)
αLi
Aie
] 1
αi+σi(1−αi)
(A.8)
where ΩPi =
(
P σi Yi
) 1−αi
αi+σi(1−αi)
[( σi
σi − 1
)αi ( R
αKi
)αKi ( w
αLi
)αLi] 1αi+σi(1−αi)
Pie =
σi
σi − 1
[(
R
αKi
)αKi ( w
αLi
)αLi] 1αi (
Yie
) 1−αi
αi
[
(1 + τKie)
αKi (1 + τLie)
αLi
Aie
] 1
αi
.
Within the confines of this model, there is a natural restriction on the returns to scale
parameter. As in Basu and Fernald (1997), standard cost-minimization requires that the
RTS parameter αi is (weakly) less than the markup σi/(σi−1). The returns to scale and the
markup shape the price elasticities of supply and demand, respectively. The price elasticity
of supply is increasing in the RTS parameter αi: when RTS are sufficiently large, the supply
curve becomes downward sloping. The restriction that αi is smaller than the markup
guarantees that a downward-sloping supply curve is not steeper than a downward-sloping
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demand curve. This restriction ensures that the willingness-to-pay reflected in the demand
curve exceeds the cost of production embodied by the supply curve when establishments
are deciding whether to produce. A rearrangement of this inequality guarantees that the
often-recurring term [αi + σi(1− αi)] is positive.
An establishment facing larger distortions uses less capital and labor.
Kie ∝
[
Aσi−1ie
(1 + τKie)
[αi+σi(1−αi)]+αKi (σi−1)(1 + τLie)
αLi (σ−1)
] 1
αi+σ(1−αi)
(A.9)
Lie ∝
[
Aσi−1ie
(1 + τKie)
αKi (σi−1)(1 + τLie)
[αi+σ(1−αi)]+αLi (σi−1)
] 1
αi+σ(1−αi)
. (A.10)
Moreover, measured in terms of either physical output or the establishment’s revenue share
in the industry, a more distorted establishment is also smaller in size.
PieYie
PiYi
=
Aie

1
1 + τKie
1
1 + τK,i

αKi

1
1 + τLie
1
1 + τL,i

αLi

1
σi
σi−1−αi
Ni∑
e=1
Aie

1
1 + τKie
1
1 + τK,i

αKi

1
1 + τLie
1
1 + τL,i

αLi

1
σi
σi−1−αi
. (A.11)
Marginal Revenue Products and Market Clearing
Distortions affect establishment choices by changing the marginal revenue gained from
an additional unit of an input (e.g. MRPKie for capital Kie). In equilibrium, the marginal
revenue product of an additional hired input equals the effective cost to the establishment
of hiring the input. If an establishment faces barriers that make acquiring capital more
expensive, then (1 + τKie) is high, and the establishment will only hire an additional unit
of capital if its MRPKie exceeds the cost (1 + τKie)R. The same reasoning holds for all
variable inputs in production.
MRPKie ,MPKie × Pie × σi − 1
σi
= αKi
Yie
Kie
Pie
σi − 1
σi
= (1 + τKie)R (A.12)
MRPLie ,MPLie × Pie × σi − 1
σi
= αLi
Yie
Lie
Pie
σi − 1
σi
= (1 + τLie)w. (A.13)
To understand the impact of establishment-level distortions for the productivity of the
industry as a whole, we need to aggregate the establishment choices. Combining input-
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market-clearing conditions with establishment input choices, we can show that each indus-
try uses capital and labor in proportion to the industry’s share of the national economy θi,
to the industry’s input elasticity αXi for a given factor X, and in inverse proportion to that
factor’s average marginal revenue products across the industry’s establishments MRPXi.
Ki = K
αKiθi
1
MRPKi
I∑
i′=1
αKi′θi′
1
MRPKi′
(A.14)
Li = L
αLiθi
1
MRPLi
I∑
i′=1
αLi′θi′
1
MRPLi′
. (A.15)
The average marginal revenue products are weighted by establishment size. In the absence
of distortions, or if all establishments faced the same distortion, MRPXie would be equal
across establishments and hence equal to the industry MRPXi. We revisit this point below
when we define a counterfactual allocation of resources in which all establishments are
equally distorted.
1
MRPKi
=
Ni∑
f=1
1
MRPKie
PieYie
PiYi
=
1
R
Ni∑
f=1
1
(1 + τKie)
PieYie
PiYi
(A.16)
1
MRPLi
=
Ni∑
f=1
1
MRPLie
PieYie
PiYi
=
1
w
Ni∑
f=1
1
(1 + τLie)
PieYie
PiYi
. (A.17)
Much like the above definitions of average MRPX in the industry, we simplify the
notation for the average distortion in an industry by defining
(1 + τXi) =
[
Ni∑
e=1
PieYie
PiYi
1
1 + τXie
]−1
for X ∈ {K,L}.
Toward a Measure of Industry Productivity
Industry output can now be expressed as
Yi = AiK
αKi
i L
αLi
i , (A.18)
where Ai is the total factor productivity TFPi of the industry. In thinking about how
distortions affect industry productivity, we introduce notation based on Foster, Haltiwanger
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and Syverson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) that distinguishes the productivity for
producing a quantity of physical goods, Aie, from the productivity for generating revenue,
TFPRie.
TFPRie , PieAie =
PieYie
K
αKi
ie L
αLi
ie
. (A.19)
This distinction is helpful since two establishments with the same physical productivity
Aie can have different revenue productivities TFPRie if they face different distortions. In
other words, TFPR can help summarize the impact of distortions on an establishment:
TFPRie =
( σi
σi − 1
)αi (
PieYie
)1−αi [MRPKie
αKi
]αKi [MRPLie
αLi
]αLi
(A.20)
TFPRie ∝
[
(1 + τKie)
αKi (1 + τLie)
αLiA
(σi−1)(1−βi)
ie
] 1
αi+σ(1−αi) . (A.21)
Revenue productivity increases in the level of distortions, as the establishment’s input
bundle has to compensate for a large effective cost of hiring the inputs.
We can define an industry revenue productivity following the establishment definition:
TFPRi , PiAi =
( σ
σ − 1
)βi (
PiYi
)1−βi [MRPKi
αKi
]αKi [MRPLi
αLi
]αLi
. (A.22)
This formulation of industry revenue productivity allows us to write industry TFPi as
the CES aggregate of establishment physical productivity Aie, weighted by the difference
between industry and establishment revenue productivity TFPRi/TFPRie.
TFPi = PiAi
1
Pi
= TFPRi
1
Pi
=
[
Mi∑
e=1
(
Aie
TFPRi
TFPRie
)σ−1] 1σ−1
. (A.23)
The weight captures the establishment’s size as well as the deviations of its marginal rev-
enue products from their respective industry averages:
TFPRi
TFPRie
=
(
PiYi
PieYie
)1−αi [
MRPKi
MRPKie
]αKi [MRPLi
MRPLie
]αLi
(A.24)
TFPRi
TFPRie
=
(
sie
)αi−1( 1 + τK,i
1 + τKie
)αKi ( 1 + τL,i
1 + τLie
)αLi
. (A.25)
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Misallocation
More distorted establishments have smaller weights in industry productivity. Conse-
quently, the correlation of productivity and distortion is important for measuring gains
from equalizing the distortions faced by different establishments within the industry. If
more productive establishments are also more distorted, then equalizing distortions would
give larger weights to the more productive establishments in the counterfactual. This tilt-
ing of weights toward more productive establishments would translate to large TFP gains
from reallocating inputs.
More formally, if all establishments within an industry face the same distortions, so
that τ = τ , then the establishment weights for calculating industry TFPi simplify in the
following manner:
TFPRi
TFPRie
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
=
(
sie|τ=τ
)αi−1
=

[
Aie
] 1
σi
σi−1−αi
Ni∑
e=1
[
Aie
] 1
σi
σi−1−αi

αi−1
. (A.26)
Note that under constant returns to scale (αi = 1) TFPRie is identical across all establish-
ments. This equality is at the center of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) intuition: “A key result
we exploit is that revenue productivity... should be equated across firms in the absence of
distortions. To the extent revenue productivity differs across firms, we can use it to recover
a measure of firm-level distortions” (1404). Note, however, that if returns to scale in an
industry are not constant, then revenue productivity can vary across undistorted estab-
lishments. As a result, there is not a direct mapping between the variance of TFPR and
the misallocation within industry. To calculate the gains from eliminating distortions, the
econometrician has to calculate the counterfactual weight for each establishment.
For every industry i, we then define misallocation as Φi, the net gain to industry TFP
from equalizing distortions across establishments within the industry:
Φi =
TFPi
∣∣
τ=τ¯
TFPi
=
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
Aie
TFPRi
TFPRie
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
)σi−1] 1σi−1
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
Aie
TFPRi
TFPRie
)σi−1] 1σi−1 . (A.27)
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The misallocation for all of US manufacturing in a given year is then
Φ =
∏
i∈I
Φθii , (A.28)
where θi is industry i’s revenue share in the manufacturing sector.
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A.2 Heterogeneous Markups within Industry
In this appendix, we generalize our model to allow markups to vary across establish-
ments in an industry. We introduce these heterogeneous markups by replacing monopo-
listic competition in output markets with oligopolistic competition, in the style of Atkeson
and Burstein (2008). In short, we allow establishments to internalize their impact on the
industry demand, leading them to change their price-setting behavior, with larger estab-
lishments now charging higher markups.
Previously, establishments internalized their own downward-sloping demand curves:
Pie = PiYiY
1−σi
σi
i Y
−1
σi
ie . (B.1)
Now they also internalize the demand for the industry aggregate, so we can write an
individual establishment’s demand curve as
Pie = θiPY Y
1−σi
σi
i Y
−1
σi
ie . (B.2)
Profit maximization on the part of these oligopolistic establishments leads to an updated
expression for the equilibrium price, which is still a markup over marginal cost:
Pie =
ε(sie)
ε(sie)− 1
[(
R
αKi
)αKi ( w
αLi
)αLi] 1αi (
Yie
) 1−αi
αi
[
(1 + τKie)
αKi (1 + τLie)
αLi
Aie
] 1
αi
. (B.3)
The establishment-specific markup ε(sie)/(ε(sie) − 1) is now based on the elasticity ε(sie),
whose inverse is defined as the weighted average of inverses of the industry CES elasticity
of substitution σi and of the aggregate economy’s Cobb-Douglas elasticity 1.
1
ε(sie)
=
1
σi
(1− sie) + sie (B.4)
ε(sie)
ε(sie)− 1 =
σi
σi − 1
1
1− sie . (B.5)
Larger establishments charge higher markups:
∂ ε(sie)
ε(sie)−1
∂sie
=
[
1
ε(sie)− 1 −
ε(sie)
(ε(sie)− 1)2
]
∂ε(sie)
∂sie
=
σi − 1
σi
[
ε(sie)
ε(sie)− 1
]2
> 0. (B.6)
Working through the model, we show that the establishment size now depends on the
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establishment markup:
sie =
PieYie
PiYi
=
[(
ε(sie)
ε(sie)− 1
)−αi Aie
(1 + τKie)
αKi (1 + τLie)
αLi
] 1σi
σi−1−αi
Ni∑
i=1
[(
ε(sie)
ε(sie)− 1
)−αi Aie
(1 + τKie)
αKi (1 + τLie)
αLi
] 1σi
σi−1−αi
. (B.7)
To calculate misallocation in this generalized model, we derive the scaling factors with
and without distortions. The scaling factors defined by the relative revenue productivity
now depend on M˜RPX, the average marginal revenue products that are scaled by the
establishment-specific markups:
TFPRi
TFPRie
=
(
PiYi
PieYie
)1−β  M˜RPKi
MRPKie
ε(sie)
ε(sie)− 1

αKi
 M˜RPLi
MRPLie
ε(sie)
ε(sie)− 1

αLi
(B.8)
TFPRi
TFPRie
=
(
PiYi
PieYie
)1−β 
Kie
PieYie
Ni∑
e=1
PieYie
PiYi
Kie
PieYie

αKi

Lie
PieYie
Ni∑
e=1
PieYie
PiYi
Lie
PieYie

αLi
, (B.9)
where the last expression above is now entirely in terms of data, making it straightforward
to implement. In the absence of distortions, we can write the scaling factor as a function
solely of the relative size in the absence of distortions sie|τ=τ¯ :
TFPRi
TFPRie
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
=
(
sie|τ=τ¯
)αi−1 
(
1− sie|τ=τ¯
)
Ni∑
e=1
sie|τ=τ¯
(
1− sie|τ=τ¯
)

αi
(B.10)
where sie|τ=τ¯ =
[
(1− sie|τ=τ¯ )αiAie
] 1
σi
σi−1−αi
Ni∑
i=1
[
(1− sie|τ=τ¯ )αiAie
] 1
σi
σi−1−αi
. (B.11)
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A.3 Demand Shocks and Misallocation
Our measure of misallocation is based on a counterfactual in which we change distor-
tions but keep fundamentals (e.g., tastes/demand, productivity, etc.) unchanged. We show
that our residual-based measure of establishment productivity Âie would conflate produc-
tivity Aie and demand in an augmented model where we allow for establishment-specific
taste parameters ψie. We then show that we would correctly calculate misallocation even
when we cannot separately measure productivity and tastes in the residual Âie. In short,
the measure of misallocation requires us to capture this combined object of productivity
and demand; it does not require us to separate the two.
If we allowed for establishment-specific taste parameters, our residual Âie would be a
product of the establishment productivity and the taste parameter. We show this by mod-
ifying the industry CES aggregator from equation (1.2) to include establishment-specific
taste shifters ψie:
Yi =
(
Ni∑
e=1
(ψieYie)
σi−1
σi
) σi
σi−1
. (B.12)
In this augmented model, the demand for an establishment’s revenue depends on the
consumer’s tastes for the variety in question:
PieYie = PiY
1
σi
i (ψieYie)
σi−1
σi (B.13)
Following the standard process for backing out the residual Âie, we now back out a term
that conflates productivity Aie and the taste shifter ψie:
Âie =
(PieYie)
σi
σi−1
K
αKi
ie L
αLi
ie
= κiψieAie (B.14)
Since productivity and taste parameters always enter multiplicatively in the expres-
sion for misallocation, we would calculate misallocation correctly even though we could
not separately measure productivity and demand shocks. We note first that the relative
revenue productivity is unchanged from its expression in the baseline model:
TFPRi
TFPRie
=
(
PiYi
PieYie
)1−β 
(
Kie
PieYie
)
(
Kie
PieYie
)

−αKi 
(
Lie
PieYie
)
(
Lie
PieYie
)

−αLi
. (B.15)
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When we reallocate inputs to equalize distortions across establishments, the relative rev-
enue productivity now depends on the product ψitAie:
TFPRi
TFPRie
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ¯
=

Ni∑
e=1
(ψieAie)
1
σi
σi−1−β
(ψieAie)
1
σi
σi−1−β

1−β
(B.16)
Putting these pieces together, we show that we can calculate misallocation using the resid-
ual Âie even when we cannot separately measure productivity and demand shocks:
Φi =
TFPi|τ=τ
TFPi
=
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
(ψieAie)
TFPRi
TFPRie
∣∣∣∣
τ=τ
)σ−1] 1σ−1
[
Ni∑
e=1
(
(ψieAie)
TFPRi
TFPRie
)σ−1] 1σ−1 . (B.17)
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A.4 Measurement Error in Bils, Klenow and Ruane (2017)
Bils, Klenow and Ruane (2017), henceforth BKR, highlight the possibility that mea-
surement error could be misinterpreted as misallocation in microdata. They propose a
correction for additive measurement error in establishment revenue R and input bundles
I. Their estimates suggest that measurement error has increased in U.S. Census microdata,
and that accounting for this change in measurement error eliminates the upward trend in
misallocation from a gross-output Hsieh-Klenow model.
In this appendix, we show that deviations from constant returns to scale look like mea-
surement error in the BKR procedure, and that a decline in returns to scale over time looks
like an increase in measurement error. Informally, our argument emphasizes two points.
First, a procedure that does not explicitly account for multiplicative measurement error
will pick up this multiplicative measurement error as additive measurement error. Second,
overlooking deviations from constant returns to scale leads to multiplicative measurement
error in the input bundle. For instance, if the true returns to scale in an industry were αi,
then the input bundle under constant returns to scale Icrts,ie would relate to the true input
bundle Iie, as shown below. As a result, the BKR procedure could interpret deviations from
constant returns to scale as measurement error.
Icrts,ie = I
1−αi
αi
ie︸ ︷︷ ︸
multiplicative measurement error
Iie
Icrts,ie = Iie + [I
1−αi
αi
ie − 1]Iie︸ ︷︷ ︸
additive measurement error
.
Formally, we focus on the key parameter λ in BKR estimating equation [2], reproduced
below. BKR show that λ = 1 if there is no misallocation. Larger deviations from unity
indicate a greater extent of measurement error. The key estimating equation relates the
time-series change in revenue, R, to the change in the input bundle I, the revenue produc-
tivity TFPR, and the product of I and TFPR. Both I and TFPR depend on the assumed
returns to scale. The measure of change ∆ defined as the “growth rate of a plant variable
relative to the mean of its sector.”
∆R̂ = Ψ ·∆Î + Φ · f(lnTFPR) + Ψ(1− λ) ·∆Î · g(lnTFPR).
We derive the below relationship between λcrts, estimated under assumed constant
returns to scale, and true λ, where g(·) is some polynomial. In short, the BKR procedure
correctly captures measurement error under one of two conditions: either λ = 1, so there
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is no measurement error, or αi = 1, so that the assumed constant returns to scale hold in
the data. As a result, if there is any measurement error in the data, the BKR estimates can
conflate measurement error with model misspecification.
λcrts = λ+ (1− λ)[1− γ] where γ =
g
(
lnRie − αi ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnRie − ln Icrts,ie
) .
We show that the mismeasurement of λ varies predictably with returns to scale αi.
Since λ̂crts in BKR takes values between 0.095 and 0.358 for U.S. data, we focus entirely on
the case of λ < 1. In short, if λcrts is closer to 1 than is λ, then we understate measurement
error when we impose constant returns to scale. Indeed, this is the case when returns to
scale are increasing: when αi > 1, then 1 > λcrts > λ, and we understate misallocation.
By contrast, when returns to scale are decreasing, then we overstate misallocation, since
αi < 1 leads to 1 > λ > λcrts.
Consider a setting in which measurement error does not change over time, but returns
to scale decline from increasing to constant; imposing constant returns to scale in this
setting would lead us to infer an increase in measurement error, even though no such
increase has taken place. As detailed in the previous paragraph, overlooking increasing
returns to scale leads us to understate measurement error. As returns to scale decline over
time, our estimate of measurement error asymptotes to its true value from below. In short,
imposing constant returns to scale here would lead us to understate measurement error
early in the period and to see this measurement error grow toward its true value over time.
However, by assumption, true measurement error has not changed; we only see it grow as
the bias from imposing constant returns declines over time.
With the caveat that our estimates of returns to scale are for a value-added world,
while BKR work in a gross-output world, we present the BKR estimates of λcrts and our
estimates of returns to scale αi. By the arguments above, it is possible that a decline in
returns to scale could explain the increase in measurement error over time that BKR find.
If, as a result, there has not been a substantial change in measurement error over time,
then measurement error is less capable of explaining the upward trend in misallocation.
Table A.1: U.S. Manufacturing – Division of Value Added
1978-1982 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007
λcrts 0.358 0.336 0.326 0.326 0.192 0.095
αaverage 1.23 1.20 1.20 1.12 1.11 0.96
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Supporting Algebra
• Key measurement objects:
lnTFPRcrts,ie = lnTFPRie +
αi − 1
αi
ln Iie = lnTFPRie + (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
∆Îcrts,ie = ln

Icrts,ie,t
Icrts,i,t
Icrts,ie,t−1
Icrts,i,t−1
 = ln

Iie,tI
1−αi
αi
ie,t
Icrts,i,t
Iie,t−1I
1−αi
αi
ie,t−1
Icrts,i,t−1
 = ln

Iie,t
Ii,t
Iie,t−1
Ii,t−1
I
1−αi
αi
ie,t
(Ii,t)
1−αi
αi
I
1−αi
αi
ie,t−1
(Ii,t−1)
1−αi
αi
(Ii,t)
1
αi
Icrts,i,t
(Ii,t−1)
1
αi
Icrts,i,t−1

∆Îcrts,ie = ∆Îie +
1− αi
αi
∆Îie + Ω∆I , where Ω∆I = ln

(Ii,t)
1
αi
Icrts,i,t
(Ii,t−1)
1
αi
Icrts,i,t−1

Rearranging, we have:
lnTFPRie = lnTFPRcrts,ie − αi − 1
αi
ln Iie = lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
∆Îie = αi∆Îcrts,ie − αiΩ∆I
• I will now plug these rearranged objects into the main estimating equation to derive
the parameters Ψcrts, Φcrts, and Ψcrts(1− λcrts):
∆R̂ = Ψ ·∆Î + Φ · f(lnTFPR) + Ψ(1− λ) ·∆Î · g(lnTFPR)
= Ψ ·
[
αi∆Îcrts,ie − αiΩ∆I
]
+ Φ · f
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
+ Ψ(1− λ) ·
[
αi∆Îcrts,ie − αiΩ∆I
]
· g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
= Ψ ·
[
αi − αiΩ∆I
∆Îcrts,ie
]
∆Îcrts,ie + Φ ·
f
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
f
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie
) f (lnTFPRcrts,ie)
+ Ψ(1− λ) ·
[
αi − αiΩ∆I
∆Îcrts,ie
]
·
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie
) ∆Îcrts,ieg (lnTFPRcrts,ie)
∆R̂ = Ψcrts ·∆Îcrts + Φcrts · f(lnTFPRcrts) + Ψcrts(1− λcrts) ·∆Îcrts · g(lnTFPRcrts)
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• How do estimated Ψcrts, Φcrts, and Ψcrts(1 − λcrts) relate to parameters Ψ, Φ, and
Ψ(1− λ)?
– Ψcrts = Ψ ·
[
αi − αiΩ∆I
∆Îcrts,ie
]
– Φcrts = Φ ·
f
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
f
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie
)
– Ψcrts(1−λcrts) = Ψ(1−λ)·
[
αi − αiΩ∆I
∆Îcrts,ie
]
·
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie
)
• Without model misspecification, we can back out true λ as
λ = 1− Ψ(1− λ)
Ψ
• With model misspecification, λcrts provides a biased estimate of λ
Ψcrts(1− λcrts)
Ψcrts
=
Ψ(1− λ)
Ψ
[
αi − αiΩ∆I
∆Îcrts,ie
]
·
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie
)
[
αi − αiΩ∆I
∆Îcrts,ie
]
1− λcrts = (1− λ)
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie
)
λcrts = 1 + (λ− 1)
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnTFPRcrts,ie
)
λcrts = 1 + (λ− 1)
g
(
lnRie − ln Icrts,ie − (αi − 1) ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnRie − ln Icrts,ie
)
λcrts = 1 + (λ− 1)
g
(
lnRie − αi ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnRie − ln Icrts,ie
)
λcrts = λ+ (1− λ)[1− γ] where γ =
g
(
lnRie − αi ln Icrts,ie
)
g
(
lnRie − ln Icrts,ie
)
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APPENDIX B
Chapter II Supporting Material
B.1 Data Descriptions
B.1.1 Publicly-Traded Firms
The empirical evidence on public firms is based on a linked data set that has three
components. In this appendix we describe the details of the dataset.
The ExecuCompustat provides data on executive compensation. It reports the total
realized and estimated compensation of the CEO, CFO, and three other highly paid exec-
utives of U.S. public firms in the S&P Composite 1500 Index from 1992 onward.1 The
executive compensation consists of salary, bonus, stock options, long term incentive plans
(LTIPs), restricted stock awards, and all others. “Realized” compensation (variable name:
TDC2) measures the value of stock option awards at the time of execution, while “esti-
mated” compensation (variable name: TDC1) measures the value of stock options at the
time of granting using the Black-Scholes formula.2
The confidential Census Bureau databases provide the other key variables needed to
measure within-firm inequality and exporting status. The LBD is compiled from the Census
Bureau’s Business Register, which covers the universe of U.S. firms at the establishment
level. We aggregate it up to the firm level and extract annual employment and payroll
variables, which are used to compute the average non-executive wage for each firm in a
given year. The LBD is linked to the last component of the data set, the LFTTD, using the
1The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires public firms to disclose the total compensation
of at least five said executives starting from 1992. Any firm that was once included in the S&P 1500 Index is
included in the sample, even if the firm is later dropped from the index. The S&P 1500 Index is the union of
three commonly used indices: S&P 500 (LargeCap), S&P MidCap 400 Index, and S&P SmallCap 600 Index.
This index covers approximately 90 percent of the total U.S. public firm capitalization.
2In 2006, the SEC changed the disclosure rule on executive compensation, which makes the raw data
before and after 2006 not directly comparable. The ExecuCompustat data set takes this into account when
constructing TDC1 and TDC2 so these two variables can be used for the entire sample.
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methods described in McCallum (2013). The LFTTD records the universe of individual
international trade transactions made by U.S. firms based on the data collected by U.S.
Customs from 1992 onward. It links each export transaction to the U.S. exporting firm
and thus provides the base to identify exporting firms in each year. The final linkage
between ExecuCompustat and the linked LBD-LFTTD is done through the Compustat-SSEL
Bridge provided by the Census Bureau. Table B.1 and B.2 provide summary statistics of
the combined data set.
Matched Data ExecuCompustat
Sector Percent N.Obs. Percent N.Obs.
Mineral & Construction 4.39% 751 5.44% 1876
Manufacturing 46.15% 7892 42.51% 14649
Transportation, Communications and Utilities 10.79% 1845 11.24% 3873
Wholesale and Retail Trade 12.36% 2113 11.49% 3960
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 13.91% 2379 15.28% 5265
Services 12.40% 2121 14.03% 4835
Other 0.71% 122 0.69% 239
Total 100.00% 17223 100.00% 34697
Table B.1: Sector Composition: Public Firm Sample
Note: This table reports the sectoral composition of the firm-year observations in the linked
ExecuCompustat-LBD-LFTTD data set and compares the distribution with the original Ex-
ecuCompustat data set. The sector definition is based on a one-digit SIC code.
Mean Exporters Non-Exporters Overall
CEO Compensation, Estimated 4487.7 3254.3 4197.1
CEO Compensation, Realized 4662.4 3340.4 4350.8
CEO-to-worker Pay Ratio, Estimated 91.9 80.8 89.3
CEO-to-worker Pay Ratio, Realized 91.8 79.6 88.9
N. Observations 13169 4054 17223
Table B.2: Summary Statistics: Public Firm Sample
Note: This table reports the mean of key variables of the linked ExecuCompustat-LBD-
LFTTD data set. The unit of observation is firm-year. Executive compensations are mea-
sured in thousands of U.S. dollars. For the difference between estimated and realized
compensation, see Section 2.2.
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B.1.2 Privately-Held Firms
The evidence on privately-held firms in the US is based on the linked CIQ-LBD-LFTTD
dataset. In this appendix we describe the details of the datasets.
To construct the dataset, we start with executives working in private U.S. firms between
2003 and 2007 from the CIQ data. This yields a data set that contains around 33,000
individuals working in 3,849 privately held firms and 11,706 firm-year level observations.
We then link this data set to the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL) in the
Census Bureau. Unlike the ExecuCompustat, where the bridge files exist and firms can be
matched using standardized identifiers, the CIQ data have not been linked to the census
data sets before. Therefore, we carry out a fuzzy match based on name, street address,
and zip code. We require that the weighted similarity has to be at least 95 percent for two
entries to be considered a match and then hand-screen all the matched records to eliminate
obvious errors. The matched CIQ records are then linked with LBD-LFTTD constructed by
McCallum (2013).
Table B.3 summarizes the results of the fuzzy merge and compares the distribution
of firms across sectors in the linked data set and the original CIQ data. The linked data
set contains 6,002 firm-year observations and 2202 unique firms. A total of 3,366 firm-
year observations and 1,207 unique firms are exporting firms, while the remaining 2,636
observations with 9,95 unique firms are non-exporters. Overall, 51 percent of the CIQ
records are matched with the census data. The sectoral distribution of the CIQ is preserved
in the linked data set. For example, manufacturing firms constitute 33.8 percent in the
linked data and 34.4 percent in the original data; financial firms are responsible for 22.0
percent in the linked data and 18.9 percent in CIQ.
Instead of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio, we construct the ratio between the highest-paid
executive and the non-executive wage as the benchmark measure of intra-firm inequality.
The CIQ data does not report standardized job titles, and therefore, constructing the CEO
title from the raw data would introduce unnecessary noise. Nevertheless, most of the
highest-paid executives are indeed CEOs: in ExecuCompustat, more than 98 percent of
the highest-paid executives are the CEOs. There is no strong reason to believe that this
ratio will be significantly different in the CIQ sample.
The summary statistics of the top-1-to-worker pay ratio are reported in Table B.4. Over-
all, within-firm inequality is lower among private firms than among public firms. The top-
1-to-worker pay ratio is 37.6 in the private firm sample compared with 89 in the public
firm sample. Again, the top-1-to-worker pay ratio varies with exporting status. The ratio
is 41.3 among exporters and only 32.8 among non-exporters.
122
Matched Data Capital IQ
Sector Percent N.Obs. Percent N.obs.
Mineral & Construction 3.32% 199 4.13% 483
Manufacturing 33.86% 2032 34.44% 4032
Transportation, Communications and Utilities 10.71% 643 10.23% 1197
Wholesale and Retail Trade 9.30% 558 9.18% 1075
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 21.98% 1319 18.85% 2206
Services 19.99% 1200 21.80% 2552
Other 0.85% 51 1.38% 161
Total 100.00% 6002 100.00% 11706
Table B.3: Sector Composition: Private Firm Sample
Note: This table reports the sectoral composition of the firm-year observations in the linked
CIQ-LBD-LFTTD data set and compares the distribution with the original Capital-IQ data
set. The sector definition is based on one-digit SIC code.
Mean Exporters Non-Exporters Overall
Top 1 Compensation, Estimated 2626.9 1731.2 2233.5
Top 1 Compensation, Realized 2157 1522.1 1878.2
Top-1-to-worker Pay Ratio, Estimated 49.8 36.7 44
Top-1-to-worker Pay Ratio, Realized 41.3 32.8 37.6
N. Observations 3366 2636 6002
Table B.4: Summary Statistics: Private Firm Sample
Note: This table reports the mean of key variables of the linked CIQ-LBD-LFTTD data
set. The unit of observation is firm-year. Executive compensations are measured in thou-
sands of U.S. dollars. For the difference between estimated and realized compensation,
see Section 2.2.
B.1.3 Multinational Firms
The evidence on multinational firms is based on the same dataset as our baseline es-
timation. The multinational firm indicators are constructed from the geographic segment
data in Compustat. We classify a firm-year observation as multinational if a U.S. firm re-
ports the existence of a non-domestic geographic segment, such as a foreign division. The
multinational indicators from segment data are then linked with the ExecuCompustat-LBD.
The resulting data set contains 12,943 firm-year observations and 1,606 unique firms. Out
of these firm-year observations, 5,885 records are classified as non-MNE and the rest 7,058
as MNE. On average, the CEO-to-worker pay ratio is 87.4 among the non-MNE group and
100.0 among the MNE group.
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B.2 Additional Tables and Figures
B.2.1 Additional Evidence on Export Status
To complement section 2.2.2, we present additional evidence of the robust correlation
between participation in international markets and within-firm inequality. In panel A of
Table B.5, we show that exporting status is positively correlated with within-firm inequal-
ity even when CEO compensation is measured by its subcomponents: CEO salary, bonus,
and stock & options. Column (6) shows that the key correlation is also positive when we
measure inequality relative to the compensation of the top 5 executives. In panel B we first
modify estimating equation (2.1) to include different forms of fixed effects, firm-specific
time trends, and we employ different forms of clustering; the core positive relationship be-
tween exporting status within-firm inequality persists. In column (5) we show that multi-
national firms have 23.6% higher within-firm inequality than non-multinationals. Panel C
uses the data on compensation within privately-held firms to document a positive relation-
ship between exporting status and different measures of executive compensation among
private firms. Table B.6 replicates table 2.2 while replacing employment and payroll with
sales and assets as measures of firm size.
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Table B.6: Robustness: Within-Firm Inequality, Export Status, and Firm Size
Panel A: Within-Firm Inequality and Firm Size in the United States
Dependent Variable Log CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Sales 0.423*** 0.437***
(0.010) (0.007)
Log Assets 0.427*** 0.425***
(0.009) (0.007)
Sample Manufacturing All Manufacturing All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Fixed Effects Sector Sector Sector Sector
Observations 8,000 17,000 8,000 17,000
R-squared 0.417 0.439 0.407 0.428
Panel B: Within-Firm Inequality and Export Status, Controlling for Firm Size
Dependent Variable Log CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter 0.047 0.024 0.295*** 0.062**
(0.091) (0.025) (0.079) (0.025)
Log Sales 0.422*** 0.436***
(0.010) (0.007)
Log Assets 0.424*** 0.420***
(0.011) (0.007)
Sample Manufacturing All Manufacturing All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group Fixed Effects Sector Sector Sector Sector
Observations 8,000 17000 8,000 17000
R-squared 0.417 0.439 0.407 0.428
Note: The left-hand side variable for each of the regressions is the (log of) CEO-to-worker pay
ratio. “Exporter” is the exporter indicator computed from LFTTD. Exports are dollar values of
shipments from LFTTD. Sales are the total annual sales reported in COMPUSTAT. Assets are the
total assets reported in COMPUSTAT. The unit of observation is firm-year and the time period
spans 1992 through 2007. See Table B.1 for sector distribution of the sample. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the year-sector level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B.2.2 Additional Evidence on the Trade Shock
To highlight the source and timing of our identification, we compare across different
periods the within-firm inequality for firms with and without China-specific trade rela-
tionships. To that effect, we plot in Figure B.1 the coefficients γp measuring the period-p
difference in within-firm inequality from a pooled regression of the following form:
Outcomeit = δ0 + d′1 · f + d′2 · y +
P∑
p=1
γpTreatmenti × Periodp + it, (B.1)
where Periodp partitions our sample into consecutive three-year blocks of time and Treatmentt
is an indicator for firms that exported to China between 1999 and 2001.3 Prior to China’s
WTO accession, the relative within-firm inequality γp is not statistically distinguishable
from zero. Nonetheless, over the pre-WTO period, the point estimates of γp increase from
3% at the start to 13% just before the WTO accession. The impact of the WTO accession
is driven by the 2005-2007 period when the treated firms have 25% higher inequality—a
differential effect that can also be statistically distinguished from zero.
Figure B.1: Average Treatment Effect for CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios across Time
Note: This figure plots estimated regression coefficients γp of the period-by-period differ-
ence in within-firm inequality for firms that exported to China between 1999 and 2001
relative to the control group. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals.
3More detailed definitions of time periods would not have permitted us to disclose all coefficients from
regression (B.1).
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To allay potential concerns about the timing of the trade shock, we repeat the earlier
analysis using a window that includes 2001, the year of the WTO accession, into the
definition of the treatment. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those
from the baseline table 2.3. Specifically, in table B.7 we redefine the treated firms to be
those that exported to China in the period 1999-2001 instead of the period 1998-2000. For
manufacturing firms with this pre-existing China-specific relationship, China’s accession to
the WTO led to a 77.9% increase in exports and an 11.2% increase in the CEO-to-worker
pay ratio. When we include firms in all sectors, we estimate a 43.9% increase in exports
and a 10.3% increase in within-firm inequality. Taking the ratio of our estimates for trade-
driven changes in inequality and firm size, we–as based on table 2.3–derive an elasticity
implying that a 1% increase in firm size leads to a 0.2-0.3%.
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Table B.7: China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization and Within-Firm Inequality
Robustness: Including Accession Year 2001 in Treatment Definition
Panel A: Exports and CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratio
Dependent Variable (log) Exports
CEO-to-
Worker Pay
Ratio
Exports
CEO-to-
Worker Pay
Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment × Post 0.779*** 0.112* 0.439*** 0.103*
China WTO Accession (0.122) (0.063) (0.111) (0.053)
Treatment
Exporter to China
1999-2001
Exporter to China
1999-2001
Sample Manufacturing All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,000 8,000 13,000 17,000
R-squared 0.909 0.714 0.930 0.755
Panel B: Employment and Payroll
Dependent Variable (log) Employment Payroll Employment Payroll
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment × Post 0.594*** 0.601*** 0.321*** 0.326***
China WTO Accession (0.070) (0.072) (0.052) (0.054)
Treatment
Exporter to China
1999-2001
Exporter to China
1999-2001
Sample Manufacturing All
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,000 8,000 17,000 17,000
R-squared 0.927 0.919 0.936 0.921
Note: The left-hand side variable for each of the regressions is the (log of) CEO-to-worker pay
ratio. “Exporter” is the exporter indicator computed from LFTTD. Exports are dollar values of
shipments from LFTTD. Employment is the total annual employment reported in LBD. Payroll
is the total annual payroll reported in LBD. The unit of observation is firm-year and the time
period spans 1992 through 2007. See Table B.1 for sector distribution of the sample. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the year-sector level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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B.2.3 Additional Information on the Calibration
Afghanistan Cote d‘Ivoire Iraq Nepal Spain
Albania Denmark Ireland Netherlands Sri Lanka
Algeria Dominican Israel New Zealand Sudan
Argentina Ecuador Italy Nicaragua Sweden
Australia Egypt Jamaica Niger Switzerland
Austria El Salvador Japan Norway Syria
Bangladesh Fiji Jordan Pakistan Tanzania
Belgium Finland Kenya Panama Thailand
Benin France Korea Papua New Guinea Togo
Bolivia Germany Laos Paraguay Tonga
Botswana Ghana Lesotho Peru Trinidad &Tobago
Brazil Greece Malawi Philippines Tunisia
Bulgaria Guatemala Malaysia Poland Turkey
Burundi Guyana Maldives Portugal Uganda
Cameroon Haiti Mali Romania United Arab Emirates
Canada Honduras Mauritania Rwanda United Kingdom
Central African Hong Kong Mauritius Saudi Arabia United States
Chile Hungary Mexico Senegal Uruguay
China Iceland Mongolia Sierra Leone Venezuela
Colombia India Morocco Singapore Vietnam
Congo Indonesia Mozambique Slovak Zambia
Costa Rica Iran Namibia South Africa Zimbabwe
Table B.8: Countries Included in Calibration
Note: This table reports the list of countries (110 in total) included in the calibration.
All the countries except the U.S. are included in ROW. The GDP and population data are
based on Penn World Table 7.0 in the year 2008. GDP is in the unit of constant 2005
international dollar and calculated as the product of RGDPL and POP.
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τ g TFP, ROW
1988 1.930 6389.846 0.406
1989 1.906 6363.507 0.405
1990 1.911 4204.818 0.463
1991 1.896 3831.308 0.476
1992 1.891 4110.471 0.466
1993 1.894 4019.989 0.467
1994 1.873 4024.921 0.463
1995 1.834 3662.035 0.468
1996 1.826 3686.147 0.465
1997 1.808 3742.491 0.461
1998 1.830 4336.815 0.444
1999 1.832 4447.511 0.438
2000 1.812 4197.577 0.442
2001 1.854 3915.460 0.453
2002 1.884 3808.301 0.460
2003 1.878 3361.962 0.470
2004 1.843 2880.914 0.482
2005 1.821 2481.549 0.494
2006 1.797 2063.574 0.514
2007 1.760 1440.825 0.546
2008 1.720 1020.479 0.577
Table B.9: τ , g, and TFP
Note: This table reports the calibrated trade cost τ , g, and the estimated TFP. The τ and
g matrices are assumed to be symmetric. The calibrated τ and g assume that the TFP for
both countries is fixed at the 1988 level. The TFP reported is calculated to match the GDP
ratio between the U.S. and ROW in each year. The TFP in the U.S. is always normalized to
1.
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(a) Domestic Firms (b) Exporting Firms
(c) MNE (d) Top Income Share
Figure B.2: Income Inequality Between Autarky and Trade,  = 6
Note: This figure plots how income inequality changes between autarky and trade for the
case when  = 6. For more details, see the notes to Figure 2.4.
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(a) Domestic Firms (b) Exporting Firms
(c) MNE (d) Top Income Share
Figure B.3: Income Inequality Between Autarky and Trade,  = 2
Note: This figure plots how income inequality changes between autarky and trade for the
case when  = 2. For more details, see the notes to Figure 2.4.
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B.3 Details of the Model
B.3.1 The Firm’s Problem
Denote the total expenditure in country i as Hi, the ideal price level as Pi. If a firm
in country j wants to sell to the market i, denote the price of the good as pij(x) and the
marginal cost (iceberg cost included) of selling to market i as Mij(x). The firm solves the
following problem:
max
qij(x)
pij(x)qij(x)−Mij(x)qij(x),
s.t. pij(x) = H
1

i P
−1

i qij(x)
− 1
 ,
where the constraint of the maximization problem is the inverse of the derived demand
function from solving the consumer’s problem in market i.
The solution of the above maximization problem is
qij(x) = HiP
−1
i
(

− 1Mij(x)
)−
, (B.2)
pij(x) =

− 1Mij(x). (B.3)
Equation (B.3) is the result of plugging equation (B.2) into the inverse derived demand
function.
The marginal cost of supplying to market i depends on the productivity of the firm, as
well as the method through which the firm chooses to serve market i. If market i is served
by a domestic firm or by an exporter in country j, then:
Mij(x) =
τijwj
Aj(x)
.
In the special case of i = j, market i is served by the domestic firm in country i:
Mii(x) =
wi
Ai(x)
.
If market i is served by an MNE founded in country j, then
Mij(x) =
wi
Aj(x)
.
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The sales to market i, σij(x) is therefore
σij(x) = pij(x)qij(x) = HiP
−1
i
(

− 1Mij(x)
)1−
.
To supply qij(x) to market i, the labor used in production is
Lij(x) = HiP
−1
i
(

− 1Mij(x)
)
τij
Aj(x)
,
with the understanding that when i = j, τij = 1.
The profit earned in market i before the fixed cost is
[pij(x)−Mij(x)]qij(x) = Hi

P −1i
(

− 1Mij(x)
)1−
To ensure that firms sort into non-exporters, exporters, and multinational firms by
productivity, we impose the following assumption similar to the one used in Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004):
gji
fji
≥
(
τjiwi
wj
)−1
This equation implies that only the most productive firms will engage in FDI, while the
other productive firms choose export over FDI.
A similar restriction needs to be imposed to ensure the separation of the domestic firms:
we need to make sure that in equilibrium, not all the firms choose to sell to the foreign
market. In a Melitz model, this condition can be written down explicitly. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to do so for this paper. The reason is that x∗i does not admit a closed-form
solution. Nevertheless, characterization of the restriction is still possible. Generally, we
need the market size of the home country to be above a certain level relative to the foreign
country, or the variable trade cost to be above a certain level, so the firms in the home
country will not find exporting to the foreign country too easy. In all the results presented
in this paper, the separation of firms into domestic and exporting/multinational firms is
checked and ensured.
B.3.2 The Equilibrium Conditions
The first three equilibrium conditions on cutoff human capital levels are self-evident.
Here we explain the other two equilibrium conditions in detail. In this section, we derive
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the equilibrium conditions under truncation.
Income-Expenditure Identity The third equilibrium condition, equation (2.7), requires
that the total expenditure and total income in country i must be the same:
Hi = niwi
∫ x∗i
0
xfi(x)dx+ ni
∫ ∞
x∗i
pii(x)fi(x)dx. (B.4)
Total expenditure is denoted as Hi. Total income consists of two parts: the total labor
income and the total profits. The CEO compensation function, k(pi), does not enter the
accounting equation. The difference between the profit and the CEO compensation at
each firm is distributed to all the individuals in the same country, and therefore k(pi) does
not matter for total income.
The total labor income is easy to compute. It is the wage rate w(i) times the total labor
supply:
wi ·
(
ni
∫ x∗i
0
xfi(x)dx
)
= wini
λ
1− esiλ
∫ x∗i
0
xe−λxdx, (B.5)
=
wini
(1− e−λsiλ)
[
e−λx
∗
i (−λx∗i − 1) + 1
]
, (B.6)
= wini
F (x∗i )
λ
− nix
∗
i e
−λx∗i
1− e−λsi , (B.7)
= wi ·
{ni
λ
[F (x∗i )− x∗i f(x∗i )]
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor Supply
, (B.8)
where f(.) is the PDF of the truncated exponential distribution. The part in the curly
brackets is the total labor supply in country i.
The total profit in country i is composed of three parts: the profit earned in the home
country i, the profit earned in the other country j through export, and the profit earned in
country j through FDI. This three-part separation is not the same as separating the profits
into firms in the three corresponding groups. The difference is that, the profits earned in
the home country i includes the profits from all the firms, as the exporters and MNEs also
sell to the home market.
The total profit earned in the home market i is
ni
∫ s
x∗i
Hi

P −1i
(

− 1wi
)1−
(bie
x)−1fi(x)dx− nifiiwi[1− F (x∗i )].
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The total profit earned in the foreign market though exporting is
ni
∫ xfji
xeji
Hj

P −1j
(

− 1τjiwi
)1−
(bie
x)−1fi(x)dx− nifjiwi[F (xfji)− F (xeji)],
and the total profit earned in the foreign market through FDI is
ni
∫ s
xfji
Hj

P −1j
(

− 1wj
)1−
(bie
x)−1fi(x)dx− nigjiwi[1− F (xfji)].
The total profit in country i is the summation over these three parts. The income-
expenditure identity here does not imply trade balance, as it usually does in a Melitz
model. What it does imply is trade and financial balance. Trade in equilibrium is almost
surely unbalanced, and the gap will be offset by the differences in capital flow: the differ-
ences between the profits the domestic MNEs collected from abroad and the foreign MNEs
collected from the home market.
Ideal Price Level Equation (2.8) is the definition of the ideal price level in country i:
Pi =
(∫
m∈Θi
p(m)1−dm
) 1
1−
. (B.9)
What needs further explanation is the set of goods available in country i: Θi. This set is the
union of three mutually exclusive subsets: (1) the goods provided by all the firms created
in country i, (2) the goods provided by all the exporting firms in country j, and (3) the
goods provided by all the MNEs in country j. The price for every single variety in each of
the subsets is a constant mark-up over the marginal cost in that subset. The marginal cost
for goods in different subsets can be found in Appendix B.3.1. The ideal price level is a
CES integration of all the individual prices over the set Θi.
After decomposing the set Θi into the three subsets mentioned above, the ideal price
level can be expressed based on the firm productivity distribution directly:
P 1−i =
{
2∑
j=1
[
nj
(

− 1τijwj
)1− ∫ xfij
xeij
bie
xf(x)dx+ nj
(

− 1wi
)1− ∫ s
xfij
bie
xf(x)dx
]}
.
Note that when i = j, xeij = x
∗
i . The first part in the square bracket includes all the goods
provided by domestic firms, domestic exporters, and foreign exporters. The second part in
the square bracket includes all the goods provided by the domestic and foreign MNEs.
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Labor Market Clearing Condition The labor market clearing condition in country i re-
quires that total supply of efficiency labor equals to total demand. Total supply equals
the integral of x from 0 to x∗i over the density function f(x). Total labor demand is more
complicated. It has four parts:
1. The labor used in the production of all the goods supplied to the home market i and
exported to the foreign market j by the firms founded in country i:
L
(1)
i = ni
2∑
j=1
∫ xfji
xji
Hj
P 1−j
(

− 1
τjiwi
Ai(x)
)−
τji
Ai(x)
f(x)dx.
2. The labor used in fixed costs of operation and export incurred for the production in
part 1:
L
(2)
i = ni
n∑
j=1
fji
∫ xfji
xji
f(x)dx.
3. The labor used in fixed costs for the goods supplied to country j through FDI by the
firms created in country i:
L
(3)
i = ni
2∑
j=1
gji
∫ ∞
xfji
f(x)dx.
4. The labor used in the production of the goods supplied to country i by the foreign
subsidiaries in country i from the firms founded in country j:
L
(4)
i =
2∑
j=1
nj
∫ ∞
xfij
Hi
P 1−i
(

− 1
wi
Ai(x)
)−
1
Ai(x)
f(x)dx.
B.3.3 Firm Size Distributions
In this appendix, we derive the CDF of firm productivity, sales, profit, and employment
distributions for different groups of firms.
B.3.3.1 Productivity Distribution
The human capital, x, in country i is distributed exponentially with the following CDF:
F (x) = 1− e−λx,
138
and the firm founded by the individual with human capital x has the following productiv-
ity:
Ai(x) = bie
x.
Note that the marginal individual between entrepreneur and worker has human capital
x∗, and thus will create a firm with productivity:
Ai(x
∗) = biex
∗
.
For simplicity of notation we denote the lowest firm productivity as A∗i . This implies that
the human capital distribution underlying all the entrepreneurs is a shifted exponential
distribution with the following CDF:
F ∗(x) = 1− e−λ(x−x∗).
The CDF of the firm productivity distribution conditional on the lower bound A∗i , de-
noted as FA(y), can be derived as follows:
FA(y) = Pr(Ai(x) ≤ y) = Pr(biex ≤ y) = Pr(ex ≤ y
bi
),
= Pr(x ≤ log(y/bi)) = F ∗(log(y/bi)),
= 1− e−λ[log(y/bi)−x∗],
= 1− bλi eλx
∗
y−λ,
= 1− (A∗)λy−λ,
which is the CDF of a Type-I Pareto distribution with location parameter A∗ = bix∗ and
shape parameter λ. This CDF is shared by all the firms in country i whether they are
non-exporting firms, exporting firms, or multinational firms.
Truncation If the exponential distribution is truncated from above at s, then the CDF of
the human capital distribution for all entrepreneurs will be:
F (x) =
1− e−λ(x−x∗)
1− e−λs , x ∈ [x
∗, s].
Given the same functional form of firm productivity, the CDF of the productivity dis-
tribution can be derived using similar methods outlined above. The distribution can be
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verified to be a truncated Pareto distribution,
FA(y) =
1− (A∗)λy−λ
1− bλi u−λi
, y ∈ [bi, ui],
where ui is the country-specific upper bound of firm productivity:
ui = bie
s.
In the rest of the this appendix, we use the original distribution without truncation.
B.3.3.2 Sales Distribution
The sales from country j to country i is derived in Appendix B.3.1 and repeated here:
pij(x)qij(x) = HiP
−1
i
(

− 1Mij(x)
)1−
, (B.10)
where Mij(x) is the marginal cost of production conditional on the mode of access (export
or multinational production). Based on the market-specific sales, we derive the firm sales.
We denote sales for a firm with CEO human capital x in country i as σi(x) and rewrite it as
a linear function of Ai(x)−1:
σi(x) = Σi(x)Ai(x)
−1.
Σi(x) summarizes the market size accessible to the firm. It is a step function depending on
x:
Σi(x) =

Hi
(
Pi
wi
−1

)−1
, x ∈ [x∗i , xeji),
Hi
(
Pi
wi
−1

)−1
+Hj
(
Pj
τjiwi
−1

)−1
, x ∈ [xeji, xfji),
Hi
(
Pi
wi
−1

)−1
+Hj
(
Pj
wj
−1

)−1
, x ∈ [xfji,∞).
The first line is the market accessible to the non-exporters, the second line the exporters,
and the last line the multinational producers. The general formula for the CDF of the sales
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distribution is
Fσ(y) = Pr(σ < y),
= Pr(Σi(x)Ai(x)
−1 < y) = Pr
(
Ai(x) <
(
y
Σi(x)
) 1
−1
)
,
= FA
((
y
Σi(x)
) 1
−1
)
= 1− (A∗i )λ
(
y
Σi(x)
) −λ
−1
,
= 1−
(
Σi(x)
(A∗i )1−
)θ
y−θ,
where
θ =
λ
− 1 .
The above equation defines Type-I Pareto distribution with shape parameter λ
−1 and lo-
cation parameter Σi(x)(A∗i )
−1. The location parameter differs by Σi(x). The non-exporting
firms have the smallest Σi(x) and therefore the lowest location parameter. The exporting
firms have higher Σi(x) and the multinational firms have the highest Σi(x). Note that
within the same group (non-exporters, exporters, and multinationals), Σi(x) is the same
for all the firms.
B.3.3.3 Profit Distribution
The profit earned in each market is provided in Appendix B.3.1. Based on the market-
specific profit, the firm profit can be written as an affine function of Ai(x)−1:
pii(x) = Πi(x)Ai(x)
−1 − Ci(x).
Similar to the sales distribution, Πi(x) takes three values depending on x:
Πi(x) =

Hi

(
Pi
wi
−1

)−1
, x ∈ [x∗i , xeji),
Hi

(
Pi
wi
−1

)−1
+
Hj

(
Pj
τjiwi
−1

)−1
, x ∈ [xeji, xfji),
Hi

(
Pi
wi
−1

)−1
+
Hj

(
Pj
wj
−1

)−1
, x ∈ [xfji,∞).
The first line is the market size accessible to a domestic firm. The second line is the
market size for exporting firms, and the third line is the market size for multinational
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firms. Similarly, the fixed cost term Ci(x) depends on the type of the firm
Ci(x) =

wifii , x ∈ [x∗i , xsji),
wi(fii + fji) , x ∈ [xeji, xfji),
wi(fii + gji) , x ∈ [xfji,∞).
The distribution function of pi takes the following general formula
Fpi(y) = Pr(pi ≤ y) = Pr(Πi(x) · Ai(x)−1 − Ci(x) ≤ y),
= Pr
(
Ai(x) ≤
(
y + Ci(x)
Πi(x)
)
) 1
−1
)
,
= 1− bλi
(
y + Ci(x)
Πi(x)
)
) −λ
−1
= 1−
(
y + Ci(x)
Πi(x)b
−1
i
)− λ
−1
,
= 1−
(
1 +
y + µi(x)
χi(x)
)−θ
,
where
µi(x) = χi(x)− Ci(x),
χi(x) = Πi(x) · (A∗i )−1,
θ =
λ
− 1 .
This equation is the CDF of a Type-II Pareto distribution as defined in Arnold (1985). The
shape index of the firm profit distribution is θ = λ
−1 . The two location parameters µi(x)
and χi(x) depend on the market that the firm can access to.
B.3.3.4 Employment Distribution
Employment distribution is similar to the profit distribution. Market-specific employ-
ment is provided in Appendix B.3.1 and here we aggregate it up to firm-level employment.
For each firm the employment, Li(x), can be written as an affine function of Ai(x)−1:
Li(x) = Λi(x)Ai(x)
−1 + Ti(x).
142
Λi(x), again, summarizes the market size accessible to a firm x and is a step function that
takes three values:
Λi(x) =

Hi
P 1−i
(
1
wi
−1

)
, x ∈ [x∗i , xeji),
Hi
P 1−i
(
1
wi
−1

)
+
Hj
P 1−j
(
1
wi
−1

)
τ 1−ji , x ∈ [xeji, xfji),
Hi
P 1−i
(
1
wi
−1

)
+
Hj
P 1−j
(
1
wj
−1

)
, x ∈ [xfji,∞).
Ti(x) is the labor used as fixed cost of operation, export, and multinational production:
Ti(x) =

fii , x ∈ [x∗i , xsji),
fii + fji , x ∈ [xeji, xfji),
fii + gji , x ∈ [xfji,∞).
Because both the employment and the profit are affine transformations of Ai(x)−1, the
steps to derive the general formula of CDF are exactly the same. In the end, employment
distributions are also Type-II Pareto distributions with shape parameter θ. The two location
parameters depend on the market size accessible to the firm as well.
B.3.4 Income Distribution
The equilibrium income distribution in the model follows a two-class structure: the
worker’s income distribution follows an exponential distribution, and the CEO’s income
follows various Pareto-Type distributions. In this appendix, we present the details of the
income distributions of the model.
Workers Workers in country i receive wi for each unit of efficiency labor supplied to
the market. The income for a worker with human capital x is wix, which follows an
exponential distribution, same as x. The shape parameter of the income distribution is λ
wi
.
The CDF of the distribution is
V (y) = Pr(wix ≤ y) = Pr(x ≤ y
wi
),
= 1− e− λwi y.
CEOs If k(pi) is monotonic and regularly varying with tail index β, then the CEO income
follows a Pareto-Type distribution with shape parameter θ/β. Given a compensation func-
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tion k(pi), the CDF of the CEO income is
U(y) = Pr(k(pi) ≤ y) = Pr(pi ≤ k−1(y)) = Fpi(k−1(y)),
where k−1(y) is the inverse of k(pi) and Fpi(·) is the CDF of firm profit distribution derived
in Appendix B.3.3. The inverse function exists because k(pi) is monotonic. Because k(pi) is
a regularly varying function with tail index β, the inverse function k−1(·) is also a regularly
varying function with tail index 1/β (Proposition 0.8.5, Resnick (1987)).
The survival function of pi is a regularly varying function, with tail index −θ as well. To
see this:
lim
pi→∞
1− Fpi(ηpi)
1− Fpi(pi) =
(
1 + ηpi+µ
χ
)−θ
(
1 + pi+µ
χ
)−θ = η−θ.
The composition of two regularly varying functions is a regularly varying function, and
the tail index of the composition function is the product of the two indices (Proposition
0.8.4, Resnick (1987)). Therefore 1 − U(y), as the composition of k−1(y) and 1 − Fpi(pi),
is a regularly varying function with tail index − θ
β
. This defines y = k(pi) as a Pareto-Type
distribution with shape parameter θ
β
(Definition 7.25, Gulisashvili (2012)). Moreover, the
CDF of k(pi) can be re-written as:
U(y) = 1− y−θ/βR(y),
where R(y) is a slowly varying function:
lim
y→∞
R(ηy)
R(y)
= 1.
Example The CEO compensation function is
k(pi) = α1−βpiβ = α1−β
(
Π · A−1 − C)β .
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The CDF of k(pi) is
U(y) = Pr(k ≤ y) = Pr(α1−β (Π · A−1 − C)β ≤ y),
= Pr
(
A−1 ≤ y
1
βα
β−1
β + C
Π
)
,
= 1− bλ
(
y
1
βα
β−1
β + C
Π
)− λ
−1
.
Using the general result proved above, it is trivial to show that k(pi) follows a Pareto-
Type distribution. Here we follow a different route and prove directly that the survival
function 1− U(y) is a regularly varying function. To see this:
lim
y→∞
1− U(ηy)
1− U(y) = limy→∞
(
η
1
β y
1
βα
β−1
β + C
y
1
βα
β−1
β + C
)− λ
−1
,
= lim
y→∞
η
1
β + C
y
1
β α
β−1
β
1 + C
y
1
β α
β−1
β

− λ
−1
.
As y →∞, y 1β →∞, therefore
lim
y→∞
1− U(ηy)
1− U(y) = η
− λ
β(−1) ,
which defines 1 − U(y) as a regularly varying function with index − λ
β(−1) . This further
implies that the income distribution function of CEOs in corporations can be expressed as
U(y) = 1− y− λβ(−1)R(y).
The income distribution of the CEOs at sole proprietorship firms is the same as the
profit distribution and therefore is Type-II Pareto.
See Feller (1966), Resnick (1987), and Gulisashvili (2012) for more details on regularly
varying functions and Pareto-Type distributions.
B.4 Proofs
For completeness, we provide another proposition to establish the ranking in the ex-
tended model with multinational firms. We then provide the proof for this proposition
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along side with proposition 1:
Proposition 5 If the sets of exporting firms and multinational firms in country i are non-
empty, then the average CEO-to-worker pay ratio among domestic firms is strictly smaller
than the average CEO-to-worker pay ratio among exporting firms, which in turn is strictly
smaller than the average CEO-to-worker pay ratio among multinational firms.
B.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and 5
The least productive CEOs manage the domestic firms, which implies that, on average,
they receive the lowest compensation among all the CEOs. The more productive CEOs
manage the exporting firms, and the most productive CEOs manage the multinational
firms. Since wage is equalized across the firms, the ranking of the CEO-to-worker pay
ratio is the same as the ranking of the CEO income.
B.4.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Profit-to-wage ratios in this model only depends on the cutoff human capitals in general
equilibrium. This property can be exploited to gain some insight into the basic mechanism
of the model without quantification.
Domestic Profit The profit-to-wage ratio in the domestic market is the profit earned
from the domestic market divided by domestic wage. This part of profit is earned by the
domestic firms, the exporters, and the MNEs created in the home country.
The profit-to-wage ratio is
piii(x)
wi
=
Hi
wi
(
Pi
wi
− 1

)−1
Ai(x)
−1 − fii.
From the cutoff condition of the marginal firm, we know:
Hi
wi
(
Pi
wi
− 1

)−1
b−1i e
(−1)x∗i − fii = x∗i ,
and therefore
Hi
wi
(
Pi
wi
− 1

)−1
=
x∗i + fii
bie(−1)x
∗
i
. (B.11)
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Plug this into the first equation, we have
piii(x)
wi
= (x∗i + fii)e
(−1)(x−x∗i ) − fii.
The partial derivative of this ratio with respect to x is positive, so in general, the profit-to-
wage ratio is higher when the firm is more productive and larger. All the general equilib-
rium movements affect this ratio through the only endogenous variable in this equation:
the cutoff value x∗i . The cutoff human capital is a measure of the competitiveness of the
home market in general equilibrium: it will be higher when the market is more compet-
itive due to highly productive foreign firms entering. The partial derivative of this ratio
with respect to x∗i is
∂
∂x∗i
(
piii(x)
wi
)
= e(−1)(x−x
∗
i )[1− (− 1)(x∗i + fii)]. (B.12)
The sign of this derivative is the same as [1 − ( − 1)(x∗i + fii)]. We claim that this sign
is always negative under the assumption that the least productive individual in country i
must not find creating a new firm profitable. This restriction is imposed to guarantee the
existence and uniqueness of the occupational choice cutoff in the paper. This assumption
means:
Hi

P −1i w
1−
i
(
− 1

)−1
Ai(0)
−1 − fiiwi < 0,
fii >
Hi
wi
−1(− 1

Pi
wi
)−1
Ai(0)
−1.
Plug equation (B.11) into the above inequality, we have
fii >
x∗i + fii
Ai(x∗i )−1
Ai(0)
−1
fii >
x∗i
e(−1)x∗i − 1 .
Now we need to prove
x∗i + fii >
1
− 1 . (B.13)
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To do this, we define
m(x∗i ) = x
∗
i +
x∗i
e(−1)x∗i − 1 −
1
− 1 .
It is easy to show that m(x∗i ) is monotonically increasing,
∂m(x∗i )
∂x∗i
= 1 +
e(−1)x
∗
i (1 + (− 1)x∗i )− 1
(e(−1)x∗i − 1)2 > 0,
because
((− 1)x∗i > 0) ∧ (e(−1)x
∗
i > 1).
Therefore, the minimum of m(x∗) is obtained at x∗i = 0, which is precisely 0. To see this,
we need to apply L’Hoˆpital’s rule to the second term at x∗i = 0:
lim
x∗i→0
m(x∗) = x∗i +
1
e(−1)x∗i (− 1) −
1
− 1 ,
=
1
− 1 −
1
− 1 = 0.
This implies that for all possible values of x∗i ∈ [0,∞), equation (B.13) is true and
therefore the profit-to-wage ratio decreases with x∗i .
Exporting Profits The profits earned from exporting to the foreign country, divided by
local wage, is
pieji(x)
wi
=
Hj
wi
(
Pj
τjiwi
− 1

)−1
Ai(x)
−1 − fji.
Similar to the domestic profit, the cutoff human capital of the marginal exporter is a
sufficient statistics for the size of the foreign market and the marginal cost of accessing to
that market. To see this, we start with the cutoff condition:
Hj

(
Pj
τjiwi
− 1

)−1
Ai(x
e
ji)
−1 − fjiwi = 0,
Hj
wi
(
Pj
τjiwi
− 1

)−1
=
fji
bie
(−1)(x−xeji)
.
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Plugging the above equation into the original profit-to-wage ratio, we have:
pieji(x)
wi
= fji[e
(−1)(x−xeji) − 1].
This ratio depends positively on x and negatively on xeji. x
e
ji is a measure of the access
to the foreign market: it will be lower (easier to access) when τji is lower, or the foreign
market is larger (Hj or Pj higher). When τji is lower, the profit-to-wage ratio from the
exporting market will be higher.
B.4.3 Proof of Proposition 3
If τji = τij drops, then xeji will be lower and x
∗
i will be higher. Proposition 2 implies
that piii(x)
wi
will be lower, which futher implies that the income ratio between CEOs at the
domestic firms and the workers will be smaller. Proposition 2 also implies that
pieji(x)
wi
will
be higher as a result. Note that the ratio between the profit of the exporting firms and
wage rate is the sum of the domestic and the export ratios:
piii(x) + pi
e
ji(x)
wi
=
Hi
wi
(
Pi
wi
− 1

)−1
Ai(x)
−1 − fii + Hj
wi
(
Pj
τjiwi
− 1

)−1
Ai(x)
−1 − fji.
The symmetry assumption implies that H, P and w will be equalized across countries,
and so will their partial derivative with respect to τji and τij:
∂
(
HiP
−1
i w
−
i
)
∂τji
=
∂
(
HjP
−1
j w
−
i
)
∂τij
It is also straight forward to show that the partial derivative must be positive in general
equilibrium, otherwise, there will be negative aggregate gains from trade.
The above observations imply that the sign of
∂
(
piii(x)+pi
e
ji(x)
wi
)
∂τji
is always positive independent of Ai(x), because τ 1−ji will be higher if τji is lower. The
intuition is simple: the income ratio between CEOs at the exporting firm and the workers
will be higher following bilateral trade liberalizations.
The income ratio between the CEOs at the exporting firms and the domestic firms will
also be higher because piii(x)
wi
is lower and
piii(x)+pi
e
ji(x)
wi
is higher as shown above.
Proposition 1 implies that the any CEO at the exporting firms earn higher income that
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the CEOs at the domestic firms and the workers. Now consider any individual with x > xeji.
After the changes in τji, the income gap between him and all the individuals below xeji will
be wider. This directly implies that the income share for all the individuals with x > xeji
will be higher if τji is lower, and thus p∗ can be computed as the survial function of the
human capital distribution:
p∗ = 100× (1− F (xeji)) = 100× (eλx
e
ji)
B.4.4 Proof of Proposition 4
FDI Profits The profits earned from FDI to the foreign country, divided by local wage, is:
pifji(x)
wi
=
Hj
wi
(
Pj
wj
− 1

)−1
Ai(x)
−1 − gji.
From the FDI cutoff condition, we know
Hj
wi
(
Pj
wj
− 1

)−1
Ai(x
f
ji)
−1 =
Hj
wi
(
Pj
τjiwi
− 1

)−1
Ai(x
f
ji)
−1 + (gji − fji),
Hj
wi
(
Pj
wj
− 1

)−1
=
[
fji
Ai(x
f
ji)
−1
Ai(xeji)
−1 + gji − fji
]
1
Ai(x
f
ji)
−1 .
Therefore
pifji(x)
wi
= fjie
(−1)(x−xeji) + (gji − fji)e(−1)(x−x
f
ji) − gji.
This profit-to-wage ratio decreases with xfji:
∂
pifji(x)
wi
∂xfji
= e(−1)(x−x
f
ji)(gji − fji)(1− ) < 0.
B.5 A Model for the CEO Market
In this section we extend the benchmark model to allow for a labor market for CEOs,
and an endogenously-determined CEO compensation function. The model here closely
follows the work of Gabaix and Landier (2008). The key message of the extended model
is, as long as the CEO contributes to the productivity of the firm, the equilibrium compen-
sation function will satisfy the key assumptions that were used to exogenously define the
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compensation functions in the benchmark model.
Instead of allowing the individuals to create firms, we start by assuming that there ex-
ists a continuum of potential firms with different innate productivity, denoted and indexed
by φ ∈ Φ, where Φ is a subset of real numbers. A firm needs to hire a CEO in order
to operate. A potential CEO comes from the pool of candidates who are differentiated by
their human capital x. The distribution of x follows the same exponential distribution as in
the benchmark model. The final productivity of the firm depends on both the innate pro-
ductivity of the firm, and the ability of the CEO. Following the notation of the benchmark
model, the final productivity of the firm is:
A(φ, x) = φ · b · ex,
where b denotes the TFP of the country. CEO receives compensation k from the firm. The
compensation as a function of talent, k(x), will be determined in equilibrium. Following
the notation of the benchmark model, the profit of the firm in this extension can be written
as:
pi(φ, x) = H˜A(φ, x)−1 − fw − k(x),
where H˜ describes the size of the markets to which the firm has access:
H˜ =
H

P −1w−
(

− 1
)1−
.
When the firm determines which CEO to hire, it takes the market price of talent, k(x)
as given. The first order condition of the firm is:
H˜(− 1)A(φ, x)A(φ, x)′ = k′(x)
which is essentially balancing the benefit of hiring a slightly better CEO with the extra cost
of doing so. The solution to the differential equation of k′(x) is:
k(x) = H˜b(− 1)
∫ ∞
x
φ(x)ex(−1)dx+ C, (B.14)
where φ(x) : R → Φ is the equilibrium mapping between CEO with talent x and the
firm with productivity φ. C is the integration constant, which can be pinned down by the
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outside option of the least talented CEO, x:
C = xw.
It is impossible to exactly solve equation (B.14) without specifying the functional form
of φ(x). However, without a closed-form solution we can still establish a couple of prop-
erties of k(x). Gabaix and Landier (2008) characterized k(x) by re-mapping x and φ into
sequential indices, and utilizing an approximate spacing function of x. Specifically, they
showed that equation (B.14) can approximately obtain a closed form solution if x follows
an exponential distribution, up to a slowly varying function. Their key insights are two-
folds. First, efficient market implies that in equilibrium there must be assortative matching
between firms and CEOs, and thus φ(x) must be monotonically increasing in x. This implies
that k(x) must be monotonically increasing in x as well. Further more, when x follows an
exponential distribution, the spacing function of x is regularly varying. This implies that
in equilibrium, k(x) must be regularly varying as well.
The arguments above establish that in equilibrium, the endogenously-determined k(x)
must be 1) monotonically increasing in x, and 2) regularly varying in x. These two results
are precisely the assumptions that we made in the benchmark model, where k(x) is ex-
ogenously imposed on the market. Moreover, it shows that even if we separate CEOs and
founders, and model the market between CEO talents and firms, the end result in terms of
the compensation scheme and matching pattern, will not change.
B.6 Calibration
The measure of population are computed following the method in Caselli (2005). The
computation is based on Penn World Table 7.0, and all undefined variable names in italics
are the standard variable names in PWT. We first compute real GDP in year t, Yt, as
Yt = popt · rgdplt .
The number of workers, Lt, is backed out by
Lt = Yt/rgdpwokt .
This raw measure of the stock of work-force is first adjusted by human capital. Using
years of school attainment for both males and females 25 years old and above from Barro
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and Lee (2010), we construct human capital ht as
ht = e
φ(ct),
where ct is the years of schooling and φ(ct) is piece-wise linear:
φ(ct) =

0.134 ∗ c if ct ≤ 4
0.134 ∗ 4 + 0.101 ∗ (ct − 4) if 4 < ct ≤ 8
0.134 ∗ 4 + 0.101 ∗ 4 + 0.068 ∗ (ct − 8) if 8 < ct
.
Because the year of schooling data are only available at five-year intervals, linear inter-
polation is used to fill in the gap years. ct is a slow-moving variable; therefore, linear
interpolation can provide reasonably smooth estimations.
To construct the stock of physical capital in each year, we first compute investment in
each year as
It = Yt ∗ kit/100,
and then back out the initial capital stock using perpetual inventory method. We assume
that capital and output grow at the same rate, and the depreciation rate is 6 percent per
year. The initial capital stock when t = 0 is
K0 = I0/(gk + 0.06),
where gk is the average growth rate of GDP in the first 10 years of data. Given the initial
capital stock, the sequence of capital stock in year t is computed as
Kt = (1− 0.06)Kt−1 + It.
With a computed sequence of physical capital, the final measure of population year t,
nt, is computed as
nt = K
a
t (htLt)
1−a,
where a = 1/3. The number of n used in the benchmark calibration is the average between
1988 and 2008.
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APPENDIX C
Chapter III Supporting Material
C.1 Additional Tables
Table C.1: Makes in Sales Volume Data
Acura Honda Nissan
Alfa Romeo Hyundai Porsche
Audi Infiniti Ram
BMW Jaguar Saab
Buick Jeep Scion
Cadillac Kia Smart
Chevrolet Land Rover Subaru
Chrysler Lexus Suzuki
Dodge Lincoln Tesla
Fiat Mazda Toyota
Ford Mercedes-Benz Volkswagen
GMC Mini Volvo
Mitsubishi
Note: Data come from Ward’s Automotive. We exclude Mercury from the dataset because it was
discontinued in January 2011, the first month of our analysis.
154
Table C.2: Automakers in Stock Price Data
Automaker (Holding Company) Ticker
BMW BAMXY:US
Daimler (Mercedes-Benz) DDAIY:US
Ford F:US
Fiat-Chrysler FCAU:US
Fuji-Subaru FUJHY:US
General Motors GM:US
Honda HMC:US
Mazda MZDAY:US
Nissan NSANY:US
Toyota TM:US
Tesla TSLA:US
Tata Motors (Jaguar and Land Rover) TTM:US
Volkswagen Group VLKAY:US
Note: Stock prices for automakers come from Bloomberg. Ford, General Motors, and Tesla are
listed on U.S. stock exchanges; all remaining prices come from American Depository Receipts.
Sample restricted to companies that sell light vehicles in the United States.
Table C.3: Makes in Twitter Data
Acura Honda Mini
Audi Hyundai Mitsubishi
BMW Infiniti Nissan
Buick Jaguar Porsche
Cadillac Jeep Ram
Chevrolet Kia Scion
Chrysler Land Rover Smart
Dodge Lexus Subaru
Fiat Lincoln Toyota
Ford Mazda Volkswagen
GMC Mercedes-Benz Volvo
Note: Data come from Networked Insights.
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C.2 Robustness
In this appendix, we first show that our treatment of Mini as a non-German make in
the baseline specification does not drive our results. Next, we document that the results
are very similar to the baseline, when we use different control groups, and in a number of
alternative econometric specifications.
C.2.1 Classification of Mini
Table C.4: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales Growth, Robustness – Mini
German vs. Non-German Manufacturers, Excl. VW Group
Dependent Variable 12-month Log Sales Growth
Treatment of Mini
Baseline
(non-German)
Exclude
Include as
German
(1) (2) (3)
German × Post-Scandal -0.104 -0.105 -0.111
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Make Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.292 0.294 0.293
N 2150 2082 2150
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Standard errors clustered at vehicle make level in parentheses. Volkswagen Group
(Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche) excluded from all regressions. Volkswagen emissions scandal
dated September 18, 2015. Sales are measured in units sold. All regressions include a constant,
make and time fixed effects, and are weighted by the square root of sales volumes. Data come
from Ward’s Automotive.
In our country classification of car makes, we include Mini—a company with historical
roots in Britain that is now owned by BMW—as a non-German make. Our classification
is supported by BMW board member Peter Schwarzenbauer, who told Reuters in a 2017
interview that the “brand being perceived as British, that’s important... Most people don’t
know where the cars are produced” (Pitas (2017)). This focus on the country of brand
association rather than the country of production or ownership drives our baseline classi-
fication choice. Nonetheless, we show here that this choice does not impact our results.
Column (2) of table C.4 excludes Mini from the analysis altogether; the resulting estimate
of a 10.5 percentage point decline in non-VW German car sales growth hardly changes
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from the baseline. Classifying Mini as a German make through its ownership by BMW in
column (3) of table C.4 leads to an estimated decline of 11.1 percentage points, which is
also similar to the baseline result in column (1).
C.2.2 Alternative Control Groups
Our baseline estimates of the scandal’s spillovers use all non-German makes as the
control group. Here, we vary the control group along two dimensions to investigate the
stability of our baseline results. First, we partition the control group along one specific
country-of-origin dimension, and then along a “more or less expensive”-dimension.
Column (2) of table C.5 shows that using only foreign automakers as the control group
(i.e., excluding U.S. makes altogether) leads to a growth decline estimate of 12.0 percent-
age points for non-VW German car makers. Using only U.S. makes as the control group
(i.e., excluding non-U.S. non-German makes altogether), we find a 8.8 percentage point
decline in column (3). These estimated effects are both similar to the baseline result of a
10.4 percentage point decline in column (1).
Table C.5: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales Growth, Robustness – Control Group, Country
German vs. Non-German Manufacturers, Excl. VW Group
Dependent Variable 12-month Log Sales Growth
Control Group Makes
Baseline
(non-German)
non-German
non-U.S.
U.S.
(1) (2) (3)
German Manuf. × Post-Scandal -0.104 -0.120 -0.088
(0.035) (0.036) (0.040)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Make Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.292 0.313 0.360
N 2150 1402 952
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Standard errors clustered at vehicle make level in parentheses. Volkswagen Group
(Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche) excluded from all regressions. Volkswagen emissions scandal
dated September 18, 2015. Sales are measured in units sold. All regressions include a constant,
make and time fixed effects, and are weighted by the square root of sales volumes. Data come
from Ward’s Automotive.
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We next split the control group into more and less expensive non-German makes in ta-
ble C.6. To construct the two control groups, we first calculate a sales-weighted average of
the MSRPs across models for each make in 2015. We then partition the makes by whether
their average MSRP is above or below the median non-German average MSRP, approxi-
mately $33,000. The treatment group continues to be defined as the three non-VW German
automakers. Smart’s average MSRP is below $33,000, while BMW’s and Mercedes-Benz’s
are above. For comparison, VW’s average MSRP is also below the median. When the con-
trol group consists of the more expensive makes, as in column (2), we estimate an 8.2
percentage point decline in the sales growth of non-VW German makes. When the control
group consists of the less expensive makes, as in column (3), we estimate an 11.3 percent-
age point decline. These estimated declines narrowly span our baseline estimate of a 10.4
percentage-point decline that we report in column (1).
Table C.6: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales Growth, Robustness – Control Group, Price
German vs. Non-German Manufacturers, Excl. VW Group
Dependent Variable 12-month Log Sales Growth
Control Group Makes
Baseline
(non-German)
More Expensive
non-German
Less Expensive
non-German
(1) (2) (3)
German Manuf. × Post-Scandal -0.104 -0.082 -0.113
(0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Make Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.292 0.318 0.311
N 2150 1098 1210
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Standard errors clustered at vehicle make level in parentheses. Volkswagen Group
(Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche) excluded from all regressions. Volkswagen emissions scandal
dated September 18, 2015. Sales are measured in units sold. All regressions include a constant,
make and time fixed effects, and are weighted by the square root of sales volumes. Data come
from Ward’s Automotive.
C.2.3 Alternative Econometric Specifications
We show here that our difference-in-differences estimates are not sensitive to several
alternative econometric specifications. Throughout the paper, we have weighted obser-
vations by the square root of the make’s monthly sales volume. Column (2) of table C.7
shows that our choice to weight the observations leads to a conservative estimate of the
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spillovers: the unweighted estimate of the sales growth decline is 15 percentage points.
Moreover, instead of natural log-differences, in column (3) we consider mid-point growth
rates, where the change in sales volume between period t and period t − 12 is divided by
the average level of sales of the two periods. The estimated effect of the scandal on the
German auto manufacturers under this alternative measure is a 10.6 percentage point de-
cline in the sales growth rate, which is similar to the baseline result in column (1). Finally,
column (4) shows that including make-specific linear time trends in addition to the make
and time fixed effects of the baseline specification again yields a similar result.
Table C.7: U.S. Light Vehicle Sales Growth, Robustness – Econometrics
German vs. Non-German Manufacturers, Excl. VW Group
Dependent Variable 12-month Log Sales Growth
Specification Baseline Unweighted Mid Point
Make-
specific
Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
German Manuf. × Post-Scandal -0.104 -0.150 -0.106 -0.112
(0.035) (0.057) (0.035) (0.044)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Make Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Make-Specific Linear Time Trends No No No Yes
R2 0.292 0.130 0.310 0.397
N 2150 2150 2150 2150
Note: Unit of observation is vehicle make-month. Time period covered is January 2011 to
August 2016. Standard errors clustered at vehicle make level in parentheses. Volkswagen Group
(Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche) excluded from all regressions. Volkswagen emissions scandal
dated September 18, 2015. Sales are measured in units sold. All regressions include a constant
and are weighted by the square root of sales volumes. Regressions in columns (1) through
(3) include make and time fixed effects. The regression in column (4) includes, in addition,
make-specific linear time trends. Data come from Ward’s Automotive.
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